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ABSTRACT
As a study exclusively on the political elites, the dissertation studies the Chinese regional
leaders and their political career mobility controlled by the central government from 1949 to
2010. The Chinese Communist Party controls its regional leaders by controlling their career
movement (political mobility). This study explains why some regional leaders were promoted
while some others were demoted or dismissed while most of them shared similar personal
background and career experience. By providing empirical evidence with quantitative analysis,
this study shows that in post-Deng Chinese politics (1997-2010) there are certain patterns and
manipulated by the CCP center in demoting and dismissing its regional leaders in order to
improve the party’s overall ruling legitimacy. Many China watchers have ignored the fact that
socioeconomic development among different Chinese regions is highly uneven yet has the
government found any efficient solution. The conflicts of interests between a regional
government and the central government of China may have caused different economic outcomes.
Meanwhile, the political importance of a region in China can be evaluated through the center’s
fiscal indicators. Last but not least, sustainable economic growth and regional governments’
financial conditions are among the decisive factors that determine regional leaders’ political
mobility in the future under the party-state political system.
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INTRODUCTION
“His fellow villagers asked: ‘It was planned by the meat-eaters, what it is for you to
remonstrate with?’
Cao Gui replied: ‘Meat-eaters are little learning; they are not far-sighted.’
Thus, he was shown in (to the Duke).”
---- “The Duke of Zhuang, Year 10,”
The Chronicles of Zuo (circa 4th Century BC)

It can be rather complicated to analyze the phenomena of Chinese politics in which most
outcomes are exclusively determined by its leaders rather than by the people. No matter if they
are Standing Committee members of the Politburo or the Communist Party officials in a midsized city of a quarter million people, they are names that are being mentioned, and faces that are
being publicized everyday on the media. On the other hand, they are personalities that are very
much unknown to the people. One might frequently be wondering: who are they? What are they
like? And the most important of all, how have they become who they are?
From every aspect, voting or the holding of elections is not likely to become a regular part
of most Chinese’s political life in the near future. However, in a bureaucracy as large as the
Chinese government that governs more than 1.3 billion people and a set of institutions, there are
certain techniques, channels, principles, mechanisms, or even hints or signs that outside
observers can use to make somewhat close predications about political mobility, personnel
arrangements, successions and appointments. And the political career movements in the future
among regional Chinese governmental officials are greatly affected by these leaders’ leadership
experiences and performances.
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A. Why Regional Leaders in China Are Important?
Unlike in the United States, where a state and its administration are much more
independent of the federal government, regional leaders in China serve as agents of the
ultimately powerful central government, and enjoy their power as regional leaders in a much
more different way. In most open political systems, successions or appointments of officials or
politicians can be polled or surveyed through more public and transparent means; such issues, as
they affect many people’s everyday life, can be (and mostly will be) debated or discussed more
openly with the press and the public. However, in Chinese politics, and to most Chinese, the
mobility of political elites has not yet become an open topic, nor does it seem likely to become
on in the near future. Rather, it is most discreet for open discussion. Discreet, it is; but it is also
quite common and popular in private conversations. My father often recalls that his friends and
he frequently enjoyed studying the appearance orders of senior Party officials (most were CCP
politburo members) on the People’s Daily’s front-page coverage of major political events back
to his teenage years in the Cultural Revolution. That was how they “discovered” numerous
political facts simply by thoroughly reading the contexts hidden under the front pages.
Compared to decades ago, everything today in China is no longer that secretive. Now if
one turns on one’s TV every evening, one may easily find that Chinese regional political leaders
(both provincial and municipal) are being massively exposed to public scrutiny by allowing
government-operated media coverage of their social and political activities days and nights. It
has already become the norm that the headlines on one’s daily evening news hour start with the
headlines of what the political elites are engaged in during the working hours of the day.
However, what fascinates me, as well as many others, is not what the elites are doing now, but
how much of what they are doing now can affect their next move. In other words, hardly does
2

any higher ranking party or governmental official stay in one position for more than a few years;
either they are moved up or they are carried down, or they restart with something similar but
definitely not the same.
Overall, Chinese regional leaders are among a small groups of decision makers whose
decisions have been changing peoples’ lives and reshaping politics among local governments and
the center. Individually, a regional leader, for instance, a party boss of a province or a deputy
leader of a provincial people’s congress, cannot be compared to any of the central leaders; a
central leader is far more influential and powerful and controls a great deal of resources. But
collectively, as there are hundreds of them, Chinese regional leaders are executors of the center’s
policies and regulations. Without sufficient and positive support from local governments, it is
hardly true that any of the center’s policy or important decision can be practiced or executed
effectively.
B. Why Study the Political Mobility of Regional Leaders?
A monarch is usually born to be one, a U.S. President is usually elected to be one, but a
regional leader in China is usually orchestrated to replace his or her predecessor. The
professional trajectories of Chinese regional leaders can be very interesting yet mysterious in
many ways. Their promotions and demotions can be “predictable” in terms of their age, gender,
nationality, education, factions, and previous engagements in the political system. Yet, speaking
of their capability, performance, opportunities and arrangements, their future can also be
“unexpected”. Such arrangements are always originated from the organization (zuzhi) which
represents the Chinese Communist Party; but what factors the organization considers in order
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making its final decisions on nominating and appointing a regional leader are the key elements
that the study here tries to identify.
Among all the challenges and opportunities encountered in contemporary China, the
core question is still about its politics. Has it changed through the years? How much it has
changed toward more transparency and openness? And where is it going in the 21st century?
Surely not all of these questions can be thoroughly studied and resolved in this dissertation.
However, I intend to make my contributions to answering these questions by studying the
patterns of political career mobility of China’s regional leaders. This is the very subject that
needs to be studied and analyzed to explain a series of socioeconomic phenomena ongoing in
contemporary Chinese society. By unveiling the pattern of regional leaders’ political mobility in
post-Deng Xiaoping era, it is likely that most new socioeconomic changes taking places in China
are helping the country to move forward. It is also obvious to all Chinese and China watchers,
however, that it still has a very long way to go.
Today’s regional leaders of China will very likely become the central leaders of China
in the future. The author assumes that by making an empirical analysis of Chinese regional
leaders’ political mobility, we could establish a descriptive political mobility model that reveals
leadership trajectories in Chinese politics.
C. Variables and Hypotheses

The relationship between the Center and the localities has undergone significant reforms
ever since Deng Xiaoping became the leader of China. Since the abolition of the six
administrative regions in the mid-1950s, the most important administrative levels have been the
4

provincial and the municipal. Unlike some other communist states (e.g. the former Soviet Union),
the People’s Republic of China has always been a unitary multinational state.
Below the provinces and the administrative equivalents, there is a three-level
administrative network of (a) prefectures, (b) counties and cities, and (c) townships and districts.
The prefecture does not constitute a level of political power, and therefore does not operate local
People’s Congresses and People’s Governments. Instead, prefectures have agencies,
administrative commissioners and their deputies, who are not elected but are appointed by the
higher levels.
In the dissertation, I intend to answer the following core questions:
a. What are the patterns of regional elite political mobility in post-Deng Xiaoping’s China?
b. What are the factors that affect elite mobility and its consequences?
c. How have political mobility issues affected leaders’ decision-making? How can the
outcomes be used to explain political phenomena in contemporary China?
Taking these questions into consideration, then, the dissertation will assess these
following factors:
Independent variables:
i. Geographic characteristics: (a) regions, provinces and cities in which leaders work, (b)
demographic characteristics: size of a region scaled by its population, (c) economic
importance of this region.

5

ii. Biological factors of the sampled Chinese regional leaders: (a) distribution of sex, age,
and nationality; and (b) correlation between the province and city in which they were
born and the province and city in which they later serve as regional leaders.
iii. Educational background: (a) educational level, (b) major field and other professional
training experiences, (c) alumni and other social connections.
iv. Career and recruitment patterns: (a) major career pattern; (b) work experiences in
different organizations (e.g., party, government administration, military, the Youth
League); (c) work experiences in different fields (e.g., industry, agriculture, military,
propaganda); (d) work experiences at different levels (grass-roots, bureau/county/district,
municipal); (e) initial year of party membership; (f) year of assuming office as mayor;
and (g) the most recent previous position. In the following section, we will first present
our findings in these three broad areas and compare characteristics of mayoral elites with
those of elites at different levels. Then we will explore the correlation among variables by
the application of regressions and coefficients. The final section is a discussion on the
implications of these findings.
The hypotheses are:
a. Advantages in professional experiences and personal connections, in terms of helping
leaders get promoted, can be greater than advantages of educational and professional
trainings.
b. The center has its regional preferences when determining a regional leader’s political
mobility. Regional leaders who work in the more developed regions of China more
frequently receive promotions than do leaders who work in less developed regions with
weaker economic scale.
6

c. In the post-Deng Xiaoping era, leaders who are demoted or dismissed (downward
political mobility) for actual causes (corruptions and violations) instead of purely
political accusations. We expect to find some patterns in studying the downward political
mobility among Chinese regional leaders in from 1990s to 2000s.
d. The empirical research of the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders will also have
its theoretical contribution in studying post-communist authoritarian regimes and their
elite. Regional leaders of China in the post-Deng era tend to be more technocratic. They
behave more like regular bureaucrats and less like revolutionaries; thus, central
government’s selections are becoming more and more general, rational, and technical.
Better understanding of the regime and the elite in China will constructively improve our
understanding of Chinese government and political economy.
D. Regional Leaders’ Political Mobility as the Outcome
The Chinese Communist Party is no longer the party it was when it came to power. A
new generation of leaders whose socialization, educational background, and political
experience differ significantly from those of the old elite has risen to high positions. China
has opened up since Deng Xiaoping’s “going out” reform of the late 1970s. Limited by the topic
of my discussion, this study will not preview every aspect of contemporary social and political
changes in China. To those who are interested, to begin with the analysis of Chinese leaders is a
much more practical approach that a series of indicators can be used to unveil some of the most
important political phenomena taking place in China. After more than 30 years of effort of
installing private entrepreneurships and a market economy, the economic life of Chinese has
been deeply and widely capitalized, globalized and internationalized. In 2010 alone, China was
active in the G20 summit, surpassed Japan to be the largest economy in Asia, and was criticized
7

by the U.S. Congress and Obama administration for adjusting the renminbi exchange rates to
overcome the global recession. Without the economic reform of the past few decades, most of
these events listed above likely would not have taken place in China. Still, it is a fact that some
fundamental changes in political life are more crucial for China to maintain a sustainable
economic growth and to regain the balance between economic achievements and lagging
environmental and social developments. To have most of these issued eased and problems solved,
the authorities and political leaders in China must play more efficient roles to make the right
choices for the people. Therefore, a great number of intrinsic changes, if not from the outside,
need to be put on the government’s agenda. As the great transformation was initiated by China’s
leaders, it is what the people say in China, the one who tied the bell shall be the one who unties it.
Here, the study attempts to combine the analysis of Chinese regional leaders both
individually and collectively based on their characteristics as suitable candidates for certain
leadership posts and the opportunities they have been given based on their training, experiences
and previous working locations. However, new conditions also pose new obstacles and new
issues. The problems that confront the country now are not the ones that confronted it years ago.
The dilemmas faced by China's new leaders are (1) how to decentralize economic initiative to
microeconomic units while retaining some form of macroeconomic control, (2) how to
increase functional efficiency while maintaining political control; and (3) how to continue their
elitist orientation while legitimizing their governance. This study attempts to explore these
issues by analyzing Chinese elites, especially those Chinese regional leaders who came to power
in the post-Deng Xiaoping era. Studies of the social background and career patterns of elites
must always be viewed with caution. It is hard to know what these characteristics explain about
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concrete political behavior. Situational variables, be they international, bureaucratic, or resource
constraints, may effectively strip elites of choice.
Despite of the decentralizing authority with resilient legitimacy of the CCP center since
the late 1970s and especially the post-Deng Xiaoping era, there are enduring peculiarities in
China’s mobility regime related to its political and economic institutions1. There should be no
doubt that the center controls the mobility of its regional leaders in order to consolidate its
authority in contemporary Chinese political economy but not to have itself weakened by the
socioeconomic changes through the years. As for the regional leaders, besides one’s educational
background, political credentials are important factors for leaders to build up to more powerful
posts in the system. Social background and career patterns in the aggregate also do not tell us
much about creative acts of the political leadership that aim to reshape patterns of political
preferences within a polity, or about the individual psychological dimensions of key leaders that
may significantly influence policy making. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the
linkage between the characteristics of regional political elites in China today and the broader
patterns of societal change. There is no doubt that the political elite has changed dramatically.
Broader social trends are emerging that are closely related to the leadership transformation.
We have focused on the implications of elite transformation for the issues of economic locality
and political mobility as they signal emerging trends. Therefore, the possible correlations that
will be discovered in this study can also help us find out not only the career patterns for Chinese
regional leaders, but also the intrinsic political changes adapted by the Communist party and the
possible directions China’s political system is heading in the near future.

1

Pierre F. Landry. Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the
Post-Mao Era (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.3-9. Also, Andrew J. Nathan.
“Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy, 14(1)(January 2003), pp.15-16.
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E. Data and Method
Because very little has been released by the Chinese government from its massive
confidential archives, the study relies mostly on unclassified and published materials from
Chinese state-owned media and news press. Another noticeable trend over the past 20 to 30 years
in China, in terms of political transparency, is that information about Chinese politicians and
political leaders has become more and more accessible to the public. Details about Deputy
Chairman Lin Biao’s failed coup against Chairman Mao Zedong were not released to the media
after nearly a year after Lin Biao’s plane crash in Mongolia in September 19712. Now with
telecommunication and the Internet, news about Chinese leaders travels at a much more vibrant
speed; it has been awfully difficult for the governmental officials to cover up sensitive
information once it has been known.
This study focuses on important personnel arrangements and changes which happened
in 2000s, and to compares them both with those of Mao’s era (1950s and 1960s) and Deng’s era
(1980s and 1990s). The state-run press, such as Xinhua news agency and the People’s Daily, has
relevant information on such subject, but scrambled by different dates and issues. Both Xinhua
and the People’s Daily’s releases of the leaders’ biographical information is considered the
official version. The Communist Party of China has its own website that publishes official news
of personnel changes in multiple languages (http://cpc.people.com.cn/). Other popular and
reliable Chinese search engines and webhosts, such as sina.com, sohu.com, and china.com also
publish relevant information periodically. Regional leaders’ personal information and profiles
have been collected and categorized through these resources. Economic data are accessible by
2

Federick C. Teiwes. “Mao Zedong in Power (1949-1976),” in William A. Joseph ed. Politics in China (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.89-91. Also, in Ezra F. Vogel. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China
(Cambridge, M.A.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), p.60.
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accessing the websites of China’s National Bureau of Statistics (http://www.stats.gov.cn/) and
the Ministry of Finance (http://www.mof.gov.cn/), and other relevant official resources listed in
the footnotes. In addition, each and every county, municipal and provincial government and CCP
party organization has its own website that posts biographical information about particular
leaders’ profiles and its regional economic reports. Above all, this study relies on officially
published news resources in both Chinese and English of China, the U.S. and other countries.

11

CHAPTER ONE
CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

People are always interested in their leaders. It does not matter if a leader was born to
lead one’s people whose loyalty to their leader comes genuinely, or if a self-made leader who has
worked his way from the very bottom to the very top of the bureaucracy whose power comes
from one’s position and current ranking inside the bureaucracy, outsiders often attempt to make
certain judgments about their leadership and are curious to find out more about their political life.
And as time goes by, such curiosity somehow only grows stronger and stronger.3
Regional leaders usually are not yet the world leaders whose names and faces are known
to many others in the world. Moreover, the majority of regional leaders will never become the
top leaders of their nations and countries. This does not lower, however, the political importance
of regional leaders compared to their national or central leaders; it only makes regional leaders
more important to people who live under their regional leadership, as regional leaders are those
who get involved in specific local affairs and make particular decisions that actually affect
people’s life in a much more direct way than any of the world leaders. Still, we the people expect
no less from our regional leaders compared to the national leaders. We expect our leaders to be
capable, wise, decisive, as well as moral.4
In terms of their responsibilities and engagements of regional people’s livelihood,
Chinese regional leaders have always been a crucial part in Chinese politics. They are the most
responsible for carrying out central government’s policies, applying its laws to the locals, and
3

Numerous public opinion rankings and polls have been published from time to time on the U.S. Presidents.
Surveyors like to ask interviewees to rank all the presidents from George Washington to Barrack Obama, even no
one has had the chance to live under both of the presidencies but are still asked to make comparisons based on their
impressions and opinions on American presidency.
4
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keeping all the institutions functioning. Meanwhile, they have also served as the primary and the
main channel for the feedbacks on each of the center’s decisions. Chinese regional leaders
should to some extent, if they have not been doing so, also represent the interests of the regions
they govern. In other words, regional leaders bear great expectations from both the center and the
people. It seems to be a difficult task to handle, yet who handles it well gets mobilized upward in
the bureaucracy and enjoys more power.
Before we start to explore the subject of the political mobility of Chinese political elites,
we must keep in mind that regional leaders’ power come from the center rather than the people.
In Chinese history, China has been a highly centralized state. Historically, the State was divided
into different administrative regions, later labeled as provinces and municipalities, done not so
much to serve its people better but rather to serve its ruler more efficiently. It is acknowledged to
scholars that the earliest formation of administrative regions in China, later were addressed as
provinces and counties, was initiated by the emperor to appoint his men to govern these regions
under his commands rather than having the land distributed to high ranking aristocracies who
might build their own military forces and demand much more power from the emperor.5 Thus,
for centuries, absolute loyalty to the emperor was the primary requirement for a bureaucrat who
was appointed as a regional leader in China. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China in 1949, such loyalty to emperor had been replace by the loyalty to the Chinese
Communist Party. The CCP has had a considerable capacity to monitor individuals and control
access to prestigious governmental posts around the country. Governors and provincial party
chiefs since then have been appointed by the CCP’s central leadership without campaigns and
elections. Thus, the means adapted by the center to select its regional leaders is of great
5
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importance for scholars to unveil the facts about regional leaders and their careers; also, which
factor(s) would play the decisive role in determining a regional leader’s career is what the author
intend to discover in the study.
Hence, the first chapter of the study tries to answer these questions by examining the
previous literature on the subject. What have we known about Chinese regional leaders and
career mobility? What have been bypassed or forgotten in the studies on these regional leaders?
What is it that we need find out by studying the regional leaders in China in the post-Deng
Xiaoping era compared to that of Mao’s era and Deng’s era? Consequently, the chapter is
divided into three different parts: first, a literature review of previous scholarly research; second,
an introduction to regional governance in China as related to the issues raised and analyzed by
the study; third, a general description of contemporary Chinese regional leaders, their leaderships,
their roles in Chinese politics, and the meaningfulness of the case selection.
A. Studies on Chinese Regional Leaders and Their Careers
1. The Importance of Regional Leaderships in China
Generally speaking, one of the significant characteristics of Chinese politics, as in any
authoritarian regime, is that the Communist party is closely tied to all governmental
organizations. Therefore, the Party and all the organizations together make the entire Chinese
bureaucracy. China's government is a one-party system with minimal popular participation;
success therefore depends on the energy and ideas of its leaders. Historically, there was no
middle-class in China. The ancient regime that the emperor ruled the country by appointing
bureaucrats to run the massive bureaucracy was popularly supported by China’s nationwide
landed elites and contracted farmhands known as peasants. The vast proportion of land elites
14

came from retired bureaucrats who previously served in the government. Therefore, regional
political elites had relied on the central government’s support and authority in keeping their
status quo in socioeconomic and political affairs.6 While, on the other hand, the central leader(s)
would be satisfied with the situation that regional elites can make some autonomous decisions
over local issues, their power would be as limited by the center to prevent local leaders from
overpowering the center with local affairs.7 Thus, the possible dilemma which China’s central
leaders often have to face is not having their power decentralized, but also having it be too
centralized, going beyond their capacity. 8
Hence, administrative regions in China had served a very important political function in
terms of maintaining a stable politic order nationwide; the regions are the main resources of
taxations for the center’s revenues. Thus, some scholars argue that regional and provincial
governments, especially as regional development has made significant gains in the economic
reform initiated in the late 1970s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, have been
decentralizing the central government’s control over economic sectors, constantly lobbying the
top leaders of China to extract preferable policies for their regions and to gain more economic
interests or policy benefits by lobbying the central leaders. 9 As important policy decisionmaking processes rarely involve regional leaders but as discussed and decided by the central
leaders, provincial leaders have tried to influence the final policy outcomes by stressing the
6
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importance of their provinces to the national economy. On the contrary, the central leadership
has autonomy from parochial interests in many fields; central leaders should always consider the
national interests ahead of the interests of a small region where a limited number of people
would be beneficiaries of a certain policy. Whereas variations in policy implementation are
needed to adapt to specific local conditions, policy choices are made ultimately toward
maximizing China’s national interests.10
Furthermore, scholars also find that such balance of power between the center and its
regional leaders has existed since Mao Zedong’s era. One of the significant outcomes of the
leadership battles over provincial posts was the disastrous change took place in mid-1960s, when
most provincial leaders had stabilized their posts and power and Mao himself felt unsecure about
his personal leadership over the regional leaders. In 1967, nearly 81percent of incumbent
provincial leaders were removed.11 As provincial party chiefs and governors were purged and
removed from their leadership positions during the Cultural Revolution, regional governance fell
into chaotic situations where mass rebel groups took over regional governments by claiming they
had mastered the truth of Maoist Thoughts and that regional leaders had become the bourgeoisie
opposed to people’s government and Mao himself. Such violent and drastic changes in regional
leaderships destroyed the provincial governmental and party institutions and crushed regional
leaders’ political careers, sometimes even their personal livelihoods. Though the beginning years
of the Cultural Revolution (which is commonly reckoned to have lasted from 1966-1976) were
brutal to provincial leaders’ career mobility, the provincial leadership of the main Cultural
Revolution period was more stable as nearly all of them kept their positions in the government
and the party. It is commonly understood that the Cultural Revolution caused political purges of
10
11
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16

Chinese leaders from the center to municipalities, but scholars argue that in fact it was the most
stable period for provincial leaders’ career because the victims of the Cultural Revolution had
already been removed in 1967 and those who survived the purges had entered into provincial
leadership positions after 1967 and were able to keep their jobs until the Cultural Revolution was
over. 12 Thus, after the disastrous change of regional leaderships, the rest of the leaders continued
their political careers due to their loyalty to Mao and his Cultural Revolution.
Besides playing important roles in making economic strategies and maintaining the
balance of power in the conflict between China’s central leadership and regional leadership,
scholars have also argued that regions in China are becoming more and more important in the
country’s great transformation from a developing country to modernization and industrialization.
Historically, provinces have been under the center’s direct leadership as it was they who have
defined the importance of China’s administrative regions. Urbanization is one of the most
prominent indicators of a country’s degree of modernization; while industrialization also caused
massive immigration spurred by investments and working opportunities. Therefore, ever since
the economic reform started three decades ago, coastal areas in China, especially cities and
townships where factories and manufacturing plants are located, have become more and more
important as the nation’s economic engine and samples of urbanization. Hence, governing the
newly urbanized cities and industrial areas have become crucial not only to provincial leaders but
to the CCP center as well. The success of the market economy, private ownerships and
entrepreneurs have all become challenging issues to the CCP leadership as political recruitment
is no longer the shortcut to higher social classes. As pointed out by Li and Bachman, becoming a
mayor of a municipality has often been a “stepping stone” to other higher political posts in China,
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while under China’s reform cities have taken on a much greater importance than under Mao’s
regime. 13 Yet rapid urbanization in China has raised many new challenges to Chinese authorities
in the past few decades: environmental sustainability, exhaustion of natural resources and
community development, welfare and livelihood of the laid-off state-owned enterprises’ workers,
wages and medical cares for tens of millions of migrant workers, education for lower income
families, and the politically urgent task of dealing with the resistance and protests of citizens
against governmental policies and regulations.
Most of these issues, as they are changing rapidly from time to time, have been studied by
scholars and China watchers alike. In order to realize their interests and defend their rights,
ordinary people may need to pay higher costs, and sometimes even face state repression. Some
scholars point out that since the economic reform, individuals in China have found more social
mobility channels other than joining the government-conducted units, such transition has been
mainly positive by bringing changes to social systems and subordinate institutions charged with
social welfare provision. But to midwife a mature civil society, the transition from traditional
urban communities and their dwellers to more self-governance involves a “functional transition”
from state to community institutions, since the party-state must loosen its control over private
sectors and the private lives of the Chinese people. 14 Ascribed status is the social standing an
individual is assigned at birth or assumes by tradition or by law. The lower strata of such a status
hierarchy are often inseparable from the negative stereotypes that are associated with them. All
societies display such practices of assigning statuses based on sex, gender, race, family origins,
and ethnic differences. The Chinese household registration system (known as hukou) imposes a
13
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unique type of status based on one’s parents’ place of residence, a structural rarity across cultures.
Over time, hukou has become a deeply ingrained socio-cultural identity used by people in
constructing stereotypes. 15
In consequence, most of the issues would eventually have themselves pointing to the
regional government and its leaders. In other words, as in a highly politicized society where
governmental control has been overpowering the society and its individuals, political solutions
issued or directed by the government seems to be the most direct way of easing the tensions. As
a result, although municipal leaders are not senior enough to make all the decisions, they are also
the changing forces in Chinese politics.
By far the majority of studies on Chinese regional leaders focus on provincial party
chiefs and governors alike, but the importance of newly industrialized cities and the political
roles they are about to play somehow have been mostly unmentioned in scholarly works. Based
on the consensus report published in 2011, there are 42 cities in China having a population larger
than one million.16 Presumably, the difficulties to municipal governance brought by larger
populations can certainly be compared to that of governing a smaller province in less developed
regions in China. Therefore, in future studies on related fields and subjects, more extensive
studies on the regional differences in China, especially by comparing industrialized cities to
agricultural townships in Chinese economy and politics, deserve their scholarly attention.
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2. Regional Leaders as Elites
Studies on elites show that certain social context and institutional causes can generate a
new group of political elites who tend to have more unified interests due to such elite
integration.17 In Chinese politics, such a social context was the Communist Revolution in which
CCP revolutionaries defeated the Nationalists and became the new group of political elites in
China. The earlier mechanism used by the CCP to assign political positions to its revolutionaries
was such that the party systematically allocated career opportunities according to the political
loyalty of its members. Due to high degree of organizational penetration and influential control
of educational and work institutions, the ruling communist party considers loyalty and party
membership as two of the significant requirements of a leadership post.18 Consequently, the party
is in favor of recruiting officials with loyal party membership and higher capability in leading
and governing, while the rewards for these members would be career advancement and a series
of privileges, such as higher wages, better housing options and medical care packages.
Meanwhile, educational credentials are found by scholars to be associated with increased
organizational authority, even if such authority is secondary to a leader’s loyalty to the party. In
order to achieve more privilege and higher positions, leaders are encouraged by the party to
achieve more educational credentials first. Thus, Chinese regional administrative officials whose
loyalty is high and who have outstanding educational backgrounds tend to be the elites who
enjoy more from their careers. In other words, “[i]t does not appear that intellectuals have been
on the road to class power; instead, party bureaucrats have been on the road to college.”19
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Some China watchers have argued that the Chinese government today finds it harder
than ever to attract, develop, and retain talent as some of the current cohort of regional leaders
now will be the top leaders in China in the future. Graduates from the country's top universities,
who once would have filled government posts, are instead now choosing to take jobs in the
private sector. By slowing down the political transition to open democracy and by recruiting
more talent, CCP leadership over the country is possibly declining. 20 Moreover, the structure of
the country's bureaucracy stifles initiative and promotes mediocrity. Furthermore, many officials,
from the village to the central government, are corrupt, thereby eroding the government's
effectiveness and feeding popular discontent with the system. Another argument from China
watchers contradicts the view that the entire leadership of China is facing great challenges
brought by the CCP leadership itself. Instead, they argue that contemporary regional leaders in
China collectively have become a strong political force, though individually they tend to be more
obedient to the center. However, when dealing with issues affecting regional leaders’ political
careers or their regional interests, Chinese regional leaders as a group can make the center’s
policies rather difficult to be carried out. Issues such as international environmental agreements
and an accurate renminbi exchange rate against the U.S. dollar have been pushed by the central
government as urgent policies, but have been deliberately delayed or passively pursued by
regional leaders. Thus, according to these scholars, the center’s ability to unilaterally impose its
will across China is “highly limited” due to regional political elites’ overpowering influence. 21
In addition, analysts and political reporters have also noticed that even the Chinese military
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leaders, who had been absolutely loyal to CCP’s center leadership since Mao’s era, have become
much more independent; for example, President Hu Jintao was bypassed (or delayed) in being
told the results of an important air force test flight. 22
Of all China’s challenges, the most critical one could be that of nurturing a new
generation of leaders who are capable, skilled, honest, committed to public service, and
accountable to the Chinese people as a whole. Unless China manages to produce such leaders,
the CCP and Chinese government would fail to meet the country’s challenges and its public
promises of a more prosperous and democratic future will remain unfulfilled. The difficulty that
returnees face is only one aspect of the structural problems of China's bureaucracy. Another is
that Chinese leaders must learn to deal with rapidly changing situations over many issues
throughout the country. Such adaptability can cost a leaders’ career if handled badly, but it also
provides an excellent opportunity for further promotion. Another trend in the study of Chinese
political elite mobility has been the tendency to concentrate on the mobility of much more highly
ranked Chinese leaders, especially officials ranked at the politburo level (Dickson 2003, Manion
2004, Holbig 2009, and Shin, Shan and Liu 2010). They point out that economic reform and the
installation of market economy have provided financial benefits for Chinese leaders. Bruce J.
Dickson argues against the notion that economic development is leading to political change in
China or that China’s private entrepreneurs are helping to promote democratization. Instead, they
have become partners with the ruling Chinese Communist Party to promote economic growth
while maintaining the political status quo. Thus, the Communist Party’s strategy for
incorporating China’s capitalists into the political system and the common interests, personal ties,
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and common views of the party and the private sector are creating a new form of co-existence.
Rather than being potential agents of change, China’s entrepreneurs may prove to be a key
source of support for the party’s agenda and its leaders. 23
One of the most enduring scholarly debates in the field of Chinese politics centers on
the elite political equilibrium in the Chinese Communist Party. On the one hand, some scholars
argue that Mao and other CCP leaders consistently sought to gain complete dominance over the
party. On the other hand, it has been argued that factional politics at the top produces too much
transaction cost such that no single faction can dominate. Clear historical examples can be
brought to bear to support both sides. This type of study offers a novel perspective on the debate
by taking advantage of a quantitative data set recording the biographies of all CCP Central
Committee members from the first to the 16th CCP National Congress. The data set they used has
an indicator of how influential the official heads of the CCP were within the CCP elite, as
represented by the Central Committee. Compounding the difficulty, studies also find that many
high-level officials are moved from post to post too quickly; state power is also interrelated with
economic factors and business personnel profiles.

Chinese regional leaders in the above examples were native to the county, but served in
townships other than the ones in which they were born, which is also part of a top-down
administrative strategy of the center. Some scholars argue that the rotation of CCP cadres among
different geographical areas often serves to reinforce their identification with higher levels of the
apparatus rather than with the local community. 24 It is considered a strategy used by the center
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to strengthen its ties to the local leadership groups. Many authors assert that the capacity of the
central state is weakened by decentralization and that there is an erosion of the nomenklatura
system; and some argue that the political structure in contemporary China has been transformed
from a highly effective central direction of the local cadres to the situation that the center must
try harder to coordinate its own local agents’ behavior. 25 Therefore, regional leaders’ mobility
can also function as a means to enhance the center’s influence and control over regional issues,
as well as to host a talent show for the promising cadres. For instance, the CEO of a state-owned
bank may suddenly find himself assigned to a provincial leadership position. For example,
starting as an accountant of a rural coal mine in Yunnan province, Dai Xianglong (born in 1944)
was promoted in 1985 to be vice president of the Agricultural Bank of China. Dai then in 1995
became the president of the People’s Bank of China, the top financial job in China. In 2002, Dai
was appointed as the mayor of Tianjin (the largest port of Northern China with one of the
nation’s largest Industrial and Economic Developmental Districts attached) and stayed in the
post for another 5 years until in 2008 he was appointed as the president and the party chief of the
National Council for Social Security Fund, PRC. All these ministerial posts consolidated Dai’s
experiences and reputation as one of China’s most powerful financial figures who currently
manages China’s Social Security Fund with an asset value of about ¥ 780 billion. 26 To some
degree, such promotion represents the government's hunger for talent and its willingness to put
leaders wherever they are needed. Such job-hopping, however, limits the effectiveness of leaders,
since they might have little time to learn about their positions or see their initiatives through, and
they face resistance from subordinates who know that they will soon be gone.
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Other scholars have noticed that cadre training and professional development for
regional leaders have become part of the party’s priority agenda. In order to train party officials
for their job qualifications, midcareer training is now common among regional leaders. To
improve cadre competence, CCP party schools and leadership schools have been functioning as
training institutes since Mao’s era. But in recent decades, these party schools and leadership
schools did not vanish. The training programs have been altered to fit into the new requirements
from the center; some party leadership schools even started granting advanced degrees for cadres’
midcareer training. 27 One of the major differences held by scholars asserts the Chinese and other
former Communist parties’ effective ability of adapting changes and learning from the past. For
instance, “[o]ne thing that does seem certain―both from the China case but also from the former
Soviet Union―is that stasis, nonadaptability, and inattention to change by the ruling party are a
recipe for accelerated atrophy and likely regime collapse.” 28 However, the efficiency of
vocational training offered by party schools nationwide has been doubted by other scholars.
Scholars find that in less developed regions, cadre and bureaucrat training usually is much less
useful and meaningful when compared to that in developed regions of China. As a result, poorer
vocational training has less help in cadres’ career development; though the training itself was
rather a mandatory task assigned by the party. 29
As the dominant ruling party, the CCP and its top leaders may have realized that strong,
effective and durable leadership can help the CCP overcome many of its crises. Speaking of
party leadership transitions, the transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao as the CCP General
Secretaries and Presidents of China had been made smoothly and highly predictable despite
27
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some significant personnel losses and gains (such as the replacement of Chen Liangyu, the
former Shanghai party chief, conducted by Hu in 2006, which was viewed by others as Hu’s
successful attempt to reduce former President Jiang’s influence in the party). Lower-level
officials have the opposite problem, as pointed out by other scholars (Thorton 2006 & Edin
2003). Most must work patiently inside a single area of government until they reach a relatively
senior level before they even have a chance to experience working in another ministry or bureau.
Even at the national level, it is common for directors general to have spent their entire careers
rising through the ranks of the bureaus they now lead. This further discourages risk taking and
innovation and thus creates yet another obstacle to good governance. Furthermore, the political
system, manipulated as it is by the party, encourages careerism at all levels: one Chinese study
published in 2000 found that government officials were more worried about pleasing their
superiors than serving the people. By most accounts, the central control over the provinces has
caused more resources go to those provinces that boast greater representation in the center. As a
result, the center treats central cities and other provinces differently; and central provincial
interactions are contingent on the macro-political environment.30 The Chinese party-state has the
capacity to be selectively effective, but it depends on how it defines its priorities and degrees of
importance when dealing with central and local governance issues. The center is severely
constrained in its implementation of other policies, to the detriment of famers in less developed
areas. To reduce rural poverty and farmers’ burden, thus, “the center needs to modify its
development strategy and move the issue of poverty and burden reduction to the top of its
agenda.” 31
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Overall, the contributions that previous scholarly works have made must be
acknowledged in terms of making the study of Chinese leaders and their political careers an
advanced, comprehensive, meaningful, fascinating, and both methodologically and evidentially
rich subject. Yet, the shortcomings of and deficiency existed in previous studies also must be
pointed out in order to spur further progress and advancement to the subject. First, despite
biological research and analysis on regional leaders’ personal backgrounds, the socioeconomic
and political differences existing among regional leaders in China has not been studied. Leaders
differ in various ways. In terms of governing regional governments in China, the limit of one’s
capacity may not only exist for one’s biological differences; due to regional differences and other
unmeasured constraints, regional leaders’ decision-makings and professional performances
actually affect their career mobility as well. Second, as China has a large population and the
population is not at all evenly distributed through the country, a large number of leaders of
municipalities and coastal cities are governing a population equivalent to some provinces in the
west of China. Thus, presumably, the difficulties of governing these municipalities can also be
compared to that of governing provinces. Yet, hardly can any studies with strong analyses on
municipal leaders in China be found at this stage. Most Chinese top leaders (Mao Zedong, Zhou
Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin etc.) have been thoroughly studied, and numerous provincial
leaders have likewise been studied, but regional leaders of newly developed cities and
municipalities have not noticed considerably by scholars. Though it is not easily accessible for
one to keep track of frequent personnel arrangements and reshufflings across China month by
month and year by year, today’s mayors and municipal leaders might well become governors and
later national leaders; it is of vital importance, therefore, that we devote more attention to them in
order to discover more of the political system in China. Third, due to a lack of relevant empirical
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evidence and theoretical construction, the CCP center has not been studied properly as a crucial
part of scholarly analyses of regional leadership. As regional leaders have been changing from
time to time due to new tasks raised by China’s progressive economic growth and social
modernization, the center has in fact also been changing as fast, if not faster, as all the regional
leaders. By taking all domestic issues into its consideration, the CCP center faces new challenges
from regional leaders, and it also adjusts its mechanism by manipulating the standards of
promoting, demoting or swapping regional leaders in order to achieve its desirable adaptabilities
and to keep its dominant position at the center of Chinese politics. In consequence, when
studying regional leaders and their political mobility, one must think of the center’s reactions
accordingly as so far it is still primarily up to the CCP center to decide a regional leader’s career
choices. As the dominant political party in China, the CCP center and its regional chiefs are not
moving in opposite directions, rather they are actually well connected to keep the system
working.
B. Typologies of Chinese Regional Leaders
Regional political elites are often considered the future leaders of China. Among 25
committee members and alternate members of the 17th CCP Politburo, 15 of them have had
previous regional leadership experiences, including President Hu Jintao and Vice President Xi
Jinping (by all accounts the next president of China). In fact, “elite integration is also enhanced
by sociometric ties, that is, networks of personal communication, friendship, and influence.”
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As in all communist regimes, the CCP has its system to manage the selection of leaders of
governmental positions. The system, no matter how a cadre is promoted to be a regional leader,
makes sure that the CCP holds a monopoly of power in town. Developed under the planned
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economy and central-planning over all other kinds of social life, the system adopted by the CCP
from the Soviet Union helps the party maintain its political dominance and authority in personnel
arrangements across the nation.
1. Regional Governance in China
In general, a region’s political importance is defined by its political or economic capacity
and importance to the central government of China. And smaller regions are usually governed by
a bigger regional government. It is most understandable to readers who are not familiar with
administrative regions and rankings in China. However, unlike the system used in the United
States, a big city in China usually also governs its surrounding counties; while a relatively small
city can be equivalent to a county. Also, the biggest cities in China (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin
and Chongqing) are equivalents to a province are divided into districts such that each district is
an equivalent of a regular city; but other cities with large population are not considered
provincial units (Figure 1.1).
Thus, municipalities under the central government (namely) Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin
and Chongqing and 28 provincial regions (with Taiwan excluded as its governor and regional
leaders are not appointed by the CCP) govern cities under their regions. And most of these cities
govern themselves and their surrounding counties. Each county governs a certain number of
towns or townships, and then each town likewise governs villages or administrative units like
villages. Therefore, according to the unit a leader is in charge of, all Chinese civil servants from
the premier of the State Council to a town’s chief, each of them can find their position in the
system as they have all been classified by it.
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Table 1.1 Bureaucratic Rankings in Chinese Politics
Rankings (from high to
low)
1

Equivalent in Regional
Governmental System
N/A

2

Title in Civil Service
System
Premier of State
Council
Vice Premier

3

Minister

4

Vice Minister

5

Ministerial
Departmental Head

6
7

Vice Departmental
Head
Divisional Head

8

Sub-divisional Head

Governor, Provincial
Congressional Leader,
Provincial CPPCC
Leader
Vice or Deputy
Governor
Provincial Departmental
Head, Mayor of a
Capital City
Mayor of a Mid-size
City
Mayor of a Smaller City
or a County
Deputy Mayor of a
Small City or County

N/A

Equivalent in CCP
System
Standing Committee
Member of Politburo
Regular Member or
Standing Committee
Member of Politburo
Provincial Party Chief,
Member of CCP Central
Committee
Vice or Deputy
Provincial Party Chief
Party Secretary of a
Department
Party Secretary of a
Department or City
Party Secretary of a
Smaller City or County
Party Secretary of a
Small City or County

*Source: Author’s Database

Based on the ranking inside the civil service system (as shown in Table 1.1), governors
are regional leaders under the premier and the center of CCP, and their equivalents in the center
are ministers. Thus, a minister can likewise be moved to a governor’s post outside Beijing, as a
governor can be called back to the center. Another confusing point to some readers would be:
who has more power inside the same regional political system, the governmental chief or the
party chief? They do enjoy the same ranking position on the chart, but in fact, the party chief has
more power and his or her authority tops that of the governmental chief’s. Needless to say,
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within one political unit, the chief is always in principle higher than his or her deputies or all the
vice chiefs. Exceptions are rare. 33
Table 1.2 Economic and Administrative Regions of People’s Republic of China
Region (Total Number = 4)

Provincial Units (Total = 31)

Northeast

Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin

East

Central

West

Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu,
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan

Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan

Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu,
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang

(Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are excluded)
Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/zgjjpc/cgfb/t20060307_402309439.htm accessed July 1, 2011

Based on China’ geographic features and cultural characteristics nationwide, the country
can also be divided into different grand regions: the East, the Northeast, the Central, and the
West. Such divisions are not official but rather are valid for statistical or cultural reasons.
However, regional economic performances are important indicators to the entire Chinese
economy. Before the economic reform which was orchestrated by Deng Xiaoping in the late
1970s, regional economic differences within China were much less noticeable than they are at
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There are, of course, exceptions. Bo Xilai, whose father was a senior veteran of the Revolution and later long-term
vice premier, was mayor and party chief of the city of Dalian under Liaoning Province in Northeastern China from
1992 to 2001. But it was well-known that his influence to the provincial affairs, and connections with the center
were more superior than the then governor. Mr. Bo is now the party chief of Chongqing, one of the centrally
directed municipalities. “China’s Other Face: The Red and the Black,” The Economist (2009, October 1), retrieved
from http://www.economist.com/node/14539628?story_id=14539628 on July 5, 2011.
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present. The West has been much less developed compared to all other regions in China, while
the Northeast used to be the industrial center of China from 1950s to 1980s as most heavy
industries and high energy consuming plants were built there during the First Five-year Plan
initiated in 1953. However, the success of Chinese economy in the past three decades made its
way through labor intensive and export-leading manufacturing sectors, instead of exporting or
selling heavy industrial products. Thus, the economy of the Northeast declined in 1990s and the
coastal areas of China shone their light over the country. Therefore, becoming a regional leader
in the coastal province, especially a mayor of a newly industrialized coastal city, can generate
some rather aggressive and intensive competition among potential cadres. On the other hand,
being moved to the West or the Northeast without a significant promotion on the ranking chart
would be considered a sign of one’s career stagnation. The data shown in Table 1.2 point out that
the dominant region in Chinese economy is the East as the percentages of the West and the
Northeast can hardly compete with the East at this stage.

Table 1.3 Regional Economies and Assets in China
Regions
Northeast
East
Central
West

GDP (100 million yuan)
14,545
92,819
31,617
28,620

Percentage (%)
8.68
55.38
18.86
17.08

Total

167,601

100

Source: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/zgjjpc/cgfb/t20060307_402309439.htm; accessed June 20, 2011.)
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Table 1.4 Economies and Assets of China’s Provincial Units 2010
GDP
Ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Provincial
GDP (100 Million
Per Capita
GDP Per Capita
Region
Unit
Yuan)
(Yuan)
Ranking
Guangdong
37775.49
39978
6
East
Shandong
33621.32
35893
7
East
Jiangsu
33478.76
43907
5
East
Zhejiang
22716.98
44895
4
East
Henan
19724.73
21073
14
Central
Hebei
17067.99
24583
12
Central
Liaoning
14696.23
34193
9
Northeast
Shanghai
14344.73
77205
1
East
Sichuan
14050.78
17289
24
West
Hunan
12939.85
19355
20
Central
Hubei
12866.05
22050
18
Central
Fujian
11855.08
33106
10
East
Beijing
11469.28
70234
2
East
Anhui
10191.48
16656
25
Central
Inner
8967.52
37287
8
West
Mongolia
16
Heilongjiang
8257.24
21593
13
Northeast
17
Guangxi
7903.47
16576
26
West
18
Shaanxi
7752.2
20497
16
West
19
Jilin
7072.25
25906
11
Northeast
20
Tianjin
7068.56
63395
3
East
21
Shanxi
7050.38
20779
15
Central
22
Jiangxi
6954.12
15921
27
Central
23
Yunnan
6178.25
13687
29
West
24
Chongqing
5693.58
20219
17
West
25
Xinjiang
4005.41
19119
21
West
26
Guizhou
3662.43
9214
31
West
27
Gansu
3373.78
12882
30
West
28
Hainan
1585.19
18760
22
East
29
Ningxia
1198.15
19642
19
West
30
Qinghai
1012.69
18346
23
West
31
Tibet
434.34
15294
28
West
Source: http://www.armluntan.cn/paiming/html/caifubangwen/295.html accessed in July 20, 2011.
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However, even among Eastern Chinese regions, differences among cities and provinces
can be undeniable for not all of them are in the period of socioeconomic development (shown in
Table 1.4). Centrally directed municipalities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, occupy tremendous
resources and their GDP per capita indices can be compared to any of the OECD country’s
performance. Therefore, it is highly possible that regional leaders in Beijing, Shanghai or
Tianjin attract more political attention from the center as they play with better cards with all eyes
on them. Accordingly, it can also be true that becoming leaders in these cities tends to be more
difficult for competitors. How difficult if compared to that of becoming an equivalent in the
Central or the West of China? The answer awaits to be revealed in the later chapters of the study.
2. Trends of Regional Leaders in Mao Zedong’s Era, Deng Xiaoping’s Era, Compared to
Post-Deng Xiaoping Era
The first generation of CCP local leaders and political elites were drawn from various
types of backgrounds, “whose legitimacy was based on charisma, their roles in the revolution,
and their positions as representatives of the former exploited class.”34 Without revolutionary
practice, ideological influences (as well as ideological propaganda campaigns) from the center
have become the crucial connection between the center and its regional elites. Despite the greater
availability of information about the current leaders of the PRC's key political institutions,
scholars remain divided in the conclusions to be drawn. While agreeing, for example, that the
new elitist party cadres are generally younger and better educated than the first generation of
revolutionaries, scholars and analysts disagree about “the nature of their training and career
paths,” 35 and the question of the possible existence of communist regime in the future. Thus,
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Li and Bachman. Ibid, p.89.
Avery Goldstein. “Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC,” The China Quarterly
(September, 1994), 139, p.718.
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“[t]he implications of a more influential subnational elite for the future evolution of the Chinese
political system are not yet entire clearly.” 36 By examining the historical process of building the
communist state under Mao’s central leadership, scholars also argue that in the 1950s and 1960s,
local leaders and party cadres were tightly controlled by communist ideology, Leninist party
discipline, and regional economic constraints controlled by the central planning system. Regional
leaders, especially those lower ranking cadres, were scrutinized not only by their vertical leaders
from the above, but also closely monitored by politically mobilized mass and relevant
institutions at lower levels. 37 Though the short-lived, decentralized economic recovery initiated
by Liu Shaoqi (then Deputy CCP Chairman and viewed as Mao’s successor) before the Cultural
Revolution called for more monitored economic freedom to the people and loosened control over
regional authorities in order to stimulate the national economy, the ideological education and
organizational discipline served as leverage on the local governments and their cadres to obey
the center unconditionally. Therefore, “[b]oth the citizens and the cadres of the new [communist]
regime were simultaneously subject to sanctions from a wide variety of sources, including
central state authorities, members of work teams, representatives of mass organizations, and
higher-ranking authorities of local political organizations, all of which employed a variety of
means, from ‘criticism’ and ‘re-education’ to the death penalty, in their attempts to ensure
compliance and mete out ‘revolutionary justice.’”38 With such constrains and pressures put on
regional leaders, the center may have reduced the degree and frequency of corruption and power
abuses among officials and regional leaders. However, despite the violation of personal freedom
and a large number of political injustices across the country, the center gained nothing more from

36

Goldstein. Ibid, p.718.
Patricia M.Thorton. Disciplining the State (Cambridge, M.A.: Havard University Asia Center, 2007), p.136.
38
Thorton. Ibid, p.141.
37

36

its cadres than absolute loyalty; the improvement of governmental efficiency and most important
of all, the urgent need of developing national economy, did not arise.
Starting from the Deng Xiaoping era, it has been more common to witness cadres
promoted as regional party leaders and heads of governments with industrial, administrative, and
distinctive professional background and career experiences. This type of elite mobility
transformation contributes to political mobilization and liberalization by de-emphasizing
ideological concerns and accentuating social tolerance in Chinese society. Deng’s reform started
with experiments that no one had done before. Thus, governors who fully cooperated with Deng
in hosting the experiments in their provinces actually received great opportunities of promotion.39
Relevant research on the topic also suggest that as veterans of the communist revolutions were
still very much alive in Deng’s era, their political mobility tend to be lower compared to that
experienced in the Cultural Revolution as Deng promoted them to regional leadership posts
when he was back to power and they did not retire until Jiang Zemin became the General Sectary
of CCP in 1989 and the 14th CCP National Congress in 1992 (Li & Bachman 1989, Walder
1995a, Bo 2002). The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 was a crucial event to some top leaders of
China but it was not an earthquake to all regional leadership group in China. The transition from
Deng to Jiang was more or less smoothly handled as Deng expected. Thus, many senior regional
leaders remained in office until 1992.
After Deng Xiaoping’s withdrawal from public in 1992 and his subsequent death in
1997, Jiang Zemin was known as the leader who “normalized” Chinese politics by repeatedly
signaling that Hu Jintao would be his successor once Jiang had served his terms as General
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Zhao Ziyang, then party chief of Sichuan Province and Wan Li, then party chief of Anhui province were promoted
to Politburo members afterwards in 1982 due to their braveness of supporting Deng’s reformist ideas.
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Sectary and the President. During these years (1997-2000s), a significant phenomenon was the
rising importance of regional leaders’ seats in the CCP Central Committee (shown in Table 1.5).
Noticeably, regional leadership experiences had by this time become a crucial factor for one’s
career future to get into the center. One possible explanation the author thinks is this: as political
movements have declined from Chinese politics, the center has replaced its judgment on cadres’
loyalty to the party. Previously, by judging how much enthusiastic a cadre would like to
participate in the movements could help one’s upward career mobility. But now economic
growth and regional governance have become more important factors if one wants to please the
center and demonstrate one’s leadership skills and capabilities.
Table 1.5: CCP Politburo Members with Regional Leadership Experiences
Year
1956
1969
1973
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
2002
2007

Central
Committee
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th

Total Politburo
Member
13
17
21
23
25
17
20
22
24
25

Members with Regional
Experience
2
4
5
6
9
9
10
13
16
19

Percentage
(%)
9
8
24
26
36
53
50
59
67
76

Source: Author’s Database

Furthermore, the educational and professional training of regional leaders is also being
emphasized by the center in an effort to improve leaders’ performance. Some recent personnel
arrangements have shown the open door for more talent into the system. For example, the current
Minister of Science and Technology, Dr. Wan Gang, who is also the Chairman of the Zhigong

38

Party (one of the eight minority political parties in China), studied and worked in Germany for
16 years and occupied a senior technical and management position of the Audi Auto Group of
Germany before he accepted a senior administrative post at Tongji University in Shanghai and
moved back to China.40 For decades, it was extremely rare for professional technicians from a
minority political party to be chosen for a ministerial post; more typical was a rather honorary
position in the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference.
C. Conclusion
In brief, a new generation of leaders whose socialization, educational background, and
regional experiences differ significantly from those of the old elite, has risen to high positions in
contemporary Chinese politics. However, new conditions also pose new obstacles and new issues.
The problems that confront the country now are not the ones that confronted it years ago. The
dilemmas faced by China's new leaders are (1) how to decentralize economic initiative to
microeconomic units while retaining some form of macroeconomic control, (2) how to increase
functional efficiency while maintaining political control, and (3) how to continue their elitist
orientation while legitimizing their governance. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to ignore the
linkage between the characteristics of elites in China today and the broader patterns of societal
change. There is no doubt that the political elites have changed dramatically. Broader social
trends are emerging that are closely related to this leadership transformation. Studies have
focused on the implications of elite transformation for the issues of economic localism, elitism,
and political mobility and mobilization as they signal emerging trends. Many Chinese and
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foreign observers are clearly aware and worried by some of them―particularly localism―and
the central leadership may take action to mitigate or reverse any of these tendencies.

40

CHAPTER TWO
THE RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL MOBILITY OF CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS

The current map of Chinese politics shows a hierarchical system where the CCP occupies
the dominant position and has great influence over every political issue flowing within the
system. Unlike the former Soviet Union, where the Communist Party was the only game in town,
the Chinese Communist Party does have followers41 showing that this is not a “one-party state,”
but these are only followers, not competitors. Therefore, membership in the CCP usually is the
first step for someone who is interested in a career in politics.42 But the CCP contemporarily has
more than 80 million members nationwide. While not all of them can enjoy a share of the CCP’s
power, who are those who have the potentials as well as motivation to become an official? By
examining current regional leaders’ career mobility trajectories, we may find that the party does
not select its officials randomly. Instead, it is a series of combined factors of potential party
members’ background, experiences, capability and opportunities.
No denying that since its establishment 90 years ago, the CCP has been through a great
deal of external challenges and internal turmoil. Yet, it survives and maintains a hold on central
political power in China; its leadership has evolved and played the crucial part. Although not
selected as leaders through elections, Chinese regional leaders are selected through a series of
procedures and are given opportunities to accomplish tasks from their bosses; their performance
will be taken into consideration for further promotion opportunities. Regional leadership is
41

Besides the Chinese Communist Party (founded in 1921), there are other eight smaller political parties in China.
They are China Zhigong Party (1925), China Democratic League (1941), Chinese Association for Promoting
Democracy (1945), Jiusan Society (1945), China Democratic Construction National Association (1945), Taiwan
Democratic Self-Government League (1947), The Nationalist (KMT) Revolutionary Committee (1947), and China’s
Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party (1947).
42
Surely there are benefits, both political and material, for being other political party members in China.
Memberships and political mobility among the 8 minority party members will be studied accordingly in the study.
But not in an independent chapter as the study focuses on CCP and its regional leaderships.
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important to the CCP as it assures the CCP’s political dominance locally; furthermore,
outstanding regional leaders with talents and accomplishments are likely to be chosen for higher
posts in the future. Thus, the selection procedure itself makes sure that the central leadership of
China will be handed to the most capable bureaucrats in the country. “Promoting inner-party
democracy” has been mentioned frequently in recent years through CCP propaganda. It means to
grant more opportunities from the center to lower ranking officials and to party members holding
different views of the center’s policies or campaigns. It is said that the current general secretary,
President Hu Jintao, has been supportive to a number of decentralized initiatives.43 The center
tries to be more democratic to its members within the system and tolerates a very small number
of competitors, albeit with certain regulations over them. Though far from any open competition
and with no opposition party allowed, it is obvious that the CCP is adopting changes gradually as
it knows some changes are unavoidable in terms of modernization and globalization. In
consequence, changes of the selection of regional leaders may show some new signs of the
CCP’s gradual and highly cautious transformation.
In the first chapter, we have already examined some of the newer phenomena found in
regional leaders’ curriculums over time: both ideological and organizational controls over CCP
officials were tighter in Mao’s era, compared to that of Deng’s and post-Deng’s China. In the
second chapter of the study, we intend to find out: (1) what are the patterns of political mobility
of Chinese regional leaders and why has the mobility had the decisive influence on their political
careers? (2) When the political mobility is under discussion, what are the indicators in Chinese
politics which construct the map of political hierarchy in China? (3) What are some rules of
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thumb that influence political mobility of regional elites? And (4) what would a timely, crossregional, comparative examination of Chinese regional leaders reveal?
A. Defining Political Mobility
In this study, the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders focuses on promotions or
demotions of their career specifically means the movement of a leader from one position to
another during his political career as a regional leader in China. As is broadly used in
sociological studies, the term social mobility means “[t]he ability or potential of individuals
within a society to move between different social levels or between different occupations;” 44 the
political mobility in this study does not concern inter-occupational mobility as long as officials
still work within the political system.
Political mobility is a crucial part of a Chinese regional leader’s political career. The
movement of a leader can be either vertical or horizontal within the hierarchical political system;
moreover, such mobility exists in most communist and post-communist regimes as the dominant
communist party controls the decisive power to determine a leader’s political career. For
example, “[t]he movement of Soviet political elites from one part of socioadministrative
structure to another connotes a change in the individual’s political status, defined in terms of
political power. These changes over time reveal much about the dynamics of the political system
itself.” 45 Specifically in the case of Chinese provincial leaders, five different possibilities can be
said to exist for a provincial leader’s career: (1) stay where one is (no movement vertically or
horizontally), (2) get promoted at the same locale (vertical movement), (3) receive no promotion
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but get transferred to a different region (politically no change but change of location), (4) get
demoted at the same locale (vertical movement), and (5) retire (end of all movements).46 It is true
that continuing the same job or retiring due to one’s age can be considered as part of a leader’s
career movement. But as no change or retreat from leadership (or death) has little significance on
the mobility analysis, the study emphasizes regional leaders’ promotion, demotion, and location
changes.
1. Organizational Control of Leaders’ Political Mobility
Within the state conducted political system, there are different sub-systems in Chinese
politics. For instance, there are the CCP party system, the central and local governmental system,
the military system, the state-owned corporation system, and the Communist Youth League
system. Theoretically, officials who work in different sub-systems are actually interchangeable.
However, as different sub-systems are in charge of dealing with different affairs in Chinese
politics, some of the positions are practically more important to the whole system than that of
other sub-systems. Thus, being transferred from other posts to a certain post actually means a
promotional opportunity for the official. On the contrary, being transferred away from this
certain post to other posts, as a matter of fact, means a demotion to the official. In general, it is
the CCP politburo or important central committee members who decide posts for governorships,
and the CCP chief of a province or a city makes decisions to transfer or reshuffle officials within
his region. Practically, the CCP department of organization (an essential part of most CCP
regional branches) handles the details once the decision is made, and they also catalog all the
leaders and officials periodically and report to the organizational heads and party chiefs.
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Therefore, the party makes all the personnel decisions and arrangements that no matter
which sub-system needs its leadership to be filled or changed, the decision-making authority
remains in the party’s hands. And the department of organization is in charge of carrying out the
decisions. For instance, if a leadership reshuffle in a regional educational system is needed, the
party chiefs will discuss about it, make their choice, and send the organizational head to have the
job done. A department of organization exists in most CCP branches nationwide and it archives
most personnel information including every party member’s profile, curriculum vita, and career
records. Generally speaking, organization departments specialize in surveying and classifying
party members and officials personal information; the classifications routinize the political
mobility processes among regional leaders, make sure candidates meet the basic requirements,
and influence (and sometimes monitor) the decision-makers final decisions.
However, as they handle confidential materials unknown to most people, some
organization departments abuse their power to make profit. A recent case shows that a Youth
League chief of a sub-provincial city not only changed her name years ago (in order to be seen as
being related to an influential person of her hometown), but also changed her year of birth
multiple times within a short period of time, from 1969 to 1973, then from 1973 to 1978, in order
to meet age qualifications for her career promotions. She was caught again using a fake name
and documents to defraud of a multimillion dollar legacy.47 Before this League official was
finally sentenced in April 2011 for 14 years of jail, she had climbed all the way up from a young
farmer without formal education to a sub-provincial political leader and once was considered a
political star as she was a very “young” official among her peers. Even with nationwide
organizational control over CCP cadres, there are unexpected factors in studying Chinese
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regional leaders’ political mobility that can be difficult to detect or measure. Though the efficacy
of the CCP’s control over its local branches is not a subject of our study, the author would like to
point out that some of the outcomes of the CCP’s governance can be different from the center’s
expectancy. Such unexpected cases are not caused by systemic factors, as the party itself would
not be willing to promote an official with fake credentials whatsoever, but the results have
caused controversies among Chinese people question the party-state regime’s efficacy and
legitimacy.
2. Vertical Political Mobility: From Low to High
The vertical political movements of leaders are fairly obvious to explain. Apparently,
one of the most important indicators to show a regional leader has received a promotion is that
the leader has been moved from a lower level in the system to the next higher level. As shown in
Table 1.1 of chapter one, a mayor of a small city becoming the mayor of a bigger city is a
promotion, and a mayor from a mid-size city becoming a deputy mayor of a provincial direct city
(usually the capital city of the province) is also a promotion to the leader. For higher ranking
officials when a deputy governor or deputy party chief of a province moves up to the governor or
the chief position, that official is getting a promotion. A governor or provincial party chief
getting the job as mayor or party chief of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin or Chongqing also a
promotion since the four central direct municipalities, though they are smaller than any province
in China, means a great deal because most mayors or party chiefs of these four municipalities
will sooner or later become members of the Politburo. If a provincial leader is removed to the
center and accepts a chief ministerial post, usually it means a promotion. This is the case unless
the leader is removed from an important region to a much less important central ministry. Being
called up to the center entails having more opportunities and connections; perhaps becoming a
46

politburo member is soon enough to come true. Such movements in regional leaders’ careers are
vertical movements, as this type of promotions moves the leader upward and demotions move
them downward in the category. Therefore, if a governor is being moved to a non-direct
municipal city chief post, it is considered a demotion. And if a big city mayor is moved to a
small city mayor post, or given a deputy major post at a similar type of city, in terms of
population, economy and political importance, it is likewise considered as a demotion. In a word,
going upward or downward depends on where the leader is going.
Meanwhile, measurements for deputies (e.g. deputy ministers, deputy party secretaries)
have been a weakness in studying political elite mobility in China. It is hardly the scholars to
blame since there are many more deputy posts than chief posts in both governmental and party
sub-systems. Even inside the Center, deputies and vice-chiefs have been granted to senior central
leaders as promotions, political compensations, balance of power, and temporary personnel
arrangement negotiations.48 Within a province, there is one governor and one party chief, but
usually about 6 to 8 deputy governors and the same number of CCP deputy secretaries. The
Chinese bureaucracy has always been expanding and never seems to be happy with its current
size. Sometimes, for an important city inside a province, its party chief is also a deputy or vice
governor and occupies one of the 8 seats. Despite the 15 sub-provincial municipalities (listed in
Table 2.1 from Harbin to Shenzhen) whether a big city boss can be an equivalent to a deputy
provincial chief or not, it has to be examined by looking at a specific case. It is only conventional
that capital cities in provinces tend to be more important, but no official arrangement shows that
a capital city boss must take a seat among the vice governors who sit next to the governor.
48

Vice premierships on the State Council (the central government equivalent of China) are considered national
leader posts in China. There are 4 vice premiers currently under Premier Wen Jiabao’s executive leadership;
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Therefore, when a city boss becomes a vice governor or party chief while having his or her city
chief seat saved, it is considered a promotion. And for other vice governors, if they can hold
titles more than the governorship, it is also an upward mobility. If they are striped to only one
title from multiple titles and the one left is still a deputy one, meaning he is not in charge of a
region, then we can call it a demotion.
In all, the vertical movements of Chinese regional leaders look quite mixed for outsiders.
But they are not random at all. The leaders seem to be aware of the institutions set by the center,
and what they need to do to keep them closer to the upstream, and what will flush them all the
way down.

3. Horizontal Political Mobility: From Region to Region
Many have noticed the political difference among regions in China, but few have
explained it well. Yet the social mobility trend shows that more educated, skilled labors flow
from the less developed regions to more developed regions in China. The political mobility of
regional leaders also shows that once in a while, underdeveloped regional leaders with better
performance get moved to developed regions in China and become leaders there.49
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Table 2.1 Important Municipalities in China
Municipality

Population*

Beijing

19.6

Shanghai

23

Tianjin

12.9

Chongqing

28.8

Harbin

10.6

Changchun

7.52

Shenyang

7.86

Jinan

6.03

Nanjing

8

Hangzhou

7.97

Guangzhou

12.7

Wuhan

9.79

Chengdu

14

Xian

8.31

Dalian

6.69

Qingdao

7.64

Ningbo

7.6

Xiamen

3.53

Shenzhen

10.36

Total

212.9

Political
Importance
Central
Direct
Central
Direct
Central
Direct
Central
Direct
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial
SubProvincial

Leader Post
Equivalent
Politburo
Member
Politburo
Member
Politburo
Member
Politburo
Member
Vice Governor

GDP**

Province

Region

1377.8

N/a

East

1687.2

N/a

East

910.8

N/a

East

789.4

N/a

West

366.6

Heilongjiang

Northeast

Vice Governor

258.8

Jilin

Northeast

Vice Governor

435.9

Liaoning

Northeast

Vice Governor

335.1

Shandong

East

Vice Governor

501

Jiangsu

East

Vice Governor

509.9

Zhejiang

East

Vice Governor

1060

Guangdong

East

Vice Governor

556.6

Hubei

Central

Vice Governor

555.1

Sichuan

West

Vice Governor

271.9

Shaanxi

West

Vice Governor

515.8

Liaoning

Northeast

Vice Governor

566.6

Shandong

East

Vice Governor

512.6

Zhejiang

East

Vice Governor

205.4

Fujian

East

Vice Governor

951.1

Guangdong

East

12367.6

*Millions, as of 2010 **Billion Yuan, as of 2010
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (accessed June 3, 2011)
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But why? Scholars of comparative politics state that developed regions are relatively
easier to govern than underdeveloped regions. In developed regions, the rule of law is better
established, citizens tend to be more educated, the infrastructure is markedly better than that of
the underdeveloped regions, there exists greater social and political integrity, less social
cleavages, more civic engagement, more social capital, and more advanced market economy. In
general, the civil society is stronger and more autonomous in developed regions.50 If so, a
Chinese regional leader who has been doing well in governing a less developed region, as he or
she has made progressive achievements, the center should have sent that leader to an even less
developed region as the leader can do things that others cannot. In other words, have your best
employees deal with the most troublesome customers. As a matter of fact, Chinese leaders who
had worked well in underdeveloped regions more often find themselves transferred to more
developed cities and provinces. Little has previous research noticed the logic of the CCP center
behind its arrangement: that the primary concern when transferring leaders is not to put them
where they are the most needed, but to put them in more important leadership posts and to use
them in the future. It is known to all the people of China that more developed regions (especially
the four central direct municipalities) occupy much more political importance in Chinese politics
than do the less developed regions of China. Therefore, the reward for diligent leaders is to
become more well-known and powerful to the nation. Arguably, the mayor of Shanghai may
have less disturbing governance issues than the governor of Gansu Province. But certainly a
politburo member as well as the mayor of Shanghai enjoys much more political and
socioeconomic resources than the governor of Gansu who is usually not known to most Chinese
and barely has the chance to participate in any of the center’s decision-making processes.
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As shown in Table 2.1, the most important 19 central direct municipalities and subprovincial cities make up almost 15.6 percent of the Chinese population and 14.4 percent of
Chinese national economy. Furthermore, half of the cities listed here can even compare their
economies to some of the provinces in Western China (i.e., Gansu, Tibet, Xinjiang, etc.) where
the land is vast but people are poor. Thus, the political importance of these regions is weighed by
their share in the national economy and their degree of social capital, such as skilled labor,
prominent higher educational institutions, better infrastructure, hospitals and health care units,
foreign investments and cultural affairs, the professional expertise of the labor force, the region’s
adaptability to business and foreign investments, locals’ respect to the rule of law, etc. Therefore,
if a provincial leader becomes the mayor of a central direct municipality, it is a promotion. Subprovincial leaders (mayors and party chiefs) are next in line to become provincial leaders or
ministerial posts in the center. Central-direct municipal party chiefs are already politburo
members; their next upward movements are likely to be the leaders of China. However, when a
central-direct municipal mayor is removed to be the party chief of some other provinces, it is still
considered a promotion because party chiefs are more important than governors. Basically,
governor posts are not attractive enough for mayors of central-direct municipalities; they want at
least provincial party chiefs in the developed regions of China or seats in the politburo. Even if
there are only about 25 politburo members are selected once in every 5 years.
4. Cross-Dimensional Transfers between the Executive and the Non-Executive Posts
Besides vertical mobility within one sub-system of Chinese government and horizontal
mobility between regions in China, political mobility can also be found in movements of leaders
across systems and regions.
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Department of
Organization

Department of Propaganda
Deputy Secretaries

Committee of Politics and
Laws

The Secretary of
CCP

The Secretariat

Department of the United
Frontier

Committee of Disciplinary
Examination
Party School

Regional Party School

Figure 2.1: Typical Setting of a Provincial or Municipal CCP Committee
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In charge of broad
administrative affairs, issues
related with the government,
assists the provincial leaders.

The Secretariat

Provincial
Government

Departments of Finance,
Industry, Human Resource,
Agriculture, Education,
Culture, Justice, Business,
Public Health, Public Safety
(Police), Environment, etc.

Direct Departments

Taxation, Tourism, Banking,
Broadcasting, Forestry, Press
and Publishing, Quality
Control, Labor Welfare, etc.

Direct Bureaus

Headed by the governor and
usually 6-8 vice or deputy
governors, each is charge of
specific departments or
bureaus.

Figure 2.2: Typical Settings and Functions of a Provincial Government in China
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Previous studies of Chinese leaders’ political mobility show that highly ranked regional
leaders tend to have less potential upward political mobility opportunities as the promotional
room left can be limited. However, before regional leaders reach a certain ranking, cross subsystem movements can be rather frequent.51 Scholars argue that such frequent movements among
leaders leave them little time and experience to prepare, but leaders’ previous experiences hardly
help them to adjust to a new working environment.52 Scholars try to explain this phenomenon by
claiming that the CCP is trying to train its cadres to adapt new challenges brought by
internationalization and globalization of the 21st century. In fact, cross-dimensional political
mobility existed even in the early years of the CCP’s establishment. Deng Xiaoping was a classic
case of the kind. Studied in France during his teenage years of 1920s, Deng joined the
Communist Party of China before he was sent to more intense communist training in Moscow in
1924. After working briefly as a political advisor for a Nationalist (KMT) warlord (Gen. Feng
Yuxiang) in 1927, he was sent to southwest rural China to organize local peasants’ resistance
against the KMTs. Then he was transferred back to Northern China where he officially became a
military leader when the Anti-Japanese War broke out. He was put in charge of establishing the
“Liberated Territories” as forts and settlements for the communists and their supporters during
the War. Before his vice premiership in the early 1950s, he worked both as a regional party chief
and a military commander of the People’s Liberation Army. As a result, multiple job titles and
frequent career moves did not overwhelm Deng but only made him more well-known as a
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strong-willed CCP leader. As Deng said himself by reviewing his personal stories, “I became a
central leader at the age of 23, it was quite prominent!” 53
Deng Xiaoping’s case can be historically exceptional as he lived long enough to succeed
as the top leader of China after Mao Zedong. But cross-dimensional personnel arrangements
(making arrangements amongst the party, the state and government system) among leaders were
common when the CCP became the dominant political force of China in 1949, and eventually the
arrangements became systemic to provide regional leaders with different tasks before they get
promoted or demoted. Meanwhile, cross-dimensional reshufflings among highly ranked regional
leaders can always cause great attention nationwide. For example, in April 2010, Zhang
Chunxian, the CCP Chief of Hunan Province, replaced Wang Lequan as the new CCP Chief of
Xinjiang Autonomous Region of Uighurs, while Wang was moved to the center and became a
deputy secretary of the Central Committee of Politics and Laws. Each man was a regional leader
with the Politburo membership but no official explanation detailed the reason for the reshuffling.
Wang Lequan had acquired his governorship of Xinjiang in 1991 and was known as a supporter
of President Hu Jintao. However, the Uighurs Revolt in July 2008 shortly before the Beijing
Olympics, with more than 200 deaths of innocent Han Chinese civilians killed by the revolted
Uighur violence cause great controversies over Wang’s governance in Xinjiang during the past
two decades.54 Unofficial sources claim that Wang might have abused his power to have
chartered some governmental land to his family members instead of employing open bidding
among potential buyers. Revolts or political instabilities seem to be unacceptable to the CCP
center. On the other hand, ever known as a very capable Minister of Transportation, Zhang
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Dangshi xinxi bao (Journal of CCP Historical Information). Retrieved on September 3, 2011 from
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64172/64915/4695973.html.
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Chunxian became a provincial leader in 2005. Not only is Mr. Zhang 9 years younger than Mr.
Wang, but he is also known to the press as a “vivid” and “open” regional leader. This reshuffle
showed the center’s hesitation over Wang’s regional leadership even if his performance had been
approved for the past 19 years as the leader of Xinjiang. The center was seemingly eager to have
a new face such as Zhang, who is not only press-friendly but also capable of easing multinational
tension among the minorities.55 The political career movements of Wang Lequan and Zhang
Chunxian show that the CCP center has a strong interest in sustained unitary governance all over
China; it will not tolerate its tenured regional leader decentralizing its authority. Noticeably,
Wang was moved to the center with a senior post on the Central Committee but with less
practical power compared to a senior provincial chief. According to the rankings, it was a slight
promotion (since regional leaders all want to be in the center someday), but the deputy post itself
means no further promotion would be likely and Mr. Wang is obviously too old to stay on the
next CCP Politburo.
Generally speaking, governors and provincial party chiefs are interchangeable to each
other. A governor or a deputy in the East can be transferred to the Central or West to be a party
chief. It would be a promotion as the party chief controls more power in a province. And if a
deputy party chief is transferred from the Central or the West to the East to be a governor, it is
also a promotion, as this official is no longer one of the deputies, and the East is considered to be
more important both politically and economically. For sub-provincial city mayors or party chiefs,
governorships everywhere would be a promotion. Although western provinces can be poorer
than a coastal city, becoming a governor means a provincial party chief is the next step upward;
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eventually, if one makes no big mistake, entering the center is also possible after tenured terms
as a provincial leader. Within each governmental setting, the secretariat, the departments of
finance, business, human resources, and public safety (police) are relatively more important than
other departments as they control more political resources than the departments of agriculture,
social security or cultural affairs. Thus, becoming officials of the more important departments
means promotion opportunities, though they are actually more difficult to get in as well. For
officials being transferred, for instance, from a post in a department of business to one in a
department of environment can be viewed as a hold-back.56
By all means, the CCP is a political party with strong discipline and considerable
organizational strength. In fact, all communist parties were established based on the Leninist
ideology and organizational institutions. Thus, ideology and organization are crucial to a
communist party’s rule (and survival). Inside a regional CCP committee, the department of
organization and the department of propaganda are usually occupied by officials with greater
ambitions and stronger connections with the regional party chief. Therefore, cadres from these
departments as well as from the committee of laws and politics are taking the VIP seats in the
conference room. If cadres or governmental officials are removed from these departments to the
department of the United Frontier or the bureau of senior party cadres (taking physical care of
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retired cadres and providing them with a series of welfare), it would be a demotion as they are
considered “weaker” departments. On the contrary, it would be a promotion if one gets into the
propaganda or organization department from other departments. A regional party school is much
more independent compared to the departments. It has its faculty and facilities not attached to the
party committee directly. Only its principal is usually a deputy party chief of the region. Thus,
only party school principals’ mobility will be taken into consideration in this study. However,
party schools are where younger officials and cadres meet each other and get trained for further
promotions. Therefore, party school training background can contribute to a regional leader’s
political mobility in his future career.
5. Where Do the Leaders Go? Movement after Leadership
When a leader is no longer a leader, such consequences would take place to the leader’s
personal life and political career: retirement, change of occupation, resignation, dismissal, and
death. Though caused by different situations, if any of these possibilities happens to a leader it
leads to only one consequence of the leader’s political mobility: no movement thereafter.
In Mao Zedong’s and Deng Xiaoping’s eras, the political career of a high-ranked leader
could be a life-time commitment as senior leaders rarely retired and worked until they were
physically incapable of doing so (shortly before death). However, from the 1990s under Jiang
Zemin’s central leadership, it has become formalized that all regional leaders and central leaders
must retire when reached a certain age line. The age limit for provincial leaders is sixty-five
(with a few exceptions) and for lower-ranked leaders, it is sixty. When retirement became
institutionalized, new opportunities for promotion and political mobility go to the younger cadres.
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Unlike politicians in the developed world, Chinese political leaders generally do not
change their occupation as politicians. It is more or less a Mandarin tradition that being a leader
is a privilege rather than a job title. Once you are, you always are. When mayors or governors
retire, they still enjoy the housing and medical care benefits as they used to; thus, changing
career seems to be not only unwise but also unnecessary.57 However, one loses one’s leader’s
privileges if the leader is dismissed or forced to resign for mistakes made. Such mistakes include
serious violations of laws or party disciplines, corruption and bribery, inappropriate behavior,
governance mistakes, or being sued or reported for other violations by the masses. Whatever
happens, once the cadre’s party membership is dismissed and stripped down from the leadership
post, a leader’s political mobility is also terminated.
B. Measuring Chinese Regional Leaders’ Political Mobility
1. The Changing Trends of Regional Leaders in China
A political leader’s importance is usually evaluated by his or her decision-making power.
Instead of fashioning a ranking figure of all Chinese central and regional leaders by weighing
their political powers compared to each other, we must keep in mind that such ranking can be
subjective and dynamic. Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, Mao himself was the highest decision
maker in China. But such ranking came from Mao’s decades of revolutionary leadership,
reputation across the communist world, other leaders’ absolute loyalty to Mao as those who
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doubted Mao’s leadership were gradually purged, and, indeed, his charisma. Therefore, the order
of appearances of other leaders on the public media was of vital importance because whoever
showed up next to Mao or stood closer to Mao in the Great Hall of People during state
ceremonies was tabbed as a rising political leader and was deemed to have more importance in
the center’s decision-making process.
Deng Xiaoping was also a senior leader of the Chinese Revolution, but not as dominant
as Mao. Since the late 1970s, the importance of central and regional leaders and their career
paths were greatly influenced by Deng’s personal decisions; but were not manipulated singlehandedly by Deng himself, however. 58 Sometimes a certain personnel arrangement was issued
as a balance of power among senior Politburo members, rather than a decision-making outcome
toward a policy solution. For example, in order to recruit younger talents as CCP leaders and
take over the party to continue the reform, Deng created the Central Advisory Committee to
contain most senior leaders and save provincial leaders’ seats for the new comers. The
Committee was formed in 1982 during the CCP’s 12th National Congress, and it was composed
of 172 members and chaired by Deng himself. But the formalization of the semi-retirement of
senior leaders began in 1975, and after numerous meetings and personal pushes between Deng
and his senior colleagues, the Committee was finally established.59 The Central Advisory
Committee was abolished after two terms in 1992 as most senior leaders had passed away and
the third generation of CCP central leadership had been formed. Therefore, even though Deng
was the leader of China with decisive power over most issues, the authority of his leadership and
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his influence sometimes lacked the proper strength to push his regime to proceed the way he had
planned. Indeed, the CCP leadership system is a highly Leninist yet hierarchical one, which
means that centralized decision plus loyalty and discipline together characterize the nationwide
system.
In contemporary China, especially after Deng Xiaoping’s death in 1997, it has been
shown that no single central leader is able to control all regional leaders’ political mobility and
their career movements. Both the third generation, headed by Jiang Zemin, and the fourth
generation, headed by Hu Jintao, of the CCP center lacked charismatic personalities and wartime
revolutionary backgrounds. Decision-makings inside the Politburo’s compound may have been
relying on leaders’ actual powers rather than their honorary titles and impressive résumés,
compared to their predecessors. In terms of regional leaders’ mobility, simply by counting the
leaders’ order of appearances will not be enough for us to rank their importance in Chinese
politics. Furthermore, with the same age range, similar educational background and trainings,
and more likeness of their career experiences, these factors are now less significant for us in
analyzing the differences of their positions ranked in the system. In other words, facing the
growing talent pool but with similar types of talents, to make closer observation of how the
center selects its regional leaders concerns a great deal of the accountability of this study.
Nationwide, there were about 25,000 provincial-level cadres in China in mid-1980s; but the
number grew rapidly to about 35,000 as of late 1990s.60 And the CCP’s Central Committee
membership has indeed increased from time to time (Figure 2.3). An expanded bureaucracy can
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be filled with more party cadres, but the task of disciplining all of the highly ranked officials can
also be more difficult than before.
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Figure 2.3: Increased Membership of the CCP Central Committee of National Congress by Year
Source: Author’s Database

2. Toward Some Rules of Thumb with Measurements of Political Mobility
There are some rules of thumb that we should keep in mind when talk about political
mobility of Chinese regional leaders.
(1) The Party system generally has more political resources than the regional
governmental system, and it is more dynamic in terms of mobilizing its officials. Furthermore,
having party membership can contribute significantly to one’s career mobility compared to
governmental employees without CCP party membership. Age, gender, nationality, educational
level, professional background and so on contribute to the political mobility opportunities of a
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regional leader’s political career. However, being a Communist party member is still the most
important credential a leader shall have.
(2) Leaders or cadres in executive positions can get more promotions than those who
work at non-executive positions. It is difficult to define how executive a post must be to let its
leader move upward within a certain period of time. However, we may assume that such
mobility scores can be drawn from comparisons to those non-executive posts. Needless to say, in
any bureaucratic organization, its fiscal and personnel decisions can easily become its top
priority over other areas of authority. The governmental system deals with more administrative
affairs, yet some Party departments still have more executive powers over personnel
arrangements. Therefore, inside a regional government or party committee, leaders in charge of
financial and personnel arrangements are considered more prominent than other leaders or
deputies with the same ranking.
(3) Cadres with professional backgrounds (i.e., managers, engineers and businessmen
from China’s gigantic state-owned firms) can become Chinese regional leaders, and such career
moves are considered promotions or upward political mobility. Executives of big state-owned
corporations are sometimes promoted into the governmental system to become officials or
regional leaders. But generally speaking, state-owned corporation's executives are rarely
promoted into the Party system to become Party officials, neither regionally nor nationally. The
initial career movement after one’s executive post of a state-owned firm would very likely be a
post in the government (or a central ministry) rather than a secretary or deputy secretary of the
CCP committee. However, if a regional leader, either governmental or party secretaries, is
moved to become an executive of a state-owned firm, it is hardly a promotion as it is a step away
from the political system to the business world. That is, unless the leader is also appointed as a
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chair or executive member of a state-owned firm. But his or her primary profession is that of a
politician, not a businessman or businesswoman. Such cases will be coded differently and
separately, but they are not common among regional leaders.
(4) For most regional leaders, one must become a member of the CCP’s Central
Committee (CC) in order to become a Politburo member as the next step. The Politburo is the
head of the CC, and only very rarely has a regional leader become a Politburo member when first
elected a CC member. Usually it takes another five years or longer; one has to wait until the next
CCP National Congress to move from a CC member to be on the Politburo. As a result,
becoming a CC member is a promotion but losing one’s CC membership is a demotion. Also,
once a CC member reaches his or her age of retiring, his or her CC membership will be
terminated and a new member will be chosen by the CC. In other words, when one’s political
career stops, it also stops one’s social responsibility, political entitlements and publicity.
(5) In contemporary China, military leaders have been promoted regularly and
expectedly into the CCP's Central Committee, but they are rarely promoted to governmental
positions or regional leader posts. The mobility model for Chinese military leaders is more of a
straight up forward movement: they keep going straight up in the military hierarchy and among
Party rankings until they retire someday or get removed for “disciplinary reasons.”
(6) Leadership posts of the regional National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) have less upward political mobility
compared to posts of regional party committee and government. Thus, being transferred or
appointed as regional NPC or CPPCC leaders without senior membership on the regional CCP
committee is not considered as a promotion. In recent years, it is also common that regional party

64

chiefs occupy the posts as presidents of regional NPC, but it does not indicate that any NPC
president is simultaneously the party chief. Instead, it is of vital importance to become the party
chief first; then having other job titles or not would not actually affect the party chief’s political
mobility in the future. Against the odds, to control more personnel and fiscal resources are two
very important indicators of a leaders’ promotional opportunities. NPC and CPPCC branches
throughout China are run by the state and are considered inseparable political institutions of the
party-state. Leaders of NPC and CPPCC are also considered regional leaders. However, as
neither post controls executive powers in making policies and important decisions, without party
leadership, NPC or CPPCC positions alone are not as important as the regional CCP committee
or the government. Therefore, its leaders’ political mobility scores would be relatively lower.
Above all, compared to that in the developed democracies where general elections serve
to filter politicians and legislators once every few years, the posts held by Chinese regional
leaders are usually stable such that most junior leaders get tenure and promotion once in a while.
Again, Chinese politicians do not consider their political careers only as professions or job titles;
they actually treat their careers as lifetime commitments to change their social status and
personal life qualities. Thus, Chinese regional leaders’ promotions do not only mean more power
and more significant positions in the political system, the mobility can also determine the leaders’
political future and other personal choices. As is shown in Table 2.2, since the CCP’s 12th
National Congress in 1982, the number of regional leaders with full Central Committee
memberships seems to be formalized and fixed at about 60 (which means almost every
provincial unit can have its party chief and governor sit on the CC as there are 31 provincial units,
excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau). The rationalization of regional leader selections also
provides more accountability to the CCP’s regional rule. Also, during the years with the most
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frequent political movements, the percentage of regional leaders on the CC also changed
dramatically (shown in Table 2.2 from 1956 to 1977).
Table 2.2: Regional Leaders’ CC Membership of CCP National Congresses and Eastern
Regional Leaders’ Percentage
Year

CCP
Congress

1956
1969
1973
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
2002
2007

8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th

Central
Committee
Member
97
170
195
201
210
175
188
193
198
204

Alternate
Members

Total

73
109
124
132
138
110
129
151
158
167

170
279
319
333
348
285
317
344
356
371

Regional
Leaders w/
Full CC
33
91
104
98
69
66
62
61
63
64

Eastern Regional
Leaders w/ Full CC

Perce
ntage

12
37
29
29
27
20
20
19
21
23

36.4
40.7
27.9
29.6
39.1
30.3
32.3
31.1
33.3
35.9

Source: Author’s Database.

C. Conclusion: Regional Leaders under the Mobility Whip
The power structure of the CCP is extremely hierarchical and centralized. Similar inputs
can generate different outcomes through the political system. Examining only the outcomes
would not be enough to determine the mechanism of the CCP politics. Interactions among actors
in the system are difficult to gauge. Therefore, we must study the political outcomes through
comparative analysis by comparing different actors and their political career trajectories from
party cadres to regional leaders in China. Moreover, the nature of the single-dimensional
political system determines the political mobility that is most important to a regional leader’s
career.
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In this chapter, the study defines the political mobility of regional leaders to be their
respective promotion, demotion, and movements throughout their careers. Based on the
observations, a regional leader’s political mobility can be upward or downward with transfers
among different regions in China. In other words, vertical mobility determines the leader’s
promotion or demotion while the location of the leader’s governance and practice of the
leadership can also be decisive to the leader’s future career moves. Among governmental posts
and party positions, the study also points out that some posts are actually more important than
others not because they are given more attention but because they control more resources and
affect decision-makings more profoundly. As a result, cadres who occupy these more executive
posts can get promoted more and sooner than those who work on non-executive posts. No
Chinese leaders or laws ever point out which department of a government is more important than
other or which is the least important. But it does make a difference when it comes to promoting
leaders to evaluate their previous experiences as governmental employees or CCP cadres.
On the other hand, regional differences in China have served as the center’s preference
when deciding to move its leaders from one region to another. During the CCP’s 60 years of rule,
the developmental gap across the nation’s different regions has become undeniably obvious.
Regional gap in China can be explained by different levels of social resilience and different
historical heritages that led these regions onto different paths toward modernization. However, it
can also be a political issue with possible political solutions in terms of the center’s governance
and policy preferences. Some regions in China, especially coastal provinces and cities, not only
draw better policies and more investments, but their political importance also sends their regional
leaders up to the top tier of the Chinese hierarchy. Other less developed regions in China,
comparatively speaking, have faced more developmental problems, and their regional leaders
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may have drawn less attention from the center compared to the developed regions. Therefore,
when measuring the political mobility of regional leaders in China, we must also take regional
differences into our evaluation in order to make any relevant research more accountable and
comprehensive.
Finally, the chapter has also pointed out some rules of thumb as potential standards to
measure regional leader’s political mobility. In order to find the pattern of leaders’ mobility, an
analysis of more than one dimension is surely needed. Recent trends in the careers of Chinese
regional leaders’ show that leadership selection has become more rationalized and formalized
compare to decades ago under Mao Zedong’s personal rule. The transformation of the CCP as a
revolutionary organization to the dominant political party may contribute to the explanation.
Also, the transformation from the central planning system to the market economy after 1978 may
be useful for rethinking the gradual changes of Chinese government. Whatever approach or
perspective is taken for studying the issue, we must remember that the hierarchical party-politics
structure of the CCP determines the recruitment, selection and movement of its regional leaders.
These phenomena still depend on the party’s decisions instead of open discussions and
democratic elections among all the people in China.

68

CHAPTER THREE
BACKGROUND AND OPPORTUNITIES: THE MAKE OF CHINESE REGIONAL
LEADERS

The personal background of a person can provide vital information for others to know
this person. With respect to political figures, it is even truer for the people to try to know their
leaders by deconstructing their personal history before he or she had yet become one of the
political elites. In contemporary Chinese politics, personal information of prominent politicians
and governmental officials is indeed scarce and well-edited before it is released to the public.
After reviewing the officially published profiles and brief biographies of hundreds of Chinese
regional leaders’, the author notices that Chinese officials’ curriculum vitae use the same format
(which is plain and bureaucratic in tone) with well-trimmed personal information, highly concise
professional background and occupational experiences. Yet, tremendously interesting
information has been found during the author’s research by placing the plain texts back into their
historical contexts and comparing different generations of Chinese regional leaders to each other.
Ambiguities do exist in the profiles of Chinese regional leaders. While the study here has no
intention to deny the ambiguities, the interpretations made by the study help readers clarify their
potential suspicions about the make-up of Chinese regional leaders.
Classical elite studies often emphasize the importance of the personal background of
political elites. Scholars point out that a person’s early years of life, family influences,
educational levels and social connections do matter a great deal in helping the elite choose
politics as a career choice. Their characteristics accordingly affect the elite’s political attitudes,
partisanship, ideological beliefs, and future career moves.61 Consistent with this approach to elite
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study, the study here also begins with its basic assumption that the background of a Chinese
regional leader matters to the leader’s political mobility in the future. Moreover, the study
provides detailed research on both provincial and municipal leaders’ background information
and provides a cross-regional comparison among leaders to find out how age, gender, nationality,
nativity, education, party affiliation and membership altogether have become important
indicators for others to explain the regional leader’s political mobility and related career
movements.
Again, this study makes it clear that the hierarchical structure of Chinese politics
determines that the center as well as China watchers pay special attention to Chinese regional
leaders’ background information in order to select potential talents to serve in the bureaucracy in
the future. Therefore, in this chapter the study first examines crucial background information as
indicators of Chinese regional leaders by giving out relevant analyses on regional leaders’
profiles. Second, a comprehensive conclusion based on the findings of the chapter is presented in
order to establish our further research on regional leaders’ political mobility by taking the leaders’
personal contexts into our consideration. In this chapter, based on Chinese regional leaders’
profiles and background information collected by this study, we expect to find these
characteristics and features among Chinese regional leaders:
(1) Provincial leaders are generally older in age than city and municipal leaders in China, due
to their experiences and curriculums. Contemporary regional leaders are older than
provincial leaders in the Mao Zedong era. But leaders were the oldest of all at the
beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era (late 1970s and early 1980s).
(2) Women and ethnic minority (non-Han nationals) regional leaders are much fewer than
male and ethnic majority regional leaders. But we expect to see some increases of numbers
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in post-Deng Xiaoping era such that there would be currently more women and minority
regional leaders than before.
(3) The CCP has maintained a policy that regional leaders must serve during their careers
outside their hometown provinces or regions in order to minimize growing personal ties
with localities. City leaders are less important than provincial leaders, thus, we expect to
see more even distribution between native officials and non-native officials, which means
local-born leaders get even opportunities if they compete for deputy or vice posts at the
municipal level. Also, more chief posts (governors, CCP chiefs, and mayors) go to leaders
who are non-native to the regions.

(4) As younger generations of regional leaders were not interrupted during their school years
by political movements and China’s national college examination was restored in 1977 by
Deng Xiaoping, leaders and cadres have had more opportunities to finish their education.
Hence, we expect that in post-Deng era, more regional leaders will have received higher
education compared to regional leaders in Mao’s and Deng’s era.

(5) In post-Deng era, more regional leaders will have attended to the CCP party schools. And
more regional leaders will have been associated with the Communist Youth League of
China. Both hypotheses are to be compared to the situations in Mao’s and Deng’s era.
And all of our expectations are based on the theories and empirical findings below:
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A. Biological and Personal Background of Regional Leaders in China
1. Age

Chinese politics has its unique merit system such that the CCP rewards its cadres once in
a while with political promotions and related social benefits according to each and every cadre’s
loyalty and commitment to the party. This merit system was not created by the CCP but has been
commonly found among East Asian nations where the seniority of an official is sometimes
considered the equivalent of the authority of the individual inside a political system where it is
usually hierarchical and carefully arranged. In other words, the relationship between one’s age
and one’s position can be understood as: the longer a cadre has served for the CCP, usually the
higher the post this cadre may have occupied, with similarly distributed amounts of other social
resources.

The first generation of CCP leadership acquired dominant political power through the
Great Chinese Revolution, and the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949. The
previous regime was completely changed by adapting the Marxist-Leninist party-state regime
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and most initial leaders were also revolutionaries and veterans. There was no official rule that a
leader must retire at a certain age or pass one’s power to the successor by making the leader’s
post vacant. And there was no official restriction that set an age beyond which an official would
not receive any further promotion. Instead, whether a leader was going to retire or keep working
as an official was determined by the center on an ad hoc basis, based on some rules of thumb
plus common senses. As a result, both central leaders and regional leaders received their tenures
as leaders of China in 1950s and 1960s.

In 1956, the 8th National Congress of the CCP was held in Beijing and a few newer
members were added to the Politburo, the decision-making center of the CCP. As is shown in
Figure 3.1, among 17 Politburo members, the average age was about 55 and the majority of them
(N=11) were in their fifties and sixties meaning they were the early revolutionaries who joined
the party in their twenties and thirties and had been through numerous events in the CCP history
and became well-trained and well-experienced leaders. Although there was no retirement age
requirement, since most leaders became CCP members at a fairly young age, many of them were
still young despite their status as national leaders. Only a few (N=4) were getting into their
seventies; compared to another 2 leaders were in their forties. The gap between the youngest and
the oldest was about 30 years.
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Figure 3.1: Member Age Distribution of the 8th CCP Politburo in 1956
Source: Author’s Database (X=Age, Y=Number of Members).
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Figure 3.2: Member Age Distribution of 17th CCP Politburo in 2007
Source: Author’s Database (X=Age, Y=Number of Members)

74

However, about 50 years later, the demographics of the Chinese central leadership have
changed significantly. At the 17th National Congress of the CCP in 2007, the newest generation
of top Chinese leaders is generally older than the Politburo members of 1956. Among 25
members, the average age is 61.7, which is about 6 to 7 years older than the 8th Politburo. But the
distribution of ages of Politburo members is actually much less diverged compared to that of the
8th Politburo. The majority of them (20 of 25) were in their sixties, and only 2 member were
younger than 55 but still in their fifties by the end of 2007. The gap between the youngest and
the oldest was only 15 years. These changes through the decades in the CCP central leadership
show us that the CCP has become more mature in terms of its leaders’ age ranges and the
biological and chronological differences among central leader may have been reduced as they
were born about the same period of time and experienced similar types of socioeconomic
changes. Keeping in mind that 23 of the 25 Politburo members in 2007 served as regional leaders
in China or worked in regional government, they have spent a number of years working in
different parts of China before they got promoted to the center.
There are no constitutional regulations on age limits for Chinese national leader that
mandate that when a leader reaches a certain age, he or she must retire by leaving the post open
to the successor. However, according to a series of governmental documents and published
articles,62 most Chinese ministers, governors, CCP chiefs and their equivalent retire at the age of
65, for they should not receive any further promotion beyond that age. Deputies minister, vice
governors, deputy provincial CCP chiefs and equivalents should not receive promotions once
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they reached sixty years old. Departmental or divisional chiefs, mayors, city and municipal CCP
chiefs should retire at the age of sixty year old and receive no promotion when that age is
reached. Deputy departmental chiefs, vice mayors, deputy city municipal CCP chiefs and
equivalents should also retire at the age of sixty and receive no further promotions once the age
is reached. However, for any of the leaders mentioned above, when the retiring age is reached
before one’s current term is finished, one may finish one’s current leadership term but receive no
further promotion or continuous tenure thereafter. There have been, of course, exceptions. After
the Cultural Revolution, most purged provincial and central leaders made their political encores
by winning back the posts they held prior to the Cultural Revolution. They usually served until
Deng Xiaoping’s call for senior leaders’ collective retirement at the 12th National Congress of
the CCP in 1982. Even Deng himself was considered to remain in charge of the “overall situation”
to decide on vital matter until 1989, and by then he was already eighty-five years old.
These regulations were eventually institutionalized by the end of Jiang Zemin’s
leadership as the General Secretary of the CCP in the early 2000s. Retirements of senior central
and regional leaders in China had become formalized and widely accepted by leaders and the
people. No member of the Central Committee (CC) or its Politburo elected at the 16th National
Congress in 2002 of the CCP was older than 70 years old. Though Jiang himself remained the
President of China, and kept his chairmanship of the Central Military Committee at the age of 76,
he was no longer a CC member. As is shown in Figure 3.3, among 62 current regional leaders of
China who are also CC members, their age range sits from 47 to 68 years old with the average of
59.4 years old (by the end of 2010). Upon their entry into the CC in 2007, the youngest among
them was 44 years old (Hu Chunhua, then the First Secretary of the Youth League Central
Committee who became the governor of Hebei Province in April, 2008, then the youngest
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governor in China), while the eldest was 65 years old (Liu Qi, CCP chief of Beijing). Mr. Liu
was actually serving his second term as a Politburo member meaning it would be unlikely for Mr.
Liu to receive further promotions. Becoming a Politburo member in 2002, Secretary Liu started
off early but made no subsequent career. Despite the fact that 44 can be too young for a governor
and 65 might be overage for a city chief, the majority of Chinese regional leaders with CC
membership are in their late fifties (35 of 62 leaders are between the age of 55-60).
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Figure 3.3 Age Distribution of Current Regional Leaders on the CC
Source: Author’s Database
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Table 3.1 Chinese Regional Leaders’ Age Analysis (Years)
Post
Provincial
City
Total

Count

Max

Min

Mean

243
233
476

71
73
73

33
32
32

54.2
49.5
51.9

Standard
Deviation
7.0
7.0

Source: Author’s Database.
Table 3.2 Provincial Leaders’ Age Analysis (Years)
1950s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

47.6
6.2
37
67
53

1960s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

51.6
8.1
33
64
37

1970s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

59.7
6.2
40
71
47

1980s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

55.7
6.3
41
67
53

1990s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

55.4
4.8
38
64
50

2000s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

55.3
3.5
46
61
53

Source: Author’s Database.
Table 3.3 City Leaders’ Age Analysis (Years)
1950s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

42.4
5.3
33
62
49

1960s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

49.4
2.8
44
56
24

1970s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

52.8
7.9
42
71
24

Source: Author’s Database.
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1980s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

55.5
7.3
42
73
31

1990s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

50.6
4.5
37
59
43

2000s
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min
Max
Count

50.1
5.1
32
58
62

While the relationship of leaders’ ages and their further appointments tends to be
formalized by recent CCP national congresses, Chinese regional leaders’ ages are closed tied to
their political mobility through the years. By examining 473 regional leaders in China since 1949,
this study finds that as it is a hierarchical power structure of Chinese politics, it seems that older
officials have also occupied more senior posts in regional the political system. As is shown in
Table 3.1, in general, Chinese governors and provincial party chiefs have been older than mayors
and city party chiefs. Considering a term for a provincial leader is 5 years and he can serve two
terms continuously, but a term for county or sub-city districts leaders is only 3 years; it is
reasonable that the age gap between provincial leaders are in general older than city leaders for
about 5 years (average for provincial leaders: 54.2 and average for city leaders: 49.5) from 1950s
to 2000s (Table 3.1).
Contemporary Chinese provincial leaders and city leaders (since 1990s) were relatively
older than regional leaders in the 1950s, or the first half of Mao Zedong’s era (results shown in
Tables 3.2 and 3.3). However, they have been relatively younger than regional leaders in the late
1970s and 1980s, which were the years shortly after the Cultural Revolution and at the beginning
of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform. That is because during the Cultural Revolution, most of
the tenured regional leaders were removed, dismissed, or purged from their leadership posts in a
short time (1966-1968) and their posts were taken by the radical young workers from stateowned factories; these young radicals were known as zaofanpai (revolutionary rebels) and were
extreme believers in Maoism among high school and college students known as the Red Guards.
When the Cultural Revolution was finally over in 1977, many previous regional leaders
recovered from the purges and regained their personal reputation and political authority (known
as pingfan). Many of them were out of work for nearly ten years, which accounts for the
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significant increase of average ages among regional leaders: provincial leaders gained about 8
years compared to that of the 1960s (Table 3.1, 59.7 of 1970s and 51.6 of 1960s). The maximum
of age among the samplers in late 1970s was 71, while the maximum of the 1960s was only 64.
The situation was very similar compared to that of the city leaders. The maximum age among
city leaders in 1980s was 73 compared to 56 in the 1960s and the average age increased from
49.4 in the 1960s to 55.5 in the 1980s (see Table 3.3).
After the 12th CCP Congress in 1982, and especially after the 13th CCP Congress in
1987, the pattern of replacing older leaders with younger generations of cadres in regional
governments was obvious. When the CCP Advisory Committees were established both in the
center and among the provinces of China, senior leaders who had reached the retirement ages
were retained in the Advisory Committee but no longer took up posts in the governments. This
was known as CCP leaders’ “semi-retirement.” The Advisory Committee system was finally
abolished in 1992 at the 14th CCP Congress and the full retirement of all the leaders who had
reached their age limits was called by the CCP center. In other words, to refresh the party politics
by removing senior regional leaders to retirement and introducing a considerable number of
younger leaders to the system, the center finally had formalized its principles for age limits as
lawful regulations. As is shown in Table 3.4, by examining specific provinces and cities, we can
also find that the biological ages of regional leaders have become younger and younger, and that
there were some significant drops of age among regional leaders shortly after the 12th Congress
and the 13th Congress. Provincial leaders of Guangdong retired or retreated to the Advisory
Committee after the 13th Congress and the entry of younger leaders lowered the mean age of
leaders. Some provincial leaders of Guizhou stayed until 1982, which caused an increase of
mean age among leaders, but once they retired after the 13th Congress, the mean also decreased
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from 63.5 to 53 years old. On the municipal side, Xiamen of Fujian Province was not approved
to become a sub-provincial unit until 1994, which means that before 1994 the leaders of Xiamen
had lower political rankings than the capital city of the Province, Fuzhou. Thus, the mean ages of
Xiamen leaders from 1977 to 1992 were relatively younger as low-ranked officials tended to be
younger than governors or other provincial leaders. Still, the data show that older leaders were
replaced with younger ones after the 13th Congress in 1987 when the retirement age of Chinese
leaders was institutionalized.
Table 3.4 Provincial and City Leaders Age Changes (1977-1992)
Province 1977-79 Count Mean 1980-82 Count Mean 1983-87 Count Mean 1988-92 Count Mean
Shanxi
5
65
2
58.5
3
56.6
2
56
Guangdong
3
67
3
63
3
57.3
2
55
Guizhou
4
59.5
2
63.5
4
53
3
55.1
City
1977-79 Count Mean 1980-82 Count Mean 1983-87 Count Mean 1988-92 Count Mean
Guangzhou
1
71
2
58.5
2
55
4
57.5
Harbin
1
64
3
58
1
58
2
52.5
Xiamen
1
57
2
56
1
50
2
47.5

Source: Author’s Database.
When regional leaders reached their retirement ages, not only do they need to save
some opportunities for the young, but also they would acquire no upward political mobility in the
future. Noticeably, especially since the 1990s, a number of regional leaders transferred from
executive posts (party systemic or governmental) to non-executive posts (regional NPC or
CPPCC63) when they approach to retirement age. Politically they are still considered important
regional leaders as their political ranking in the civil service system have not been changed or
dragged down. But being moved or transferred to the non-executive posts means that getting
further promotions would be unlikely. This transfer can be seen as a certain type of preparation
63
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for some regional leaders’ retirement for old age. Meanwhile, in the post-Deng Xiaoping era,
where regular retirements of leaders are lawfully clarified without personal exceptions, we need
also notice that provincial leaders share a smaller age gap compare that of the city leaders in
China. Shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the age standard deviation of provincial leaders in 1990s is
4.8 compare to that of 3.8 in 2000s. And current city leaders have the largest range of ages (from
32 to 58). Without major political and social interruptions such as the Cultural Revolution, and
with diverged age distributions among Chinese city leaders in the 21st century, it could be an
interesting phenomenon that city leaders may have more diverse personal backgrounds as lower
ranked regional leaders while provincial leaders may be more homogenous, in terms of personal
experiences and professional trainings. Is it because to become a provincial leader one usually
has to wait longer that the years of waiting in line makes many others quit longing for upward
mobility in the hierarchy? Because different Chinese cities in different regions are quite
unevenly developed it makes the requirements for selecting city leaders much more specific and
dynamic, and more locally oriented compared to that of provincial leaders. Whatever the cause,
the issue will be studied in the later parts of the chapter by combining other characteristics of
Chinese city leaders.
2. Gender and Nationality
Two of the long time oppressed social groups throughout Chinese political history have
been women and ethnic minorities in China. Although the Communist Party was known to have
liberated the poor and the disenfranchised social groups in China by establishing the “People’s
Democratic Dictatorship,” known after 1949 as the People’s Republic of China, overwhelmed by
the thousands of years of male-dominance in social life and outnumbered by the Han majority in
most parts of China, Chinese women and minorities are still considered weak voices in
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contemporary Chinese politics. The CCP has been investing its political resources to ease the
tension between the majority and the minorities in political life by recruiting more ethnic
minorities with CCP membership into the political system and by saving legislature seats and
governmental posts for the minorities, especially in the “autonomous regions,” where
traditionally and historically the habitats for the Chinese minorities. As early as in Mao Zedong’s
era, Mao had stressed the importance of handling the relationship between the majority and the
minorities in general. Ethnic chauvinism, which comes from the overpowered ethnic majority, is
seriously dangerous for any Communist party to maintain its political dominance and social
stability. As Mao said: “We concentrate on fighting against Han nation’s Chauvinism as well as
regional nationalism, but that [regional nationalism] is generally not the key point…. In Soviet
Union, the relationship between the Russian nation and the minorities is very abnormal, we
should learn from their lesson.” 64 However, the first generation of the CCP central leaders’ great
blueprint for harmony among all nationalities in China was never carried out in later years due to
the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. Again, violent mass movements and radical communist
ideologies did not considered ethnic minorities in China as social groups with special needs
(socioeconomic underdevelopment and strong religious influences in people’s life). Thus, local
political elites and minority nationality regional leaders must sacrifice their beliefs and interests
in exchange for survival.65
Deng Xiaoping was indeed a pragmatic political leader who constantly emphasized the
importance of order and stability in Chinese society as the foundation of his reformist strategies.
Since the 1980s, proportional representation of the ethnic minorities among Chinese regional
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governments was institutionalized as a crucial policy of the CCP’s regional policy. In
autonomous ethnic minority regions, the governmental head is regularly a member of the local
ethnic group who is also a CCP member. A number of posts in the government, local NPC and
CPPCC are also saved for the minorities where the numbers of the Han regional officials would
not look overwhelming compared to that of the minorities. However, as the local CCP committee
is the most executive political sub-system, the local CCP chief post is actually regularly
controlled by a Han national regardless of the local population proportion. Among the CCP
central leaders, including those in the Politburo, the CC, the NPC and CPPCC presidents and
vice presidents, there are also proportional seats saved for leaders with minority nationality
background.
Table 3.5 Nationalities among Chinese Regional Leaders
Post

Han

Percentage

Percentage

Total

95.7

Non-Han
Minorities
16

Provincial

354

City and
Municipal

286

Percentage

4.3

370

100

95.3

14

4.7

300

100

Source: Author’s Database
As is shown in Table 3.5, among the 670 regional leaders surveyed in this chapter, it
happens, though purely randomly, that only 30 of 670 leaders were actually ethnic minorities.
Among provincial leaders, only 16 (4.3 percent) were not Han nationals; only 14 (4.7 percent)
city and municipal leaders were not Han nationals. And among the 30 minority regional leaders,
all of them were CCP members and most of them worked in their native provinces (Guangxi and
Xinjiang) where their ethnic background could be beneficial for their political career mobility.
Here, the author would like to point out that it might be statistically convincing that the study
surveys all ethnic minority regions to track down all the leaders with non-Han nationality
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background. However, the purpose of this study was not designated for an analysis of the
Chinese ethnicity and political demographics. The 30 minority leaders look minor compared the
entire 670 regional leadership cohort, but it has shown to the readers that the practice of allowing
proportional representation of the minorities mainly work at special regions where the Han
nationals are not the only majority ethnic group. Among the regions and provinces in Eastern,
Southern and Central China, where the Han nationality dominates demographically, the absolute
majority of the regional leaders are still made up from Han nationals. Furthermore, according to
published reports, by 2008 there were 2.915 million governmental officials (at least holding a
post as a deputy divisional head) across China who were ethnic minorities, which were about 7.4
percent of the entire governmental official population.66 Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan
province located in Southwestern China, is a city with 890,000 minority nationals or 13.8 percent
of its entire urban population. By 2011, 17.7 percent of governmental officials in Kunming were
ethnic minorities; the percentage was higher than the minority population percentage of all urban
dwellers of the municipality.67 In the entire Tibet autonomous region, where there were 208,000
CCP members in 2011, 77,000 of them were both Tibetans and governmental officials. These
77,000 Tibetan governmental officials compose 70 percent of the entire governmental official
population in Tibet.68 It is still not clear that how many minority officials in Yunnan or Tibet
have occupied high-ranked executive positions in the regional governments, or how many of
them are chief leaders instead of being deputies or committee members. But as this study has
mentioned earlier, the proportion is what really matters to the CCP center. Ethnic minorities must
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have their proportional representation in regional political system to show the center’s policy
preference and political investments to help create a peaceful political atmosphere between the
Han and non-Hans.

Regardless their age, nationalities, passions, talents and experiences, historically before
the establishment of the PRC, Chinese women could only participate in politics through informal
channels. Empress Dowager Cixi of the Machu-Qing Royal Family was the undeniable central
leader of China from 1861 during the Second Opium War to 1908 upon her death. Though
powerful, she acquired no official title except the Mother of the Emperor (s). No female senior
official was ever recruited under the Nationalist rule of China before 1949 not to mention the
male dominated polygamy system and female prostitution were both legal until the Communists
took over China. Economically, socially, and politically suppressed by men, Chinese women
only acquired official recognitions as an important political force under CCP rule. Still, the
political participation among Chinese women has been lower compared to that of Chinese men.
Up to the 17th CCP Politburo, there have only been 5 women so far who have achieved the posts
as Politburo members. These 5 are (were): Jiang Qing (1969, Mao Zedong’s wife), Ye Qun
(1969, then CCP Deputy Chairman Lin Biao’s wife), Deng Yingchao (1978, then Premier Zhou
Enlai’s widow), Wu Yi (2002, then Deputy Premier), and Liu Yandong (2007, now Vice
President of CPPCC and Councilor of the State Council). Except Wu Yi and Liu Yandong, who
achieved Politburo posts based on their leadership experiences and promoted under Hu Jintao’s
leadership, the other three female Politburo members were more or less overshadowed by their
famous husbands.
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Table 3.6 Gender Distribution among Chinese Regional Leaders
Post
Provincial
Municipal

Male
334
293

Percentage
98.2
97.7

Female
6
7

Percentage
1.8
2.3

Total
340
300

Percentage
100
100

Source: Author’s Database
For the unthinkable difficulties for a politically passionate Chinese woman to become
a Politburo member or a central leader, it can be equally difficult for any woman to become a
provincial leader in contemporary China. As is shown in Table 3.6, among the 340 provincial
leader surveyed in this study, only 6 of them (less than 2 percent) were women. And noticeably,
the first woman ever to become a governor in China did not happen until 1983.69 Before that,
female politicians were even rarer in the CCP politics. Among the 300 mayors and municipal
leaders surveyed, there were only 7 women, which made less than 3 percent of the leadership
body. However, all the increases in women’s appearances in regional politics in China occurred
in post-Deng Xiaoping era. Similar to the rule for ethnic minorities to become regional leaders,
proportional representation for Chinese women in the political system has also been
institutionalized. According to official reports, by 2010, 87.1 percent of provincial governments
across China have women officials (did not specify the ranks or posts) in the leadership groups.
The same level of the year 2000 was only 64.5 percent. Among all municipal governments in
China, 89.4 percent of municipal governments have female officials in leadership positions (did
not specify the ranks or posts) are women in the year 2010, compared that of the year 2000 was
only 65.1 percent.70 However, even with the satisfying increase in the numbers of Chinese
women as political leaders, we still do not know how many women are actually appointed as
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executive regional leaders instead of working in the non-executive posts and having much less
influences on the policy decision-making processes.
Overall, in post-Deng Xiaoping era, Chinese women’s political participation seems to
be higher than before, with the increasing number of women as regional governmental officials.
However, do the disadvantages of gender (female) and nationality (non-Han) now serve as their
natural advantages for political promotions by maximizing the center’s preferences on
proportional representation, or do they remain as genuine weaknesses such that these leaders
have little chance to acquire executive posts in the political system? The following chapters of
the study will reveal more correlations of these leaders’ political mobility throughout their entire
political careers.
3. Locality
To govern one of the biggest countries in the world, the relationship between the
central government of China and its local authorities has always been more or less problematic.
The Chinese bureaucracy that recruited officials through national Confucian essay examinations
was said to be invented in order to prevent regional aristocracies from resisting the central
government’s policies. Therefore, the divisions and distributions of the regional governance
structure served to separate regional leaders’ power and keep the balance among local
governmental branches so that the central government could always maintain its strong
influences over regional affairs.71 The design of the Chinese regional governmental systems
requires highly skillful techniques to avoid any possible failures that could cause conflicts among
local authorities and make the system inefficient and incapable of implementing the central
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government’s policies. In consequence, one of the primary requirements used by Chinese leaders
before 1949 was to appoint non-locally born officials to be the regional leaders in a region.
It is quite common among Western politicians who campaign for governmental
positions to emphasize their strong local background in order to gain popularity and votes from
the locals. Under democracies, locality can be seen as a link between politicians and their local
voters. Voters tend to think better of the candidates with specific local background as it may
show their better understandings of local issues and more concerns about local voters’
livelihood.72 However, in Chinese politics, overwhelmingly strong local connections between an
official and one’s native hometown region was considered a problem by the central government.
An official’s strong ties with his localities indicated the risk that this official could build up his
personal leadership and trust network too easily so that other regional leaders might be
outnumbered and the central government’s commands could be blocked. For example, in the
Qing Dynasty’s rule of China for 267 years, there were only three natives of Shanxi Province
who ever were appointed as regional leaders in the province, and the regulation was that regional
leaders must be transferred to a different region every three years to prevent them rooting
locally.73 Appointing non-native officials to a region was considered an effective means of
centralizing regional politics and fiscal revenues, and more importantly, to prevent any sort of
localism that can harm the entire political system. In fact, even after the establishment of the
party-state regime in China in 1949, the CCP and its central leaders still had concerns about the
degree of authoritativeness of Chinese regional government. There are different scholarly
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arguments over the locality issue under the CCP’s early rule of China. Some scholars argue that
the CCP had ignored the inherent problem of appointing natives to be local leaders, thinking that
as native are generally more familiar with local issues and situations such that they might handle
them better than non-native leaders. And this optimistic argument insists that this is the trend
even in contemporary Chinese politics―that natives are seen more and more among regional
governments in China.74 Some other scholars, on the other hand, argue that the expanding power
and influence of the provincial secretaries had made Mao Zedong uneasy as early as the 1960s.
Mao felt that his authority and power were weakened by other central leaders and Chinese
provincial chiefs. Thus, Mao’s initiation of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 was aimed at
regaining his power as the absolute leader of China. This argument can be used to explain why
most provincial leaders were removed and purged during the Cultural Revolution. As a result,
however, Mao’s fight against localism caused disastrous social and political effects.75 A more
theoretical approach, held by some scholars, points out that the early CCP party-state regime
emphasized the inner-party balance of power, ideological education, strong party disciplines and
frequent mass political movements, all of which actually reduced the opportunities for native
regional leaders to build their personal ties within the regional political system. The
characteristics of the early CCP rule concentrated on strengthening the personal leadership of
Mao instead of any other form of decentralization of power.76
While all the research on the locality listed above has contributed to the study of
regional politics and political leaders in China, none of the arguments mentioned above had
analyzed all important aspects of the issue. The fundamental difference between Mao’s China
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and Deng’s China was neither corruption nor inner-party competition for the top leadership;
instead, it was the installation of the central-planning economy (under Mao) and the
transformation to market economy (under Deng). Along with the installation of the planned
economy was totalitarian political centralization, and along with the transformation to market
economy was a post-totalitarian technocratic regime. Neither of the economic-political system
had a precedent in Chinese history, and actually brought more complexes into the existing
problems. To the center, there are good reasons and bad reasons for appointing natives to be
regional leaders at their hometowns. The advantages show a leader may get started fairly quickly
as one needs no time to adjust in a familiar environment, and proficient knowledge of locale’s
geographies and demographics is indeed helpful for a regional leader. On the other hand,
Chinese society is an atmosphere connected by family units, social capital but with low social
mobility. As is discussed in chapter two, such an atmosphere, either social or political, prevents
many regional leaders from pursuing higher vocational excellence and encourages leaders to
chase their personal gains, abuse their power for rent-seeking corruptions and stay in power as
long as possible. Corruption has emerged as a very common excuse used by the center uses to
remove or demote a regional leader or any other CCP leader; it is due to the organizational and
institutional features of corruption among Chinese officials.77 As a result, when a native is
appointed to be a regional leader in one’s hometown region, it is likely that the leader will spend
tremendous time and energy building up his personal networks in order to influence crucial
regional governmental decisions to achieve the leader’s utmost personal interests. This would be
the last thing the CCP center expects to happen if the center’s commands are being blocked or
deliberately delayed by regional governments.
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Among the 610 regional leader in China surveyed by this study, the “native born” or
“hometown” is define by looking at the leader’s hometown province. There are 34 provincial
regions in China with most of them have municipalities and cities, and in a relatively smaller
provincial region, these municipalities can be very close to each other in distances. If a leader’s
locality is measured by which municipality one is from, it can be rather common that a leader’s
hometown municipality is only miles away from where the leader works. But the dummy
variables might still be coded “0” for the leader is a “non-native.” If so, the accuracy of the study
will be significantly affected by the carelessness of the research design. Therefore, to faithfully
reflect the realistic situation to the utmost, the dummy variable is only coded “0” if either a city
leader or a provincial leader works at a regional government and he or she is from another
province.

One might also argue with the study’s approach that makes no distinction between a
leader getting transferred or appointed from a very distant province to a new post and a leader
getting transferred from a neighboring province which is only hundred kilometers away.
However, a province is an ideal administrative unit that can be compared to the units based on its
socioeconomic and political heterogeneity. Calculating a leader’s moving distance between two
posts of the leader’s might be slightly helpful if the readers are interested in provincial customs
of China. However, as this is not a cultural or anthropological study, the author believes the
moving distance factor beyond provincial level is trivial.
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Table 3.7a Non-Natives’ Appointments as Regional Leaders in China
Post
Time
Native
Provincial
1950s
21
City
1950s
21
Provincial
1960s
15
City
1960s
3
Provincial
1970s
11
City
1970s
7
Provincial
1980s
34
City
1980s
20
Provincial
1990s
21
City
1990s
24
Provincial
2000s
27
City
2000s
35
N/A
Total
239
Source: Author’s Database

%
32.3
40.4
38.5
33.3
23.4
46.7
51.5
57.1
38.2
48
27
45.5
39.2

Non-Native
44
31
24
6
36
8
32
15
34
26
73
42
371

%
67.7
58.6
61.5
66.7
76.6
53.3
48.5
42.9
61.8
52
73
54.5
60.8

Total
65
52
39
9
47
15
66
35
55
50
100
77
610

%
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Table 3.7b Native and Non-Native Regional Leaders in China
Post
Native
All Provincial
129
Post-Deng Provincial
41
All Municipal
157
Post-Deng Municipal
95
Source: Author’s Database

%
34.9
31.1
52.3
57.9

Non-Native
241
91
143
69

%
65.1
68.9
47.7
42.1

Total
370
132
300
164

%
100
100
100
100

As is shown in Table 3.7a, despite of the range of time and changes of the central
leadership from Mao Zedong, to Deng Xiaoping, to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the CCP center
has always kept a certain percentage of regional leaders in as non-natives, while the center has
also made sure that native leaders in local governments could be utilized for sustainable
governance. Therefore, there has not been a remarkably significant drop of the native leaders in
the regional governments. In the 1950s, about one third (32.3 percent) of regional leaders were
locally raised who worked in their hometown provinces as party secretaries, governors and their
deputies; and about 67.7 percent provincial leaders were outsiders or non-natives. Such a ratio
remained until the occurrence of the Cultural Revolution, when senior leaders were removed and
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purged. In 1990s and 2000s, the ratio of non-native leaders in Chinese provinces regained slowly
back to 61.8 percent and 73 percent, which were about the same level of that of the 1950s. In
other words, significant changes in the ratio of natives to non-natives appointed as Chinese
provincial leaders only happened during the Cultural Revolution and a few years afterwards
(before the opening of the 12th CCP National Congress in 1982). Other than that, the center’s
policy and determination of mixing up natives and non-natives across provinces remained
constant. The similar situation can be applied to city leaders in China through the years. In the
1950s, about 40.4 percent of city leaders were “locals” where 58.6 percent of them were nonnatives. In the 2000s, 45.5 percent of city leaders in China who were appointed to the posts were
natives. While there are many more city municipalities in China than the number of provinces,
and a number of provinces have influences to decide municipal level personnel arrangements, it
is not surprising that there have been a higher percentage of natives appointed as city leaders
than the stricter limit on natives becoming provincial leaders.

Table 3.8 Regional Chief Posts Held by Non-Native Officials
Time
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
Total

Non-Native City
Chiefs
32
6
8
16
26
27
115

Total
Chiefs
50
9
14
35
46
68
222

%
64
66.7
57.1
45.7
56.5
39.7
51.8

Source: Author’s Database
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Non-Native
Province Chiefs
34
18
27
27
30
38
174

Total
Chiefs
51
34
37
52
46
54
274

%
66.7
52.9
73.0
51.9
65.2
70.4
63.5

The difference between a chief leader and other deputy or vice leaders in a regional
government of China has been discussed in chapter two of this study. In most cases, CCP chief
secretary is more powerful than his deputies or other departmental heads who are standing
committee members. The governor in a province is supposedly the executive officer who is more
powerful than all the vice governors and departmental heads. The same situation can be applied
to municipal governments as well: city secretaries and mayors are politically more important
than their deputies. In consequence, do more natives occupy the chief posts than the non-natives
in regional governments of China? This study shows that non-native regional leaders are more
likely to be named to the chief posts, where natives are more commonly seen in deputy or vicelevel posts. As is shown in Table 3.8, through the 60 years of the CCP rule of China, 63.5
percent of all provincial chiefs (first secretaries and governors) were actually working outside
their native provinces. And 51.8 percent of chief city leaders (secretaries and mayors) in China
were serving in non-native provinces’ municipal governments. The findings show that although a
certain percentage has been kept for natives to serve in regional governments as leaders, the
center still keeps the chief posts mainly for non-native leaders from other provinces. The center
is concerned with growing ties and connections among the sub-national native leaders and their
localities, and such connections can cause localism, both economic and political, which would
become an obstacle for the center’s policies. The potential problems of having native regional
leaders can lower the center’s authority at the regional levels. By all means, the fact those
provincial chiefs are important political leaders in China; therefore, the center must minimize the
risks when it arranges the appointments. Both the provincial chief secretary and the governor of a
province have decisive power over numerous decisions.
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Currently, the majority of the provincial chiefs in China are also Central Committee members
of the CCP, which means that these leaders can also affect the center’s decisions by altering their
legal votes in the CC. By appointing provincial chiefs, the center has a lot to weigh and consider,
and natives controlling the chief posts more or less would increase localism. However, among all
the chief city leaders studied here, the natives slightly outnumber non-natives among posts in
municipal governments. It is possible that the personnel arrangements have been a combination
of central preferences and the provincial decisions where at a lower level of an administrative
region, natives are not only more acceptable by local residents, but also are more experienced
with local customs. This study suggests that if any scholarly study tracks down to village level
personnel arrangements in China, we expect to see many more natives take village chief posts
than non-natives. Non-natives get little chance in village political campaigns. It is not because of
localism is common among China’s rural villages, but because it is almost unthinkable for a nonnative farmer to be moved across provinces to become the head of a completely strange village.
Village chiefs in China do not have wages; they only have allocations which are limitedly
granted by township authorities. Without the economic and social privileges enjoyed by the
municipal and provincial leaders, it makes no sense for a non-native farmer to compete with
natives for a village official post―he would be better off to operate a small business or to work
in the cities.
4. Education
The education of a leader is commonly regarded as an important indicator of the leader’s
partisanship, ideological preferences and future career movement. In classical elite theories, as
well as in studies of political elites in democracies, empirical evidence shows that candidates
with higher educational levels are more likely to be elected to legislatures, and the career patterns
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of the elites are likewise correlated with their educational background.78 Generally speaking, the
higher one’s educational level is, the more one tends to participate in political life, the more
universal values one tends to recognize and accept, and the more professional one tends to be in
their chosen occupation one engaged in. Historically, Chinese political leaders and elites were
ideally supposed to be well-educated with thorough knowledge of Confucian philosophy and the
humanities to work not only as bureaucrats for the monarchs, but also as moral models able to be
appointed to regional governmental posts representing the empire’s high standards of moralism
and for good governance.79 However, when the Leninist-based Chinese Communist Party took
power in 1949, such an education of CCP officials was not considered a requirement for
recruiting. By contrasting regional leaders’ educational levels overall and especially the
educational indicators in the 1950s and 1960s to those of the post-Deng Xiaoping era (see Table
3.9) the study argues the followings:
In the first place, when most leaders’ educational levels were low, higher educational
attainment was not a crucial requirement to become a regional leader in China. Most regional
leaders appointed by the CCP in 1950s and 1960s were revolutionary veterans who joined in the
Chinese Revolution as early as the 1920s. The requirements for recruiting revolutionaries were
definitely different from the requirements for recruiting provincial and municipal leaders in
China. Therefore, as most revolutionaries came from humble socioeconomic backgrounds (many
of them even described themselves to be “dirt poor” before they became revolutionaries of the
Red Army), opportunities for formal school education were indeed scarce. Even among the
Politburo members, who were supposed to be the leaders of leaders, it was rare. Among all 17 of
8th CCP Politburo members elected in 1956, only 5 of the 17 had ever attended to college-level
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institutions or equivalents, and none of them was issued a degree. Among 116 provincial leaders
of the 1950s and 1960s surveyed in the study, only 39 of them (33.6 percent) had ever achieved
higher education, though the term used on their curriculum vitae was “the recognition of
university culture,” which roughly meant to have taken college courses or been enlightened
intellectually by higher education related institutions. But the lack of outstanding university
degrees and impressive GPAs did not affect any of these provincial leaders’ careers as regional
leaders. The situation was much the same for Chinese city leaders in the 1950s and 1960s.
Among 105 city leaders surveyed in the same time range, only 21 of them (20 percent) claimed
to have “the recognition of university culture.” Accordingly, despite their educational levels,
there was almost no distinction among leaders with higher education and those without. In other
words, back to the early years of CCP’s rule of China, education was not a crucial factor which
was decisive for the center in appointing regional leaders. The reason was fairly simple: because
only a small percentage of the CCP cadres received higher education. It was, in fact, an
intellectual privilege so rare among most of the cadres. Mao Zedong, the top leader himself, was
not enthusiastic at all for formal education.

Table 3.9 Educational Background of Chinese Regional Leaders
Time
1950s-60s
Post-1997
All Time
1950s-60s
Post-1997
All Time
Total

Post
Provincial
Provincial
Provincial
City
City
City
N/A

College
39
102
190
21
116
176
644

%
No College
33.6
77
100
0
55.9
150
20.0
84
97.5
3
69.3
78
62.2
392
Source: Author’s Database

98

%
66.4
0
44.1
80.0
2.5
30.7
37.8

Total
116
102
340
105
119
254
1036

In the second place, when most leaders’ educational levels got higher and reached a
certain degree, higher educational level was no longer a crucial indicator for one’s upward
political mobility. Among 102 provincial leaders in China who received their posts from 1997 to
2010, all of them (100 percent) claimed to have achieved college level higher education. And
among 119 city leaders in China of the same time period, 116 of them (97.5 percent) had
received higher education when they were appointed to their municipal posts. For this time, most
leaders listed on their curriculum vita that what they had were formal degrees with different
major fields, but no longer “the recognition.” As a matter of fact, in post-Deng era, Chinese
regional leaders have become much more educated compared to the early CCP leaders of China.
However, when something that used to be scarce has become something common, the
meaningfulness of using it in filtering elites and non-elites will also drop tremendously. Most
post-Deng era Chinese regional leaders were able to complete their higher education while
pursuing their political careers. Thus, if everyone who studies can get a degree sooner or later,
how much the center still weighs a leader’s education is unknown. Starting in 2012, the Chinese
central governmental system and all province-equivalent governmental systems will no longer
recruit new civil servants with bachelor’s degrees who have less than two years of full-time
working experiences.80 The policy announced by the Ministry of Human Resource and Social
Security of the PRC indicates that bachelor-degree level education is no longer considered an
educational advantage among young civil servants who only have studied hard to pass the civil
service recruiting exams. This event stirred some controversies among college graduates in
China for they felt that their education had become cheap and common such that the job
requirements for becoming a civil servant certainly had been raised. Only when higher education
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has become easy to achieve, would the center begin to evaluate applicants with other
requirements. Instead, the newer requirement for recruiting future officials of the CCP
concentrates more on the comprehensiveness of the fresh college graduates who have dealt with
realistic social and political issues with administrative skills rather than those who merely know
how to score high in exams. Being a leader, or to be a leader who occupies a government post, it
may be more necessary to acquire some “contextual intelligence” that helps one “discern trends
in the face of complexity and adaptability while trying to shape events.” 81 For the contextual
intelligence can be more helpful in accomplishing tasks better and getting promoted more
promptly.
Finally, advanced degree came after senior leadership posts but not vice versa. In the
post-Deng era, some regional leaders have attained doctorate degrees. Among 221 provincial and
municipal leaders surveyed in the study, 11 of them now have doctorate degrees (5 percent) and
19 of them have master’s degrees or attended master’s programs without claiming the degrees
(8.6 percent). Compared to Chinese regional leaders in the 1950s and 1960s, where none of the
regional leaders had advanced degrees, it is considered as great education progress among
Chinese regional leaders. However, among the advanced degree holders who were (are) also
regional leaders, only 1 of the 30 was a professional researcher before he pursued a career in
politics. Others were already regional leaders (though at lower ranks) when they started graduate
school. And the leaders who went to graduate school have not given up their day jobs entirely,
meaning most of them were part-time graduate students. And there were 20 of the 30 graduate
school-trained leaders who were trained at regional party schools or the Central Party School of
the CCP. Party schools do offer graduate programs like other regular universities in China,
however, most party school based graduate programs have specialized programs for CCP
81

Joseph S. Nye Jr. The Powers to Lead (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.88.

100

officials but not available to regular students. In other words, being a medium-high ranked
regional leader in China, there are even specialized graduate studies programs offered to you.
In sum, in contemporary Chinese politics, education may no longer be a crucial factor
in studying career mobility of regional leaders in China, but the personal ties established during
leaders’ educational experiences may be used to explain factional politics in China, which is also
related to the topic of the political mobility of the regional leaders. Related discussions will be
presented in later chapters of the study, yet education is still used in the author’s analysis of
regional leaders’ political mobility in order to filter certain variables.
B. Organizational and Professional Background of Regional Leaders in China
In fact, among studies on political elites done in the past, biological features of elites
have been considered by scholars as very important independent variables that they determine an
elite’s political views and social activities in later times of his life. In this study, biological
backgrounds of Chinese regional leaders are to be combined with a few other independent
variables in order to explain the leaders’ political mobility throughout their careers under the
CCP’s superiority. Most political elites under Communist or post-communist regimes are
considered by political scientists to be technocrats, as the make of the authoritarian elite and their
behaviors are different from that of the statesmen and politicians under democracies. Therefore,
the author of this study believes that it is of vital importance to examine’ Chinese regional
leader’s career movements by putting them back to the regime-related institutions, in order to
avoid any premature, biased or single-dimensional analysis. By all means, the Communist Party
of China is the most visible and vibrant political institution in contemporary Chinese society,
hence, the following analyses of the study concentrate on organizational and professional
backgrounds of Chinese regional leaders.
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1. Party Membership and Party School Trainings
Needless to say, under CCP party-state regime, being a Communist party member is the
presetting that is crucial among all other requirements to become a regional leader in China.
Unlike two-party system or consensus government of democracies, where winning the majority
in parliament by a political party cannot eliminate different voices from other political
oppositions. Under the party-state regime, the CCP is the dominantly political force in Chinese
politics. Being unchallengeable, any great decision will be made by the insiders of the CCP and
the decision-making process involves no outsiders. In other words, the game of Chinese politics
has set its primary rule which is that players must all be CCP members. Indeed, there are more
than 80 million CCP members in China, 82 not all of them can or will step into real politics. In
fact, most of them are affiliated with local CCP organizations, but are not involved in any of the
center’s policy-making processes. Our findings show that, among all regional leaders in China
since 1949, the absolute majority of them were (are) CCP members. In Table 3.10, among 254
city leaders surveyed, 251 of them were (are) CCP members (98.8 percent), only 3 exceptions.
Among 340 provincial leaders surveyed, accordingly 97.3 percent of them were (are) CCP
members and only 5 exceptions. However, there has been significant change of numbers of nonCCP regional leaders in post-Deng Xiaoping era compared to that of Mao’s and Deng’s eras. The
CCP members’ majority of the regional leadership remains overwhelming, but there are always
limited regional governmental seats saved for non-CCP members at all times.
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Table 3.10 CCP Party Membership Counts of Chinese Regional Leaders
Time
Leader Post CCP Member Count
All Time
City
251
1997-2010
City
146
All Time
Province
335
1997-2010
Province
117

%
98.8
97.3
98.5
98.3

Non-CCP Count
3
4
5
2

%
1.2
2.7
1.5
1.7

Total
254
150
340
119

%
100
100
100
100

Source: Author’s Database.
Moreover, even if non-CCP members stand some chance to move upward in the
political system in the future, it would be most unlikely that they can take the chief posts in
regional governments. Among the regional leaders studied in this dissertation, all chief posts of
Chinese provinces and cities have been occupied by CCP members. There were a few exceptions:
at the very beginning of the People’s Republic of China, to show the CCP’s representativeness of
all the people in China, Mao Zedong appointed a few non-CCP political activists to be governors,
including the governor of Hunan Province, Mao’s hometown.83 However, after the Anti-Rightists
Campaign in 1957 where most minority parties’ leaders were politically isolated by the CCP,
chief posts in Chinese regional governments were no longer appointed non-CCP leaders to be
regional leaders. In all, it is the party’s strong will that the political dominance of the CCP in
China must remain unchallengeable, though strictly limited governmental seats can be given to
non-CCP members in order to show the party’s “generosity” to outsiders and its willingness for
“multiparty collaboration.” 84
The nationwide party school system of the Communist Party of China was created
during the years of the Great Chinese Revolution by the party. It was partially because of the
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poor educational level among early revolutionaries and also for strengthening the Leninist
ideological influence among all CCP members. Inspired by the Communist party system of the
Soviet Union, the first CCP party school was established in 1933 at a Communist settlement in
Jiangxi Province 85 while the outside regions were still encircled by the KMT armed forces.
Through the years, the CCP party school system has also undergone great transformations as
Deng’s economic reform transformed Chinese society fundamentally. Before the early 1990s, the
party schools expanded all over China from counties to the center. During Jiang Zemin’s
leadership as the CCP General Secretary, establishments of county-level party schools had been
demolished yet the city-level and provincial level party schools remained. Though shrinking in
numbers, the importance of the party schools has not been declining at all. In contemporary
China, being sent to training programs at party schools, especially being sent to the Central Party
School in Beijing, is still considered a vital political opportunity for a younger cadre to gain
career experiences; for anyone with a promising political future, it means a chance to meet some
of the most important figures in Chinese politics. Furthermore, the headmaster post of the CCP
Central Party School has always been taken by one of the top leaders in China. Since 1993, then
Vice President Hu Jintao became the headmaster of the Central Party School, and Hu was
succeeded by then Vice President Zeng Qinghong as the headmaster of CPS in 2002 after the
16th National Congress of CCP. It happened shortly before Hu became President of China in
March 2003. After the 17th CCP National Congress in 2007, Xi Jinping, incumbent Vice
President of China, headed the Central Party School by replacing Vice President Zeng. As a
matter of fact, due to its importance in leader selections and successions of the CCP politics, the
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party school system in China is still a vitally important political institution attached to the
communist party.
Table 3.11 Party School Training Experiences of Chinese Regional Leaders
Time
All Time
1950s
1980s
1997-2010
All Time
1950s
1980s
1997-2010

Leader Post
City
City
City
City
Province
Province
Province
Province

All Leader Count
289
52
38
154
340
65
66
102

%
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Party School Attendance
197
3
10
62
119
10
24
65

%
68.2
5.8
26.3
40.3
35.0
7.1
36.4
63.7

Source: Author’s Database
By contrasting party school trained regional leaders in China over the years, from
Mao’s era to post-Deng’s era, our findings (shown in Table 3.11) prove the author’s hypothetical
expectations on the political importance of the CCP party schools to Chinese regional leaders to
be correct. Firstly, the number of party-school trained CCP regional leaders in China has been
steadily increasing in the past few decades, especially in post-Deng Xiaoping era. Overall, there
have been 197 city leaders out of 289 (68.2 percent) have been trained at party schools. And 35
percent of provincial leaders of in the PRC’s history (119 of 340) have been trained at party
schools before they became provincial leaders in China. Also, the percentages of party schooltrained city leaders increased from 5.8 percent in the 1950s to 26.3 percent in the 1980s and
eventually reached 40.3 percent in post-Deng Xiao era from 1997 to 2010. The same percentages
rises among provincial leaders with party school training increasing from 7.1 percent in the
1950s to 36.4 percent in the 1980s and 63.7 percent in the 1997-2010 eras. The significant rises
of party school training background among Chinese regional leaders may be seen as proof of the
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party’s higher and higher standards for more professional and skilled leaders with better
education and competence before they are appointed to head the regional governments around
China.
Secondly, the nationwide party school system of the CCP has been offering various
training courses above and beyond traditionally orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideological education.
Instead, a growing number of Chinese regional leaders completed their graduate school programs
at the Central Party School and provincial-level party schools and received master’s and doctor’s
degrees in fields other than Marxism, such as economic management. Among the graduate study
programs booklets collected by the author from regional CCP party schools in China, some offer
master’s degree programs in “National Economy” with concentrations on “modern property
theories” and “macroeconomic policy study;” 86 some offer 2- to 3-year master programs in
economic management with listed courses such as accounting, banking and monetary policies,
and “electronic business and marketing”. 87 Though it is doubtful how effective these training
programs offered by the party schools can be to turn technocrats into economists and business
experts, it indicates some positive changes advocated by the center such that Chinese political
elites are to be ready for greater economic changes and globalization in the near future.
Last but not least, a party school training background may not be a crucial factor that
affects a regional leader’s future career mobility. It does, however, have two important functions
that might have made some leaders stand out from others with a similar curriculum vita. One is
the comprehensive knowledge and global perspectives the leader can learn from party school
education, as it is by all means designed as a leadership program to develop specialized expertise
86
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in relevant subjects. The other function of party schools is to establish social networks for other
regional leaders from different parts of the province/country. Though it is hard to monitor the
interactions among the leaders during their party schools training, the network itself is
undeniably valuable to a leader’s political career.
2. Communist Youth League Experiences of Regional Leaders
Party memberships and party school trainings are tied to Chinese regional leaders’
career choices before most of them received promotions to regional leadership posts. Under most
circumstances, when an official or party cadre joined in the Communist party and was chosen to
be trained at the party school(s), he is more likely to spend most time of his career inside the
political system and long for the next upward movement toward a higher post. Unlike in
democracies, where partisanship can be switched as a result of a voter’s change of political
beliefs and policy preferences, in Chinese politics a CCP member’s partisanship was formed at a
younger age. It usually takes more than two years for someone who expresses interest in
becoming a CCP member to actually becoming a member. Furthermore, even before one has
shown any particular interests in party membership, the totalitarian structure of the Communist
party has already established pro-Communist organizations among Chinese youth, such as high
school students, young farmers, and soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army. The dominant part
of all the sub-structures is the Chinese Communist Youth League, known as the League, which is
in charge of selecting and assisting younger Chinese to become CCP members in their later years
of life.
Arguably the largest political party in the world, CCP has highly strict and picky
standards for recruiting new members into the party. For instance, after one shows interests in
becoming a CCP member, one must wait until the party organization collects others’ opinions of
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one’s application, and a “political inspection” of one’s direct family members and relatives is
also required. Finally, after all these procedural steps and if one is provisionally accepted as a
CCP member-to-be, it takes another full calendar year for a “to-be” member to become an
official member.88 The Communist Youth League recruits its members applying a similar
philosophy, but practically it is much simpler and costs less time. Therefore, before a young
person decides to become a CCP member when reaches the age requirement of 18, he or she can
choose to become a League member at the age of 14. According to the last consensus published
in 2008, there are currently more than 75 million League members in China.89 Meanwhile, as an
important sub-structure of the CCP, the League is also the major patron of other social
organizations among Chinese youth, such as the National College Students Association, the
Association of the Young Volunteers, and the Communist Young Pioneers. In other words, the
totalitarian characteristic of the Communist party entails controlling almost each and every
aspect of a society where its citizens are organizationally connected and controlled by different
units and sub-systems of the party. The League serves the function of maintaining the party’s
dominant control over Chinese youth and their politically related social activities.
The Communist Youth League was not commonly regarded as a prominent political
organization in Chinese politics until in the early 1980s. When Deng Xiaoping became the top
leader of China, he promoted to the center several younger leaders known as the Reformists who
were in charge of carrying out Deng’s reformist ideas to real policies. One of them was Hu
Yaobang, who had been the chief of the League from 1953 to 1978. Long years of leadership
experience as the League’s chief secretary, Hu Yaobang had been familiar with many younger
party cadres and was well-acquainted with their competences and capabilities. When Hu
88
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Yaobang was promoted by Deng Xiaoping to be the General Secretary of the CCP in 1981 (he
resigned as the General Secretary in January 1987 but remained to be on the Politburo), he also
promoted a number of his old time protégés to important political posts in China. Most of them
were relatively young and in favor of reformist policies, opposed to some of the senior leaders
who disagreed with Deng Xiaoping’s “Open Door” reform. Those who were close to Hu
Yaobang in the 1980s included current President of China and CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao
(then Secretary of the Youth League) and Premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao (then
Director of the Office of the CCP Central Committee). Hu Yaobang’s resignation and death in
the late 1980s did not lead to the decline of former League officials getting crucial promotions.
Instead, the League-affiliated leaders achieved more and reached higher in the political system of
China. President Hu Jintao, who had years of working experiences as a student leader, headed
the League in 1984 as the First Secretary and left the post when he was appointed the CCP
secretary of Guizhou Province in 1985. In 1992, Hu Jintao became a Standing Member of the
Politburo at the age of 49 and was expected by Deng Xiaoping as Jiang Zemin’s successor. With
the League background, provincial leadership experience (in Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet), the
headmastership of the Central Party School from 1993 to 2002, and graduation from the elitist
Tsinghua University, the self-made President Hu was considered to have promoted many CCP
cadres with League background to important regional and ministerial positions as the network
was crucial for Hu Jintao to consolidate his rule and to carry out his preferred policies.
In this study, regional leaders labeled with League background means they had at
some time worked as League officials at an officially recognized League branch or regional
committee. For those regional leaders who had ever been League members, but never took any
fulltime job post at a League organization, they would not be coded as having League
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background. With these clarifications, our findings support the author’s hypothesis on the
increase of regional leaders’ League background in Chinese politics. As is shown in Table 3.12,
there has been a significant growth of League background among Chinese regional leaders.
Nearly one-sixth of regional leaders in China have had League working experiences; as the
number for city leaders is 17.7 percent (51 of 289) and for provincial leaders is 16.2 percent (55
of 340). Such an increase was not a gradual change but rather a short-term phenomenon that took
place especially in post-Deng Xiaoping era. In the 1950s, only 5.8 percent (3 of 52) of the city
leaders surveyed had League experiences. And only 3.6 of percent provincial leaders (2 of 56)
had League background. Even in the 1980s, 19.7 percent of provincial leaders had League
background (13 of 66). However, between 1997 and 2010, 29.4 percent of provincial leaders had
League working experiences (30 of 102); and 36.4 percent of city leaders (56 of 104) had League
working experiences before they became city leaders. The growth of League connection to the
regional leaders is being viewed by outsiders as a rapid rise of the League-affiliated officials in
Chinese politics. Noticeably, not all the regional leaders with League experience were connected
with the center of the Communist Youth League or had acquired their major promotions based
on President Hu Jintao’s personal instructions. In fact, many regional leaders with a League
background had worked at local League offices and took governmental posts from these local
departments of the League. It could mean that the rise of League-affiliated officials has become a
nationwide trend―working for the League wherever the offices are helps one experience upward
political mobility in the future; one does not need to be directly connected with President Hu
Jintao. It is the systemic setting or arrangement that the League and its outstanding protégés have
become more visible on the political hierarchy map of the CCP politics.
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Table 3.12 Youth League Working Experiences of Chinese Regional Leaders
Column1
All Time
1950s
1980s
1997-2010
All Time
1950s
1980s
1997-2010

Leader Post
City
City
City
City
Province
Province
Province
Province

All Leader Count
289
52
34
154
340
56
66
102

%
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

League Background
51
3
2
56
55
2
13
30

%
17.7
5.8
5.9
36.4
16.2
3.6
19.7
29.4

Source: Author’s Database

C. Conclusion
This chapter takes a closer look at some of the most important personal characteristics
and biological features of all the regional leaders in China recorded by this study. There is no
doubt that political elite must be studied as a political being as well as a physical being. This
research based on leaders’ personal backgrounds contains crucial information of the regional
leaders in China. The information is what we need in order to make further analysis of the
leaders and their career paths in following chapters of this study. At the beginning of the chapter,
the author hypothetically expects that when compared to those in the earlier time periods of the
PRC, contemporary Chinese regional leaders have not only improved their social status and
political importance through economic reform, but also gradually changed their personal
backgrounds by becoming more well-educated and politically trained for serving in regional
governments of China.
In general, there are some aspects of Chinese regional leaders’ backgrounds and personal
characteristics that we need to keep in mind before we go any further. First, post-Deng Xiaoping
era’s Chinese regional leaders are relatively older compared to previous cohorts of regional
leaders under Mao. It was due to the merit-based promotion mechanism of Chinese technocrats
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that a leader usually would get promoted to the next higher post in the system. In consequence,
as city leaders usually spend less time in the service, they are also relatively younger than
provincial leaders in China; and provincial leaders are relatively younger than most of the central
leaders who actually reached the high profile after serving at every step lower.
Second, the Chinese ethnic majority, the Han Chinese, occupy the majority of the regional
leadership posts and all male leaders have visible advantages over female regional leaders. In a
country such as China, the consistency of state building also reflects the ethnic majority’s
involvement as the dominant part of the process. Except in ethnic minorities’ autonomously
administrative regions, one expects to see more minority-background regional leaders sitting in
responsible posts, still the party chief positions are mostly taken by Han Chinese candidates. And
Chinese women’s political participation was mostly forbidden until the creation of the People’s
Republic in 1949. As Chinese women had been suppressed by the opposite sex for centuries
through every level of the society, it is still not common yet to see Chinese women in chief
political posts.
Third, political localism has posed challenges to almost all the central governments in
Chinese history. Central leaders must balance between native political elites and non-native
elites when staffing regional governments and other bodies around China. Traditionally, natives
were regularly excluded from regional governments so as to minimize any potential localism
which can foster corruption, local networks, and the decline of the center’s authority. As a matter
of fact, it seems that the CCP has recently allowed a much greater percentage of natives to be
regional leaders in their hometown provinces. And there are relatively more native city leaders in
municipal governments than that of provincial governments, for the smaller unit it is, the less
likely the center can exclude potential local influences over personnel arrangements, and
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municipal personnel arrangements are mostly conducted by the provincial governments instead
of the CCP center. Again, it is for the political privileges and socioeconomic benefits that one is
willing to work at a distant location away from one’s native area. Thus, we expect to see more
non-natives taking chief posts instead of deputy or vice positions in regional governments across
China.
Fourth, the results show that contemporary Chinese regional leaders, as political and
social elite of China, have become much more educated compared to elite in Mao’s and Deng’s
eras. In addition, it has been asserted in this chapter that when Chinese higher education has
transformed through years, having a college degree has become an basic job requirement to
recruit regional governmental officials, then the education level indicator might no longer be
especially significant in deciding a regional leader’s political mobility. A young leader needs to
achieve more than a school diploma to expect a promotion in his leadership career.
In addition to personal background information, this chapter also examined some other
important features concerning regional leaders in China. These factors can be related to the
organizational and professional settings of the party-state directed by the Communist party.
First, being CCP member is definitely essential for potential candidate who is interested in
becoming political elites in China. Most regional leaders are CCP members; members of other
minority political parties are rarely appointed as chief regional governmental leaders. Also, the
nationwide party school system plays its important political function in training governmental
officials and younger cadres, enhancing the party’s ideological control, upgrading regional
leaders’ knowledge reserves, and making personal connections among regional leaders
themselves. The influence of party schools, especially provincial party schools and Central Party
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School has not declined in post-Deng era; they actually gained organizational strengths by
attracting higher ranked officials as well as greater social and political resources in the country.
Second, one of the newer phenomena seen in recent decades in Chinese politics has been
the significant rise of the Communist Youth League affiliated regional leaders, also known as
tuanpai (the Clique of the League). Due to two general secretaries of the CCP, Hu Yaobang and
Hu Jintao, Youth League affiliations have become politically important to many CCP officials’
career mobility. Our study shows that in recent years, there has been an important rise of Leaguebased leaders on the map of Chinese political power.
By examining the background and characteristics of Chinese regional leaders, we can
conclude that the making of Chinese regional leaders can be a rather complicated and non-linear
process related to a series of personal, social, economic, and political factors. In fact, the feature
of Chinese technocratic politics being dominated by the CCP has made some features of the
regional leadership highly homogeneous (such as education, party membership, genders, and
ethnic groups), while some other features remain complexly heterogeneous (locality and the
League background) such that different indicators must be combined to improve the existing
literature. Here, one should remember that the readers that most regional leadership posts are
actually interchangeable; for instance, a governor can be promoted to a provincial party chief,
and a vice secretary of the provincial party committee can be transferred to a mayor post at an
important big city. Due to the dominance of the CCP in Chinese politics, where authority over
making personnel decisions exclusively remains in the center’s hands, political mobility issue
can be practically more complicated than simply electing leaders as under democracy. The
communist party must balance the interests of all the parties involved in the leaders’
rearrangements such that each qualified candidate can be filtered by the center multiple times to
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reach the final decisions. Again, the center always needs capable protégés to be in charge of the
regional governance systems in China, but it is crucial that the center’s superior authority must
be maintained at all times.
This third chapter of this study analyzes matters of the most important personal
backgrounds and characteristics of Chinese regional leaders, by establishing the correlation
between the traits of the leaders and the political mobility patterns in their careers. Regional
leaders’ previous governmental posts in the Chinese political system and the locations of their
previous governmental posts are also highly important independent variables to be thoroughly
studied in this study. The next chapter of will be devoted to evaluate regional leaders’ career
paths and the geopolitical settings of their previous governmental posts. The results reveal what
they had achieved before becoming Chinese regional elite.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FISCAL REVENUES, GEOPOLITICAL SETTINGS AND POLITICAL MOBILITY OF
CHINESE REGIONAL LEADERS

Being a highly centralized country run by the state bureaucracy for its highest central
leaders, the economic and business centers in China, where the revenues were generated for the
government through taxation, historically had occupied great political importance as well. In fact,
as the center’s core interests had been tightly tied with the economic centers in specific Chinese
regions, the coordination and conflict between regional elites and the center had existed long
before the Communist party’s rule of China.90 The primary goal of the central government’s
taxations on business firms was to collect enough money for the Empire and for the emperors’
massive spending. On one hand, the center needed to secure its dominance in local economies by
monitoring local elites; on the other hand, locales also needed the authority of the center to
maintain necessary social orders and protect local elites’ interests in disputes with the peasants
and workers. In other words, “[s]tatesmen and elites aimed to defuse discontent over tax issues
based on household self-interests, the community’s welfare, and the state’s desire to sustain a
stable relationship with local society.” 91 When the CCP took over China, even though heavy
taxation on the peasants was considered the “shackles and chains” put on them by the imperial
regime, and while land reforms nationwide in the early 1950s guaranteed rural peasant’
households with contracted farming land lent by the state to secure their basic livelihood, by
centralizing Chinese economy under the CCP center’s tight control, the relatively developed
economic regions in China were under greater pressure from the center, and their incumbent
regional political elites were replaced with veteran revolutionary cadres, who politically
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controlled the regional governments and also operated the regional economy through stateowned firms.
Although during Mao Zedong’s era, the Chinese economy was framed and structured to
concentrate on heavy industries and the machinery manufacturing sectors by adapting the highly
similar model borrowed from Stalinist Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform initially
concentrated on the decentralization of the central planning economy which used to be strictly
manipulated by the state. 92 The shared purpose of both Mao’s central planning economy and
Deng’s socialist market had been to modernize China at a rapid pace to make it industrialized
and developed. The legitimacy of the CCP’s rule does not come from the claim that every
Chinese would enter into the ideal society of Communism merrily, only under the guidance of
the CCP; at least it was not the entirety of the party’s plan. The legitimacy of Communist rule
from the very beginning was based on the fact that the CCP promised the Chinese people a better
quality of life.93 However vaguely defined, life was supposed to become better under the new
regime. The people’s welfare and livelihoods should have improved, or been improving under
the CCP’s leadership. Hence, the better quality of life promise has driven the center to produce
higher economic growth rates and achieve greater and greater GDP increases year by year. 94 In
consequence, the common view held by both the center and its regional political leaders is: the
greater the economic growth across China’s different regions, and the higher growth rates and
GDP numbers they achieved at the end of every year, the more stable the CCP’s rule will be.
Furthermore, when the tasks assigned by the center have been well-accomplished by the regional
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leaders, the regional leaders’ tenures are also secured; they can continue acting as both the
leaders of their regions and the agents of the center to the people of the regions.
The scale of China’s national economy has recently become one of the largest in the
world. However, as the Western world’s China watchers keep bashing the Chinese government’s
monetary policies and manipulation of the renminbi currency exchange rates, many have ignored
the fact that socioeconomic development among China’s different regions is highly uneven. Yet,
the CCP center has not found any effective solutions.95 Meanwhile, as in any post-totalitarian,
party-state controlled and technocrats-operated state, many of the fundamental socioeconomic
issues can be anatomized by looking at the structure of the Chinese political system. The
conflicts of interests between a regional government and the central government of China may
have caused different economic policy outcomes such that the center can influence regional
governments through the allocations and other financial support. Moreover, the political
importance of a region in China can also be evaluated through the center’s fiscal indicator that is
by taking a look at the tax revenue indexes in recent years. Last but not least, under the partystate regime, sustainable economic growth and regional governments’ financial conditions and
fiscal contributions to the center are among the decisive factors that determine regional leaders’
political mobility in the future. Regional economic growth is one of the most desirable
achievements of a regional government that the CCP center expects. Yet, the distribution of
political-economic resources among different regions of China is astonishingly uneven and
inconsistent. Therefore, by looking only at a region’s economic achievement in determining a
regional leader’s political career can be rather biased when different indicators do not account for
the highly secretive political realities happening in Chinese politics. As a result, we must also
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study each regional leader’s leadership posts prior to his appointment to the new leadership post.
The professional experiences of regional leaders certainly play important part in influencing the
center’s final decisions on regional political personnel arrangements, and the center is surely
willing to promote a technocrat who combines loyalty, capability and integrity, and one’s
previous working experiences would supply some of the information that the center is searching
for in making such decisions.
Therefore, in this chapter, the first part concentrates on analyzing the political
importance of China’s regions, using empirical data of different regional governments’ social
and economic achievements over the past three decades (i.e., since the initiation of Deng’s
reform). The second part of the chapter makes its evaluation of Chinese regional leaders’
previous posts, profession experiences, and how both factors can affect these regional leaders’
political mobility throughout their careers as regional leaders. The third part of the chapter
combines our findings in part one and part two, and tries to sort out some of the most important
patterns of Chinese regional leaders’ career mobility. The following hypotheses are going to be
examined in this chapter of the study.
Hypothesis 4.1: Chinese regions (provinces, municipalities, and cities) with greater economic
contributions to the national economy and with faster economic growth, their regional leaders
receive more promotions from the CCP center than those leaders from other parts of the country.
In general, more socially and economically developed regions in China, their regional leaders are
politically ranked higher than the rest of the regional leaders in China.
Hypothesis 4.2: Among regional leaders in China, leaders with previous local governmental
leadership experience receive more promotions than those without local experience. In other
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words, provincial leaders with mayor experiences get promoted more than those without such
experience; and city leaders with local (county or city district) government leadership experience
get promoted more than those without such experience.
Hypothesis 4.3: There are certain patterns that are evident in Chinese regional leaders’ political
mobility paths through the decades. For a regional leader, being transferred to developed regions
means a promotion. Furthermore, regional leaders serve in Eastern Chinese provinces will
receive more promotions than those leaders serving in other regions of China. Finally, leaders in
chief positions (i.e., party chiefs, governors and mayors) get more promotions than their deputies
(i.e., vice-secretaries, vice governors and vice mayors).
A. Regional Political Importance Evaluated through the Levels of Socioeconomic Development
In domestic politics, accurately comparing an administrative region’s political
importance to other regions of the country can be most difficult. It is especially true when the
situation involves a relatively large country with a sophisticated domestic economic system and a
large population. In democracies, where the majority of regional leaders are usually locally
elected instead of being appointed by the central government, the political importance of a region
can be vaguely gauged through the region’s population, economic productivity, and its history of
producing powerful statesmen capable of running a regional government as well as the whole
nation. The degree of competitiveness of candidates’ political campaigns might be used as an
indicator to show how a certain region’s political identity can affect the national elections; also
important are the local political or electoral institutions of a region that impact candidates’
campaign schedules. 96 However, in Chinese politics, where the CCP emphasizes cadres’
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absolute loyalty and its authoritative rule of China, the center keeps the nature of the political
hierarchy of all Chinese regions exclusively to itself. Yet, this study suggests that we may not be
as accurate as the CCP center itself when evaluating Chinese regions’ political importance;
nevertheless, we may estimate such a hierarchy by using published indicators such as GDP
values, taxation revenues, and social welfares; these data can be used as complex indicators of a
Chinese region’s socioeconomic development and political priority compared to other regions in
China.
1. Weighing Economic Growth and GDP Achievements in Chinese Politics
Regional economic differences have existed in China throughout its history. As the
natural condition determines a region’s agricultural characteristics, traditionally, the most
productive regions of China, both agriculturally and industrially, were located alongside the
Yangzi River (the Long River) where generous rainfalls and warm climate have made the
regions ideally suitable for crop farming, tea growing, and silk manufacturing.97 Being far away
from the wars with the Grassland nomadic tribes and having greater ethnic homogeneity and
cultural integrity made the central and lower Yangzi River valley the historical economic centers
of China. These more developed regions occupied a position of national economic dominance
until the Communist Revolution. Studies show that shortly after the installation of the totalitarian
regime with its economic concentration on heavy industrial development and energy intensive
growth under Mao Zedong’s leadership, the level of uneven development among Chinese
regions was actually low, meaning that other inland regions were not significantly poorer than
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the coastal China. 98 However, Deng’s reform in the late 1970s involved a state-led fundamental
change in Chinese economic structures, where energy-intensive heavy industries were surpassed
by small-scale, labor-intensive, export-orientated, and privatized enterprises from the coastal
provinces of China. These changes in economic life have allowed provincial units to play a much
more important role in economic management than the ministries at the center which were
traditionally in charge of planning and coordination and which reflected the strategic importance
of provincial leaders.99 In other words, the decentralization of the Chinese economy has given
regional governments more autonomy in adopting economic policies to suit their local conditions;
and the center, while loosening its control, still plays its authoritative role by influencing regional
leaders in China.

Moreover, Deng’s reformist policies have also empowered provincial leaders and
regional officials with great authority in the allocation of economic resources in their provinces.
Their political and economic decisions greatly influence the economic performance of these
provinces. For this reason, they are also held accountable for the corresponding results arising

98

Ravi Kanbur and Xiaobo Zhang. “Fifty Years of Regional Inequality in China: a Journey through Central
Planning Reform, and Openness.” Review of Development Economics (2005), 9(1):97.
99
When founding special economic zones (SEZs) in Guangdong province, Deng Xiaoping and reformist leaders
were supportive. Deng told the provincial leader: “So we will give you a policy that allows you to charge ahead and
cut through your difficult road.” Provincial leaders insisted that if they did not get money from the center, at least
they must have the authority to raise their own funds. In Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of
China (Cambridge, M.A.: Belknap, 2011), pp.398-99.
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from their decisions. As a result, “[t]o a degree, provincial leaders are just like the middle-level
managers in a multidivisional corporation who are responsible for their divisional
performance.”100 Not only are regional leaders in charge of making personnel arrangements and
deciding on budgets and public spending, they are also taking control of attracting foreign
investments and negotiating with business leaders and corporate representatives in signing
contracts and making deals. In as much as foreign investors need the local authorities’ influence
on land-contracting with local farmers, to ease the local communities’ environmental concerns
and other sorts of protections they seek in business activities, regional political elites are key
strategic actors.101 The CCP center’s preference on promoting private shares in the national
economy does not mean that the Chinese Communists are ready to embrace capitalism, at least
not ideologically. This is true especially of the center, which has always held somewhat
“ambivalent” attitude toward private sectors and foreign investments in China.102 As a matter of
fact, giving regional governments more autonomous power to promote local economy and to
create faster GDP growth have been seen as the center’s important move to improve the Chinese
people’s quality of life. With improved quality of life and more economic freedom, it also
enhances the legitimacy of the party-state regime’s claim to be the only political party in China
that has always “represented the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the
Chinese people.”103

100

Hongbin Li and Li-an Zhou. “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: the Incentive Role of Personnel
Control in China.” Journal of Public Economics (2005), 89 (9-10):1746.
101
In 2003, Li Zhen-e, then county CCP chief of Changsha County, died of accident on a golf course when having
an important business luncheon with Japanese investors. Xinhua News Agency (2003, November 7). “Li Zhen-e
Died While He Was ‘On Duty’ (Zhonggong Changsha shiwei rending Li Zhen-e yin gong xunzhi)”. Retrieved from
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-11/07/content_1164928.htm.
102
Bruce J. Dickson. The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), p.64.
103
“Three Represents of Jiang Zemin.” Retrieved from http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html
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Meanwhile, previous studies have shown that the center would like to promote its
legitimacy by promoting the growth of China’s GDP and related economic numbers. However,
scholarly works have ignored the fact that regional economic achievement is among the few
indicators that differentiate all the technocrats in Chinese political system. Chapter three of this
study analyzed one thousand Chinese regional leaders’ personal background information and
found that most CCP cadres in the post-Deng Xiaoping era had similar educational background,
age profile, gender (mostly male), nationality, and training experiences (party school system). In
consequence, if one wishes to differentiate a regional leader from others with the same political
ranking it is necessary to rely on one’s deeper understandings of Chinese politics.

For instance, if a regional leader happens to be an important official from Beijing,
Shanghai, or Guangdong Province, which are considered the most “open” regions in China,
others would naturally connect the official with his region’s economic achievement and
modernization. For other regional leaders from less economically vibrant parts of China, one
may need to point out the place on the map before the conversation continues to the next stage.
The City of Shanghai is important in Chinese politics because it has the largest population, the
largest scale of economy, and maybe the highest density of international visitors to China.
Therefore, when CCP cadre-technocrats are becoming more and more homogeneous as a group,
then whoever makes the economy grows faster will receive more promotions.
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Table 4.1 Largest Provincial Economies, Their Population, and Their Leaders’ Political
Rankings (2010-2011)
Province
Guangdo
ng
Shandong
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Henan
Hebei
Liaoning
Shanghai
Sichuan
Hunan
Hubei
Fujian
Beijing
Anhui
Inner
Mongolia

GDP (100
Billion Yuan)
37775.49

National
Ranking
1

Population
(Million)
104.3

National
Ranking
1

Regi-on

33621.32
33478.76
22716.98
19724.73
17067.99
14696.23

2
3
4
5
6
7

95.79
78.66
54.43
94.02
71.85
43.75

2
5
10
3
6
14

14344.73
14050.78
12939.85
12866.05
11855.08
11469.28
10191.48
8967.52

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

23.02
80.42
65.68
57.24
36.89
19.61
59.5
24.7

24
4
7
9
17
26
8
23

East
East
East
Central
Central
Northea
st
East
West
Central
Central
East
East
Central
West

East

Party Chief
Politburo
Yes

Governor CC
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No

Source: Author’s Database (Shanghai and Beijing are also listed in city rankings)
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Table 4.2 Largest City Economies, Their Population, and Their Leaders’ Political Rankings
(2009-2011)
Municipali
ty

Provincial
Location

Shanghai
Beijing
Guangzhou
Shenzhen
Suzhou
Tianjin
Chongqing
Hangzhou
Wuxi
Qingdao
Foshan
Wuhan*
Chengdu
Dalian*
Ningbo
Nanjing
Shenyang
Changsha
Yantai
Tangshan

N/A
N/A
Guangdong
Guangdong
Jiangsu
N/A
N/A
Zhejiang
Jiangsu
Shandong
Guangdong
Hubei
Sichuan
Liaoning
Zhejiang
Jiangsu
Liaoning
Hunan
Shandong
Hebei

Population(H
undred
Thousand)
230.2
196.1
100.46
103.5
62.4
111.5
281.6
78.62
59.92
75.8
71.9
82.88
125.79
60.8
56.46
74.13
81
65.29
65.15
72.47

National
Ranking

GDP(Billio
n Yuan)

National
Ranking

Administrative
Ranking

2
3
7
6
35
5
1
18
44
21
25
13
4
41
51
23
15
31
32
24

1687.24
1377.79
1060.45
951.09
916.8
910.88
789.42
594.58
575.8
566.62
563.85
551.56
550
515
512.58
508.6
501.5
450
435.85
430

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Provincial
Provincial
Sub-Provincial
Sub-Provincial
City
Provincial
Provincial
Sub-Provincial
City
Sub-Provincial
City
Sub-Provincial
Sub-Provincial
Sub-Provincial
City
Sub-Provincial
Sub-Provincial
Sub-Provincial
City
City

Source: Author’s Database
(Population of the City of Guangzhou is cited according to the census of 2009; Shanghai and
Beijing are also listed in Table 4.1 as provincial regions.)
Among 31 provincial regions in China (with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau
excluded), Table 4.1 shows the top 15 largest provincial GDPs. The majority of them (7 of 15)
are located in the East geographic region of China, while only a few (2 of 15) are located in the
West. The top four of regions are located on the east coast and enjoying great locational
conveniences and benefits in trading with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, some of
the Mainland China’s most important trade partners. In terms of population density, most
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economically productive provinces also have large population, though Beijing and Shanghai are
not physically large in area but are very “crowded” in density. Furthermore, the top six
provincial units in terms of GDP (Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) plus Shanghai
and Beijing, have their regional CCP chief secretaries are currently sitting as CCP Politburo
members, the politically most prestigious positions a regional leader can reach in the hierarchical
system. And among the 15 largest provincial economies in China, the majority of their governors
(9 of 15), who are actually one level lower than the chief party secretaries in a provincial
political system, are also seated on the CCP’s Central Committee. Being a CC member is
likewise seen as a central leadership post; because CC members can participate as voting
members in a number of high-level decision-making processes.
As provinces located in different regions of China can differ from each other in terms
of their levels of modernization and socioeconomic development, e.g., the economy of
Guangdong province is almost about 300 times as big as that of Tibet in the Southwest China.
Large cities with over a million residents tend to be less severely differentiated from one another.
Table 4.2 lists the twenty biggest cities in China in terms of their population and municipal
economic size. Shanghai and Beijing are in the advanced stage of development among all the
regions in China; no matter that they are counted as big cities or central-directed municipalities,
their economies make great contributions to the whole country. The party chiefs and mayors of
the two cities are also politically important. Guangdong province has three of its cities
(Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Foshan) occupying the top positions on the table which means it is
also an economic engine of industrialized China. Two of the three cities, Guangzhou and
Shenzhen, are also sub-provincial political (and administrative) units. It is realistically true that
when regional leaders get moved or relocated to Guangzhou or Shenzhen from other less
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developed regions, it is considered a major promotion for the leaders. Next to Guangdong
province, Jiangsu province also has three of its cities listed as top twenty municipalities. Though
they altogether have less population (Suzhou 35th, Wuxi 44th, and Nanjing 23rd), they are
economically stronger than most other cities in terms of GDP (Suzhou 5th, Wuxi 9th, and Nanjing
16th). Overall, other than the four centrally directed municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin
and Chongqing) that are provincial units, among the remaining 16 on Table 4.2, 10 of them (62.5
percent) are actually sub-provincial administrative units meaning that they are important both
economically and politically to the center. Noticeably, even the smallest of the 20 cities
(Tangshan of Hebei Province) has a registered population of 4,300,000. Considering the tasks of
governing multimillion dwellers in a city, it can be as overwhelming as governing a province. If
a leader can do well in governing any of these big cities, surely it is an achievement that deserves
the center’s attention.
In addition, despite the GDP index which is frequently used to measure regional
economic and industrial development, urban population and labor forces are also being used to
measure regional economic contributions to that of the national economy.104 The next part of our
analysis is going to take a more comprehensive look at on regional socioeconomic development
and political importance in China.
2. Financial Revenues and Allocations of Chinese Regions
Historically, financial revenues collected from all regions of the country have been a
major source of income for the Chinese central government as the central government spent
massively on infrastructure and financed the bureaucracy to run the nation under the emperors’

104

William A. Clark. Soviet Regional Elite Mobility after Khrushchev (New York, N.Y.:Praeger, 1989), p.63.
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authority. 105 Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China the center’s control over
the national economy, as might be expected, tightened compared to the Republic of China’s
government under Chiang Kai-shek and KMT’s leadership. With a centrally planned economy,
everything and all types of economic activities must be strictly monitored by the state and wellplanned in advance by the state’s planning bureaus. Unlike in a market economy where politics
does not influence the market’s behavior directly but rather through indirect ways, in socialist
systems, economic life is under the socialist party-state’s scrutiny where the economy is
controlled by the technocrats instead of investment bankers, and politics determines the market.
106

Thus, since the nationwide establishment of the party-state and totalitarian regime, Chinese

regional governments have been tied politically and financially with the central government: on
one hand, regional governments must be responsible for carrying out the center’s economic plans
and practicing them religiously; on the other hand, the center relies on regional governments’
revenues to operate the entire China’s socialist economic construction. The CCP center was
entitled to squeeze the fatty parts out of its regional branches; and when it did, it made decisions
by itself as to where and how the center was going to spend. In other words, the fiscal and
financial systems adapted by the CCP since 1949 determined that every regional leader in China
must always represent the center at each local governmental office, not only as a political
administrator, but also as a tax collector. In return, it is the central government, instead the
regional government itself, that determines how many financial returns (allocations) a regional
government can keep for itself for local public projects for use of the people.

105

Liu Jianjun. Zhongguo Gudai Zhengzhi Zhidu Shiliu Jiang (Sixteen Lectures on Ancient Chinese Political
System) (Shanghai, China: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2006), pp.227-28.
106
Kornai, János. The Socialist System (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). Zhang, An (trans.,).
2006.ShehuizhuyiTizhi(The Socialist System). Simplified Chinese Edition (Beijing: Central Compilation and
Translation Press, 2006), p.118.
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Table 4.3 shows the changes through the years in how the Chinese government has
divided its national revenues into two parts within the political system: the center and the
regional governments. As is shown in the table, from the 1950s to mid-1970s, even the poor
performances of the national economy could not stop the center from taking the majority of the
national financial revenues; and the autonomy of Chinese regional governments to make their
own economic policies to stimulate their local economic growth was extremely limited. For
example, in 1953, only 26.1 percent of revenues were kept for regional governments, and in
1968, only 38.7 percent of revenues were kept for regional governments. Even in 1973, when the
national economy made a limited recovery, regional governments still could only keep 44.4
percent of all the revenues allocated by the political system. Deng Xiaoping’s reform gave more
autonomy to regional governments and individuals in economic life. We can also notice the
achievements of the reform by calculating the allocations of the revenues through the years.
As is shown in Table 4.3, from 1978 to 2003, which were the years of rapid growth in
the Chinese economy, Chinese regional governments also controlled more financial revenues for
themselves, instead of surrendering the last grain left in the jar to the center. This was especially
true in the 1990s, where in 1993, when the center only kept 28.3 percent of the revenues and in
1998, the center only kept 28.9 percent to itself. However, limited financial power weakened the
center’s authority in political life and its control in conducting the gigantic economic system to
function as it commanded. In the late 1990s, to overcome the negative effects caused by the 1997
financial crisis, the CCP center tightened its hands over state revenues in order to have more
control over the national economy of China. As a result, in recent years, the center has taken the
majority of the revenues (53.29 percent in 2008 and 51.12 percent in 2010). By doing so, the
Chinese central government claims to have balanced regional economic growth and the center’s
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ultimate authority.107 In other words, while the CCP center understands that regional
governments’ interests should be respected, and that their progressive economic plans should be
encouraged, the center’s decisive role must be recognized as unchallengeable at all times.
Because regional financial revenues are crucial to the CCP center, we may also
hypothesize that among regional governments in China, those which generates the most revenues,
it should have relatively more political importance to the central government. In other words, the
region that is financially important to the center, it will deserve higher political importance in
Chinese politics. And its regional leaders appointed by the center will be more high-ranked in the
political system compared to those leaders who work in regions where they make fewer revenues
to the center. We have already found that regional leaders in Chinese regions with higher GDP,
also occupy higher posts in the hierarchical political system by being selected as Politburo
members or Central Committee members with voting rights. Furthermore, according to the
official economic data published by Chinese government, these regions with higher GDP are also
making more financial contributions to the center; financially they weigh more than other
regions in China. As is shown in Table 4.4, in the year of 2005, the top GDP producers in China
were also the biggest revenue-makers in the country. The ranking of revenues by regions was:
Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Beijing (ranked 1 to 6th on Table 4.4). Among
them, Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, and Beijing were also top regions
which spent more revenues than other regions in China (ranked 1, 2, 2, 5, and 9th on Table 4.4).
And their regional chief CCP secretaries are currently all Politburo members.
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Song Xingyi. 2005. “Fenshui zhi gaige hou woguo zhongyang he defang zhengfu jian caizheng fenpei guanxi
zouxiang fenxi (Analysis of Central-Local Financial Relationship after the Reform of Revenues)”. Inner Mongolia
Social Sciences (Neimenggu shehui kexue, hanwen ban), 26(2), 2005:pp.107-108.
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Table 4.3 China’s Governmental Revenues with Comparisons between Central and Regional
Governments by Year
Year
National Total
1953
1958
1963
1968
1973
1978
1983
1988
1993
1998
2003
2008*
2010*

Revenue Income
(¥100 Million)
Central Government Regional Government

Percentage (%)

Central
Regional
Government Government
219.21
162.05
57.16
73.9
26.1
400.36
177.22
223.14
44.3
55.7
332.05
192.31
139.74
57.9
42.1
357.84
219.49
138.35
61.3
38.7
808.78
449.33
359.45
55.6
44.4
1122.09
532.12
589.97
47.4
52.6
1409.52
759.6
649.92
53.9
46.1
2491.21
845.04
1646.17
33.9
66.1
4642.3
1312.06
3330.24
28.3
71.7
10798.18
3125.6
7672.58
28.9
71.1
24649.95
7420.1
17229.85
30.1
69.9
61330.35
32680.56
28649.79
53.29
46.71
83080
42470
40610
51.12
48.88
Source: 1953-2003 data cited from China Financial Yearbook (2006)

*2008 and 2010 data cited from Xinhua News Agency: National Budget Report (2010), retrieved from
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011lh/2011-03/05/c_121152402.htm.
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Table 4.4 Regional Financial Revenues and Expenses of National Percentages (2005)

Provincial
Region

Financial Revenue
Income
National
(¥ 100
Percentage
National
Million)
(%)
Ranking
919.21
2.9
6
331.85
1
16
515.7
1.6
9
368.34
1.2
12

Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner
Mongolia
277.46
0.9
Liaoning
675.28
2.1
Jilin
207.15
0.7
Heilongjian
g
318.21
1
Shanghai
1417.4
4.5
Jiangsu
1322.68
4.2
Zhejiang
1066.6
3.4
Anhui
334.02
1.1
Fujian
432.6
1.4
Jiangxi
252.92
0.8
Shandong
1073.13
3.4
Henan
537.65
1.7
Hubei
375.52
1.2
Hunan
395.27
1.2
Guangdong
1807.2
5.7
Guangxi
283.04
0.9
Hainan
68.68
0.2
Chongqing
256.81
0.8
Sichuan
479.66
1.5
Guizhou
182.5
0.6
Yunnan
312.65
1
Tibet
12.03
0
Shaanxi
275.32
0.9
Gansu
123.5
0.4
Qinghai
33.82
0.1
Ningxia
47.72
0.2
Xinjiang
180.32
0.6
Source: China Financial Yearbook (2006)

Financial Expense
Expenses
National
(¥ 100
Percentage
National
Million)
(%)
Ranking
1058.31
3.1
9
442.12
1.3
25
979.16
2.9
10
668.75
2
15

19
7
24

681.88
1204.36
631.12

2
3.5
1.9

15
6
17

16
2
3
4
15
11
22
4
8
12
12
1
19
29
22
10
25
16
31
19
28
30
29
25

787.79
1646.26
1673.4
1265.53
713.06
593.07
563.95
1466.23
1116.04
778.72
873.42
2289.07
611.48
151.24
487.35
1082.18
520.73
766.31
185.45
638.96
429.35
169.75
160.25
519.02

2.3
4.9
4.9
3.7
2.1
1.7
1.7
4.3
3.3
2.3
2.6
6.7
1.8
0.4
1.4
3.2
1.5
2.3
0.5
1.9
1.3
0.5
0.5
1.5

12
2
2
5
14
20
20
4
7
12
11
1
19
30
24
8
22
12
27
17
25
27
27
22
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Table 4.5 Regional Socioeconomic Development Compared to Their GDP Per Capita
Province/
Municipality

Location

Shanghai
Beijing
Tianjin
Zhejiang
Jiangsu
Guangdong
Shandong
Inner
Mongolia
Liaoning

East
East
East
East
East
East
East
West

Fujian
Jilin
Hebei
Heilongjiang
Henan
Shanxi

Northeast
East
Northeast
Central
Northeast
Central
Central

GDP Per
Capita
Ranking1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Life
Expectancy
(Year)2
74.89
75.92
75.44
69.82
75.35
72.02
72.32
73.81

National
Ranking

National
Ranking

8
1
3
23
4
18
16
11

Public Educational
Spending Per Capita
(Yuan)3
1952.04
2456.01
1464.22
1050.02
919.22
937.51
649.51
1096.09

National
Ranking

3
1
4
10
14
12
25
8

Higher
Educational
Institutions4
30
60
17
27
43
37
40
10

9

75.26

5

926.9

13

40

4

10
11

74.41
74.11

9
10

871.99
859.12

17
18

17
24

18
14

12
13

69.92
72.12

22
17

649.56
698.72

24
22

30
25

8
13

14
15

72.82
71.02

14
21

617.93
843.27

27
19

28
16

9
19

Source: 1 By 2010, retrieved from http://www.armluntan.cn.
2

By 2010, retrieved from http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=766839419.

3

By 2009, retrieved from http://info.i0532.net/action-blogdetail-uid-12116-id-1392.html.

4

By 2006, retrieved from http://bbs.city.tianya.cn/tianyacity/Content/333/1/23956.shtml.
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8
1
18
10
2
5
3
25

Table 4.6 Chinese Municipalities and Cities’ Revenues and National Rankings
City

Political
Ranking

Regional
Location

2009

January 20113

2010

Shanghai

Provincial

East

Revenues
(¥ 100 Million)
2540.3

National
Ranking
1

Revenues
(¥ 100 Million)
2873.6

National
Ranking
1

Revenues
(¥ 100 Million)
527

National
Ranking
1

Beijing

Provincial

East

2026.8

2

2553.9

2

470

2

Shenzhen

Sub-Provincial

East

880.82

3

1106.8

3

149

3

Tianjin

Provincial

East

821.38

4

1069

4

131.4

6

Suzhou

City

East

745.18

5

900.55

6

139.5

4

1

7

121.1

7

Guangzhou

Sub-P.&Cap.

East

702.58

6

790

Chongqing

Provincial

West

681.83

7

1018

5

135.5

5

Hangzhou

Sub-P.&Cap.

East

520.79

8

671.35

8

97.8

8

Nanjing

Sub-P.&Cap.

East

434.5

9

518.8

10

N/A

N/A

Ningbo

Sub-Provincial

East

432.8

10

530.9

9

N/A

N/A

Wuxi

City

East

415.91

11

511.9

11

74.7

10

Dalian

Sub-Provincial

Northeast

400.2

12

500.8

13

N/A

N/A

Chengdu

Capital City

West

387.5

13

506

12

81.9

9

Qingdao

Sub-Provincial

East

377

14

452.6

15

N/A

N/A

Shenyang

Capital City

Northeast

320.2

15

465.4

14

N/A

N/A

Wuhan

Sub-P.&Cap.

Central

316.1

16

390

16

59.4

11

Zhengzhou

Capital City

Central

301.9

17

386.8

17

54.4

12

Foshan

City

East

254

18

305.96

19

N/A

N/A

Changsha

Capital City

Central

246.3

19

312.42

18

46.3

13

20

2

21

N/A

N/A

Xiamen

Sub-Provincial

East

240.6

289.17

Source: Author’s Database.
Number based on Guangzhou government’s estimation, not actual final result. 2Xiamen was out of top 20 in 2010, the 20th was Nantong, a city
located in Jiangsu Province.
1

Number collected through the published results in March 2011, only top 13 were ranked. “Sub-P.&Cap.” means the city is a sub-provincial
political unit and also the capital city of its province.
3
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Moreover, previous scholarly works have studied the Chinese regional economies by
heavily relying on each region’s GDP growth and total size and comparing them to that of entire
China. Such an approach surely is a means that provides a direct look at Chinese regional
differences. However, by doing so, readers may likewise ignore the uneven development of
socioeconomic levels among regions in China. This study suggests that we take more factors into
consideration in comparing regional developmental gaps. As is shown in Table 4.5, the top
fifteen GDP provinces in China in the year of 2010, their population’s life expectancy and social
welfare indexes are also ranked accordingly at the same time. Noticeably, the population of the
centrally directed municipalities in China (e.g., Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) has
greatest life expectancies in the nation (No.1 Beijing, No.3 Tianjin, and No.8 Shanghai). Top
GDP regions Guangdong and Zhejiang are ranked lower on the table with shorter population life
expectancies, but they are large provinces with complicated geographic settings. There are
certain regions in these two provinces where are very mountainous and much less developed. But
these top GDP producers in general also spend more on public education for their people
compare to that do other provinces in China. Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin’s educational
spending is significantly higher than other regions, and Beijing’s educational spending per capita
in 2009 (¥2456) was four times that of Henan Province (¥618). Finally, as the national higher
educational system is mostly sponsored by the government, and where most collegiate and
higher educational institutions are public, we also find that biggest regional economies also have
higher concentration of colleges, with Beijing (60), Jiangsu (43), Shandong (40), Liaoning (40),
and Guangdong (37) occupying the table’s top five spots.
Furthermore, after 30 years of continuously prolific GDP growth, many of the regional
governments in China have already mastered the techniques of improving their economic
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numbers and making their local GDP grow. That is to say, to evaluate a Chinese region’s
economic resources regional GDP growth rates in China must not be the sole criterion. There are
two reasons evident.
First, GDP growth supported by strong investment and industrialization might have
little to do with improvements in regional quality of life. For instance, GDP numbers can be
boosted by exporting a region’s natural resources, but the negative effects would be
environmental pollution, shocking interruption of people’s conventional way of life,108 and the
regional government’s ignorance to social welfare such as public education and health care.
Second, as it is true in China’s case, GDP numbers can be artificially inflated by
governmental officials to look better than they actually are. Even a governor of a province
sometimes has to use other indexes to correct GDP growth reports in order to reduce their
artificial parts.109 Instead, we should rely more on the regional revenues index to evaluate
Chinese regional economies. Because the more revenues a province (or a city) would surrender
to the center at the end of the year, the more gross revenues it has made during this fiscal year.
Regional governments tend to keep more to themselves, as it is mutually true to the central
government as well. Thus, the regional revenues index can be a more reliable resource of a
region’s political importance to the center, as the center highlights those regions more frequently
that give more to the center.
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State-led investment in construction and demand for local herbal medicines caused environmental and habitual
concerns of people living in Tibetan plateau. Yangcheng Wanbao (Yangcheng Evening News, 2006, July 26).
“Chongcao Lanfa Hui Jiaju (Worsening Over-Harvest of Chongcao),” retrieved from
http://news.xinhuanet.com/environment/2006-07/26/content_4879755.htm on February 13, 2012.
109
“China’s Puzzling Numbers.” The Wall Street Journal (2011, September 15). Retrieved from
http://online.wsj.com on September 15, 2011.
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Both Tables 4.4 and 4.6 show the national rankings of annual revenues among Chinese
regions. In Table 4.4 for example, in 2005 the top revenue generators among provincial units of
China were Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Beijing. All of them are located in the
East of China. Beijing is politically crucial to the Communist government, while the remaining
five of them are very industrialized regions with well-developed economic sectors. In Table 4.6,
after comparing top twenty cities or municipalities in China that provide the most revenues for
the center annually, we notice that Shanghai and Beijing, either as provincial-equivalent
municipalities or as super-sized Chinese cities, make great financial contributions to the center.
Meanwhile, bigger cities on the east coast of China in general make more financial contributions
to the center than that of the cities in mid-west Chinese regions. And among the top 20 revenue
providers, 4 of them are provincial municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing), 9
of them are sub-provincial cities (45 percent), and 8 of them are provincial capitals (40 percent).
Needless to say, a capital city is politically more important, as a political center can influence its
economic policy-makings. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that these top revenue providers for
the CCP center, as generators of Chinese economic growth, also occupy important positions in
the political system of China. Even among low-ranked smaller cities, being able to generate
additional revenues is considered a political achievement for its regional officials, as more
revenues draw more attention from the top leaders. 110
Overall, financial revenues, allocations, and other comprehensive socioeconomic
indexes used in this part of the study have shown that the economically more developed regions
in China, enjoy higher quality of life than other regions in China. It proves the author’s

110

In Hubei Province, the City of Xiangyang made it publically acknowledged to all that its annual revenue
contribution to the province in 2010 has topped a longtime rival, its neighboring city, Yichang. Retrieved from
http://news.wuhan.soufun.com/2011-01-20/4408177.htm.
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hypothesis to be reliable that these more developed regions merit greater investment from the
center, and their regional leaders are considered to be more prominent than other regional leaders
in China. The GDP index can be used to evaluate a region’s political importance, as many
previous scholarly works have shown. However, the results here have pointed out that relying
solely on GDP factors to explain regional leaders’ career movements can be biased. For instance,
if the governor of Shanxi province in Central China receives a transfer to be the governor of
Jiangsu province in East China, it is a promotion. But it is not only because Jiangsu has much
greater GDP than Shanxi, but because other socioeconomic factors (people’s life expectancy,
educational spending, and college concentration) can demonstrate that Jiangsu is much more
developed as a province than many other provinces in China. Thus, it is convincing to all that
this particular governor is getting a promotion.
B. Previous Posts and Chief Leadership Experience of Chinese Regional Leaders
As discussed in chapter three of this study, the CCP center has its elaborate system of
making comprehensive evaluations of Chinese regional leaders before it decides to give any
promotion, demotion or transfer to any of the important regional political figures. However, as
has also been discussed, some of the important indicators the center uses are based on biological
features or personal characteristics of regional leaders and party cadres such that others would
not stand a chance in the leadership competition. For instance, gender (being male), ethnicity
(being a Han Chinese), or locality (serving at one’s native province) and other natural advantages
they possess are characteristics that others cannot compete with. Meanwhile, there are some
other factors that seem to be relatively fairer when applied to all cadres with certain
qualifications for regional leadership competitions; examples of such are educational level, CCP
membership, and professional training (party schools’ educational or training-program
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experiences). By examining Chinese regional leaders’ background information over the past six
decades, the analysis here suggests that it seems that the CCP center cares not only about a
regional leader’s personal characteristics, but also values a great deal of the leader’s previous
occupational experiences and achievements. Basically, the merit system that rewards some
regional leaders with upward political mobility acknowledges those regional leaders with
creditable experiences who have done their jobs properly. The analysis presented here so far
suggests a few assumptions to use before we explore any further Chinese regional leaders’
previous occupational histories.

First, as the primary expectation the center has for a regional leader is a well-governed
regional government, the center values those potential candidates with governance experiences
(i.e., those who have previously worked on leadership posts). Second, compared to Mao’s era
where background combinations of regional leaders were more diverse (as they used to be
revolutionaries who came from various strata of Chinese society), in the post-Deng era, Chinese
regional leaders have a more uniform background. We now expect to see more regional leaders
(higher in percentile) with previous experience as lower-level local leaders before they were
appointed to the higher regional governmental posts. In other words, despite the importance of
personal characteristics (gender, nationality and locality), more current regional leaders had been
in local governments in their previous political careers than was the case under Mao.
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Table 4.7 Chinese Regional Leaders’ Local Working Experiences
Post
Provincial

Experience
Counts Percentage
Mayor
264
71.35
Experience
Provincial
No Mayor
106
28.65
Experience
Provincial
Total
370
100
City
Local
224
74.67
Experience
City
No Local
76
25.33
Experience
City
Total
300
100
Local
488
72.84
All
Experience
Regional
No Local
182
27.16
Experience
Total
670
100
Source: Author’s Database (1950-2010)
Table 4.8 Mao Zedong Era Regional Leaders’ Local Working Experiences
Post
Provincial

Experience
Counts Percentage
Mayor
37
66.07
Experience
Provincial
No Mayor
19
33.93
Experience
Provincial
Total
56
100
City
Local
41
65.08
Experience
City
No Local
22
34.92
Experience
City
Total
63
100
Local
78
65.55
All
Experience
Regional
No Local
41
34.45
Experience
Total
119
100
Source: Author’s Database (1950-1976)
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Our findings show that there are (were) a large number of Chinese regional leaders who
had worked as lower-ranked local governmental officials before they received promotions to
become regional leaders at the next-higher level of governments. As is shown in Table 4.7,
among the 670 regional leaders surveyed in the current study, 488 of them (72.8 percent)
whether provincial or city level worked previously as local officials. And 182 of them (27.2
percent) had no local-government based occupational experiences before they received the posts
as Chinese regional leaders. Among all 370 provincial leaders, 264 out of 370 (71.4 percent)
worked at some point in their careers as city leaders. Keeping in mind that city leaders are
considered regional political elites, it means that the majority of provincial leaders in China in
general had become political elites by virtue of their career moves to achieve higher rankings in
the political system. City leader working experiences (e.g., being mayors or city CCP secretaries)
may have helped them a great deal to become provincial leaders; as has been discussed in
previous chapters of the study, most current central leaders of China had provincial leadership
experience before they marched from provincial capitals to Beijing. Our findings also show that
among all 300 city leaders from the1950s to 2000s, 224 of them (74.7 percent) had worked
previously as local leaders in regional governments. These regional political units include
counties, smaller cities, and administrative districts of big cities such as in Beijing, Shanghai, and
Tianjin where even a city district can have a population over one million.
In addition, the result shows that in Mao’s era of Chinese politics, there were lower
percentages of regional leaders in China with previous regional governmental working
experiences. In other words, many communist cadres in Mao’s era got promoted to be regional
leaders without even having worked as regional leaders before. Among 119 regional leaders
surveyed, with a concentration in the 25 years preceding Mao’s, 78 of them (65.6 percent) had
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occupational histories as regional leaders while 41 of them (34.5 percent) never worked in
regional government, either at the provincial or lower-ranked local government levels. It can be
viewed as proof that regional leaders in Mao’s era came from more diverse background, as
former revolutionaries instead of school-trained technocrats (Table 4.8).
Table 4.9 Post-Deng Xiaoping Era Regional Leaders’ Local Working Experiences
Post
Provincial
Provincial
Provincial
City
City
City
All
All

Experience
Mayor
Experiences
No Mayor
Experience
Total
Local
Experience
No Local
Experience
Total
Local
Experience
No Local
Experience
Total

Counts
109

%
82.6

23

17.4

132
116

100
70.7

48

29.3

164
225

100
76.0

71

24.0

Post296
100
Deng All
Source: Author’s Database (1997-2010)
Our findings also show a significant increase in prior leadership experience among
post-Deng Xiaoping era Chinese regional leaders. As is shown in Table 4.9, among 132 postDeng provincial leaders categorized by the study, 109 of them (82. 6 percent) had previously
worked as city leaders in different parts of China; while only 23 of them, 17.4 percent of the
entire provincial leadership body, had had no regional governmental working experience.
Among 164 post-Deng city leaders (mayors and party secretaries) studied, 116 of them (70.7
percent) had worked as leaders in local governments (counties, smaller cities, or administrative
districts of big cities). But 71 of them (24 percent) had no local governmental working
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experiences whatsoever before they were appointed by their regional leadership posts (Table 4.9).
This result revealed by this study shows that in contemporary Chinese politics, regional
leadership posts are more frequently occupied by CCP cadres with previous leadership
experiences than by those who never worked as regional leaders at any level of the political
system.
Table 4.10 Previous Occupational Experiences of Provincial Leaders
Previous
Counts
%
Occupation
Business
6
1.6
Central
42
11.4
City Leader
100
27.3
Education
1
0.3
Governor
16
4.4
League Official
2
0.5
Military
24
6.5
Provincial Secretary
82
22.3
Vice Governor
36
9.8
Vice Secretary
53
14.4
Others
5
1.4
Total
367
99.9
Source: Author’s Database (1950-2010)
Furthermore, supporting the assumptions presented earlier, some other noticeable
details emerged in the process of recording provincial leaders’ occupational histories. As is
shown in Table 4.10, there have been some major patterns in the career paths taken by Chinese
provincial leaders who became provincial elites in China. Among 367 provincial leaders
examined by the study, a large number of them (100 of 367, or 27.3 percent) worked as city
leaders in China before they were promoted to be provincial leaders (governors and provincial
party secretaries). Eighty-two of the 367 (22.3 percent) provincial leaders were already
provincial party chiefs before they were moved, meaning that what they had received were
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opportunities to change their locations, either from the developed parts of China to the rest of the
country or vice versa. Did their moves count as promotions, demotions or lateral change? We
will need to specify in the following part of the study by tracking their career mobility. Similarly,
there are (were) 16 governors, 36 vice governors and 53 vice secretaries of the 367 provincial
leaders surveyed who received career movements while they were already provincial political
elites. Combine these provincial elites (82 chief secretaries, 16 governors, 36 vice governors, and
53 vice secretaries), and then we have 187 of the 367 provincial elites (51 percent) who were
tenured provincial leaders. There have been 24 military officers ever appointed as provincial
leaders (6.5 percent), but all of them were named as provincial leaders under Mao’s regime. No
military officer has been found to receive a civil servant post ever since, evidence that the
Chinese bureaucracy after Mao Zedong has become civilianized. Also, there were two
Communist Youth League leaders who became provincial leaders directly after leaving League
leadership posts. The two cases were Hu Qili (League Secretary prior to becoming Tianjin party
chief in 1980) and Li Ruihuan (League Secretary prior to being Mayor of Tianjin in 1983). Mr.
Hu and Mr. Li were colleagues and personal friends; when Hu left Tianjin top post, he
recommended that Li be appointed his successor. Among 367 provincial leaders surveyed, there
were six leaders who got promoted from business posts and one from education. However, none
of them worked in private business or in an educational institution; instead, they were all
employed by state-owned firms and university. By all means, regional leadership posts are open
to qualified party cadres, but not to elites from the private sectors of China.
Overall, all regional leaders coded with previous regional leadership experiences were
those who actually worked in local governments (county, city or district levels) as leaders, not
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merely as committee members or division heads. Thus, our findings here have revealed two
trends in post-Deng Chinese regional leaders. They are:
(1) Compared to Mao’s and Deng’s era, post-Deng Chinese regional leaders share more
similar prior professional background as the majority of them used to be lower-ranked political
elites before they were promoted to be higher-ranked regional leaders in China. Evidence shows
that these newer leaders are (were) less diverse in terms of their occupational histories, as many
of them spent their careers climbing the hierarchical political system, working from junior
positions to get promoted step by step. Not only their personal features share many things in
common (mostly male, Han Chinese, college-educated), but their career paths in general are also
similar to one another.

(2) The root cause of the homogenization of Chinese regional leaders’ before they received
the center’s promotion may not be the idiosyncratic personal reasons of the top leaders; instead,
it could be the consequential result of the center’s desire to fill regional governments with the
CCP technocrats. First of all, a regional leader must be someone who is capable of
accomplishing the center’s complex tasks. Thus, candidates with local leadership credentials
(and who actually achieved something while working as a local leader) seem to be suitable. Last
but not least, the leader to-be must be loyal to the party and the center. Thus, years of experience
serve as observational periods for the center to examine a potential regional leader’s capabilities
and trustworthiness. To be sure, regional leaders in China are supposed to be defenders of the
party-state regime, not challengers to the center who dare to try anything to decentralize the
center’s authority.

146

C. Toward the Political and Geopolitical Patterns of Political Mobility among Chinese Regional
Leaders
1. Classification of Regional Leaderships Posts, Regional Settings, and Background
Analysis
This chapter of the study has argued that Chinese regional leaders’ previous leadership
experiences are important indicators of their future political mobility. The relevant research
extant has not commonly taken into consideration both the prior posts of the leaders and the
priori physical locations where the leaders (used to) work. Again, it is argued here that the CCP
center values each regional leader’s credentials as the center looks among them for a potential
future leader of China on the world stage. Therefore, elaborate systems have been applied by the
center to guide its personnel decisions for regional governments.
First, according to Chinese law, a provincial leader, which is equivalent to a minister of
the central government on the political ranking chart, can work as a provincial head of
government for a maximum of 2 terms. Each term is 5 years; thus, it would be a 10-year-period
for a provincial leader working at the same post. A city leader can continuously work for 2 terms
as well, and each term is again 5 years, resulting in a maximum 10 years term.111 Nevertheless,
before the finalization of the laws was issued in 2004, after multiple changes during the mid1990s, regulations on how many terms a regional could serve at one’s current post was only
vaguely defined and often overlapped between the party system and the administration. Table
4.11 shows that the mean number of service years among Chinese regional leaders from the
1950s to 2000s is 5 years; it is 4.3 years for Chinese city leaders surveyed by the study.
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Geji renmin daibiao dahui he difang renmin zhengfu zuzhi fa (Regional Congress and Government Formation
Law), modified and approved on October 27, 2004. Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/flfg/200506/21/content_8297.htm.
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Second, there have been cases of provincial leaders serving 14 years in a provincial
government, and one city leader served 17 years in the same post. Both cases were found in
Mao’s era and the early years of Deng’s rule when the retirement of Chinese political elites had
not been constitutionalized and formalized as laws. Here, the present analysis has hypothesized
that the longer a regional leader serves, which means that his leadership post has become
stabilized, the more likely it is for the leader to receive a promotion (upward political mobility).
Because the merit system adopted by the party-state bureaucracy rewards cadres with great
loyalty and faithful service, the longer years one serves the party, the greater a regional leader’s
chance to get promoted.
Third, as is shown in Table 4.12, all the regional leaders surveyed in this study are clearly
classified by their current posts. Among all provincial leaders, the present study focuses solely
on provincial CCP secretaries (156, or 42.2 percent), vice secretaries (49, or 13.2 percent),
governors (130, or 35.1 percent) and vice governors (35, or 9.5 percent). These are the most
responsible posts in the executive branch of provincial governments. Among all the city leaders
recorded in this study, there are likewise four types of leaders: city CCP secretaries (152, or 50.7
percent) and vice secretaries (14, or 4.7 percent) from the party system, and mayors (109, or 36.3
percent) and vice mayors (25, or 8.3 percent) from the executive. In chapter two of this study,
party chiefs and governmental heads are classified as decision-makers of the executive branches
of Chinese regional governments. The regional People’s Congress system and Political
Consultative Conference system are clearly of political importance, but they do not occupy the
decision-making parts of the Chinese political systems. By studying the executives of Chinese
regional governments, one is more likely to find out revealing facts and trends of contemporary
Chinese politics. As a matter of fact, even among the executives of Chinese regional
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governments, the selection processes of governors and mayors (as heads of the administration),
and party secretaries (as heads of CCP party-organizations) are actually different; so are the job
requirements expected of these new leaders. Here, it is hypothesized that governors and mayors
as administrative heads have different career paths and political mobility, compared to these of
party leaders of regional governments. As has been discussed, party chiefs are ranked one level
higher than administrative chiefs.

Table 4.11 Length of Service Years among Chinese Regional Leaders (Years)
Post

Counts

Mean

Provincial
Leaders
City Leaders

359

5.0

Standard
Deviation
2.6

300
4.3
2.5
Source: Author’s Database

Max

Min

14

1

17

1

Table 4.12 Distribution of Posts among Regional Leaders
Post
Observations Percentage
Provincial CCP
156
42.2
Secretary
Governor
130
35.1
Vice Secretary
49
13.2
Vice Governor
35
9.5
Total
370
100
City CCP Secretary
152
50.7
Mayor
109
36.3
Vice Secretary
14
4.7
Vice Mayor
25
8.3
Total
300
100
Source: Author’s Database
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Fourth, the study also finds that examining the posts before and after an individual
assumes the post of regional leader is necessary to draw accurate conclusion about regional
leaders’ political mobility. Therefore, every regional leader coded by the study has at least three
types of movements recorded in the database: what post was held by this leader before becomes
a regional leader? What is (was) one’s current post held at the same time the data were sampled
by the study? What is (was) the post held by the leader afterwards (after the leader had left one’s
current post)? In other words, we must be aware of where a regional leader came from, what the
regional leader does (did) in the government currently, and where the leader was relocated (or
removed) to.

Table 4.13 Previous Governmental Positions Held by Provincial Leaders
Previous Position Held
Frequency
Business
7
Central Govt.
42
Education
1
Governor
16
Youth League
2
City Mayor
100
Military
24
Provincial Secretary
82
Vice Governor
36
Vice Provincial
53
Secretary
Other
5
Total
368
Source: Author’s Database
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%
1.9
11.4
0.3
4.4
0.5
27.2
6.5
22.3
9.8
14.4
1.4
100

Table 4.14 Position Held by Provincial Leaders afterwards
Position Held after Provincial
Frequency
Leadership
Central Government
99
County Official
1
CPPCC (National)
10
Governor
44
Military
6
Mayor
1
National People's Congress
23
Provincial Secretary
139
Vice Governor
12
Vice Secretary
22
Other
5
Total
362
Source: Author’s Database

%
27.4
0.3
2.8
12.2
1.7
0.3
6.4
38.4
3.3
6.1
1.4
100

Table 4.13 shows the array of prior posts held by these officials before they were
appointed as provincial governmental heads of China. These occupational types are: provincial
party secretary (22.3 percent), governor posts (4.4 percent), posts at Chinese central government
(11.4 percent), vice provincial secretaries (14.4 percent), vice governors (9.8 percent), military
officers (6.5 percent), Communist Youth League officials (0.5 percent), city mayors (27.2
percent), state-owned business (1.9 percent), education (0.3 percent), and others (1.4 percent).
These data indicate that the majority of Chinese provincial leaders were appointed from positions
as provincial governmental officials (chief and vice secretaries, governors and vice governors,
which total 50.8 percent of all cadres). A large number of them were mayors or city chiefs prior
to the promotion, and posts in the central government were the next largest sources of personnel
getting promoted to provincial leaders. Thus, the data show the center’s strong preferences in
choosing provincial leaders with regional governmental leadership experience. Government151

related working experiences are more valued by the center than experience at firms and
educational institutions. Moreover, if we look at the subsequent postings of provincial leaders
(i.e., after worked as provincial leaders of China), 38.4 percent of them became chief provincial
party secretaries, 12.2 percent of them became governors, 3.3 percent of them still worked as
vice governors, and 6.1 percent of them as vice provincial secretaries. As shown in Table 4.14,
another large portion of them (27.4 percent) went to the center and became ministerial or even
higher political leaders in China. Thus, when provincial leaders leave provincial governments,
the majority of them remained in executive branches of the Chinese governmental system. Only
2.8 percent worked at CPPCC and 6.4 percent of them worked at National People’s Congress,
both considered as parliamentary units of Chinese politics. In other words, provincial leaders
remain in power (executive branches) when they leave provincial leadership posts.
Table 4.15 Position Held by City Leaders afterwards
Position Held after City Leadership
Frequency
Dismiss, Death or Unknown (0)
36
Non-Governmental (1)
12
City Vice Secretary (2)
1
Mayor or City Chief (3)
10
Transfer (4)
57
Vice Governor (5)
50
Provincial Vice Secretary (6)
39
Provincial CPPCC or Congress (7)
39
Governor (8)
20
Provincial Chief Secretary (9)
10
Central Govt. or Minister (10)
26
Total
300
Source: Author’s Database

Percentage
12
4
0.3
3.3
19
16.7
13
13
6.7
3.3
8.7
100

Meanwhile, similar results are also found in studying the career paths of Chinese city
leaders’ career paths after they left city leadership posts. Here, the subsequent post of city leaders
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(after they have left their city leaderships) was coded from 0 to 10. The data show that a great
number of Chinese city leaders (57 of 300, 19 percent) accepted locational transfers without a
major upgrade of their political rankings. As seen in Table 4.15, these city leaders served at some
other cities after their current posts, entailing a geographic change instead of a normative change
of ranks. There were also many other city leaders who got promoted to be provincial leaders
immediately after their terms were served in the cities: 3.3 percent of them became provincial
party secretaries, 6.7 percent of them became governors, 16.7 percent of them became vice
governors, and 13 percent of them became provincial vice secretaries. In all, 39.7 percent of all
the city leaders observed received provincial promotions to posts as new provincial leaders of
China. Also, 8.7 percent of city leaders became ministerial leaders at the central government
level once they left city leaderships posts. Aside from dismissed, death, or retirement due to age,
most city leaders stayed in the bureaucracy instead of stepping out of it for some other
occupation. Only 4 percent accepted non-governmental positions, although not necessarily
leaving politics for good. As has suggested in previous chapters of the study, a political elite in
China enjoys more than mere political power and publicity. It can be very difficult, therefore, to
leave one’s regional elite lifestyle behind for one who has been entitled to it and has grown used
to it.
Finally, geographic (locational) changes or relocations can have significant political
meaning to Chinese regional leaders once they are transferred between regions in China. As
highlighted earlier, different regions in China have different levels of political importance to the
CCP center. Even if Chinese provinces are not different from each other in terms of population
and administrative priority, they do have different degrees of socioeconomic development, and
most of all, their revenue contributions to the central government make some of the regions stand
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out from others. As the findings shown in Table 4.16 and 4.17, a great number of provincial
leaders (106 of 370, or 28.7 percent) were moved to the central governmental system in Beijing
after serving their terms as Chinese provincial leaders. Combined with those who were move to
NPC and CPPCC posts (served as committee chairs or vice chairs of NPC and CPPCC), more
than one third (36.2 percent) of Chinese provincial leaders eventually become central
governmental officials, rightly considered political elites of China. In addition, a large of number
of provincial leaders (21.4 percent) continued their leadership services in East China as
provincial leaders of the more developed regions of the country. The rest of them, if not retired,
demoted or dead, also continued working as provincial governmental heads in other regions of
China, sent as they were to the West, Northeast, and the Central provinces of the country.

Table 4.16 Provincial Leader Changes of Regions afterwards
Provincial Leader Regions
Frequency
after
Dismiss, Death or Retire(0)
13
West (1)
65
Northeast (2)
11
Middle (3)
68
East (4)
79
Central Government (5)
106
NPC or CPPCC
28
Total
370
Source: Author’s Database
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Percentage
3.5
17.6
3.0
18.4
21.4
28.7
7.6
100

Table 4.17 City Leader Changes of Regions afterwards
Working Region
Frequency Percentage
after
Dismiss or Death (0)
6
2.0
West (1)
62
20.7
Northeast (2)
26
8.7
Middle (3)
65
21.7
East (4)
110
36.7
Central Government
29
9.7
(5)
NPC or CPPCC (6)
2
0.7
Total
300
100
Source: Author’s Database
While central governmental positions are actually foreseeable for Chinese provincial leaders,
as their junior counterparts in Chinese cities, the majority of city leaders are not likely to get
promoted to the central government immediately after their city leadership services. As Table
4.17 reveals, only 29 of 300, or 9.7 percent, arrived in the central leadership. And as city leaders
are usually younger than provincial leaders, they rarely go immediately to work at NPC or
CPPCC either, as these posts are reserved for more senior members of governments (only 0.7
percent of them were moved to NPC and CPPCC). Still, the majority of Chinese city leaders
have to continue working at regional governments after their current terms. However, we do see
a great number of them transferred to East China instead of staying where they were or moving
to the Mid-West (36.7 percent of all city leaders accepted Eastern regional posts afterwards).
These descriptive statistical findings support our theoretical hypotheses that city leaders as
relatively junior political elites in China, compared to provincial leaders and central leaders that
they also need to serve a longer time and gain more local working experience before being
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promoted higher in the hierarchical political system. Furthermore, as East China is economically
important to the CCP center, we also see a higher concentration of political elites working in the
Eastern provinces and cities, while other regions in China actually draw less political resource
from the center.112

2. Political Mobility Analysis of Chinese Provincial Leaders
As we have clearly defined Chinese provincial leaders’ current posts (the posts they held
while being sampled by the study) in provincial governments, and the differences (both political
and personal) of occupying different posts, our analysis now turns to concentrate on career
movements beyond the positions of provincial leaders in certain regions, and the regional
changes among different Chinese provinces. First, the author examines provincial leaders’
political mobility by applying three different logistical regression models to identify independent
variables that potentially might affect a provincial leader’s career movements.

112

In fact, except East Chinese regions with more developed economies and human capitals, they may have drawn
less international attention as well. Recent Financial Year Books of China have shown the East Chinese provinces
enjoy more foreign investments than all the Mid-West provinces combined. See Ge Shunqi and Zheng Xiaojie
(2004). “Zhongguo 31 ge shengshi liyong waizi yeji yu qianli bijiao yanjiu (Comparative Studies on Achievements
and Potentials of Using Foreign Investments among Chinese Provinces).” Shijie Jingji (World Economy), 2004, 3(1):
11-15.
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Table 4.18 Logistical Models Explaining Provincial Leaders’ Political Mobility

Age
College Edu.
Native Province
Length
Tenured
League Experience
Party school
Gov. now
Sec. now
Developed Region
Mayor Experience
Gov. before
Sec. before
Minister before
Vice Gov. before
Vice Sec. before
Constant

Model 1
Promotion
-0.020
(1.05)
0.527
(1.77)
-0.093
(0.33)
-0.089
(1.54)
0.906
(2.85)**
0.435
(1.16)
-0.469
(1.59)
0.624
(1.57)
0.014
(0.04)
0.215
(0.52)
0.760
(2.68)**
0.027
(0.04)
-0.685
(2.03)*
0.408
(0.79)
0.318
(0.61)
0.283
(0.67)
1.051
(0.92)
368
44.68
.0002
.106

N
LR chi2
Prob>chi2
Pseudo R2
(Standard Errors in
parentheses)
*p≤ .05;**p≤ .01
Source: Author’s Database

Model 2
Demotion
0.010
(0.22)
0.975
(1.49)
0.300
(0.49)
0.284
(2.47)*
-1.873
(2.70)**
0.216
(0.30)
-0.179
(0.27)
-1.313
(1.52)
-0.462
(0.66)
0.586
(0.52)
-0.561
(0.86)

0.310
(0.39)
-0.313
(0.25)
0.950
(0.98)
0.978
(1.12)
-4.836
(1.89)
352
15.11
.4437
.128
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Model 3
Transfer
0.004
(0.18)
-0.898
(2.59)**
-0.193
(0.60)
-0.080
(1.17)
-0.451
(1.32)
-0.180
(0.45)
0.477
(1.47)
-0.021
(0.05)
0.313
(0.79)
-0.670
(1.58)
0.113
(0.34)
0.363
(0.49)
0.705
(1.87)
-0.047
(0.08)
-0.219
(0.36)
-0.432
(0.87)
-0.425
(0.34)
368
28.27
.0294
.082

The three models of logistics regression are:
Model 1: Provincial leaders receive promotion (or not) due to factors associated with
these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native province (or not), how many
years they have served, continuing serving as provincial leaders (or not), having
Communist Youth League experiences (or not), having received party school training (or
not), currently serving as governor of the province (or not), currently the chief CCP
secretary of the province (or not), whether the province is among the top revenue
contributing provinces of China (or not), a leader having had any city governmental
leadership experience (or not), a leader having been a governor before his current post (or
not), a leader having been a CCP provincial secretary before (or not), a leader having
been a CCP provincial vice secretary before (or not), a leader having been a vice
governor before (or not), and a leader having had ministerial or central governmental
experience (or not), and having been a vice-ministerial leader before (or not).
Model 2: Provincial leaders receive demotion (or not) due to factors associated with these
leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native province (or not), how many years
they have served, continuing serving as provincial leaders (or not), having Communist
Youth League experiences (or not), having received party school training (or not),
currently serving as governor of the province (or not), currently the chief CCP secretary
of the province (or not), whether the province is among the top revenue contributing
provinces of China (or not), a leader having had any city governmental leadership
experience (or not), a leader having been a governor before his current post (or not), a
leader having been a CCP provincial secretary before (or not), a leader having been a
CCP provincial vice secretary before (or not), a leader having been a vice governor
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before (or not), and a leader having had ministerial or central governmental experience
(or not), and having been a vice-ministerial leader before (or not).
Model 3: Provincial leaders receive parallel transfer (or not), meaning no change of ranks,
due to factors associated with these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s
native province (or not), how many years they have served, continuing serving as
provincial leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experiences (or not), having
received party school training (or not), currently serving as governor of the province (or
not), currently the chief CCP secretary of the province (or not), whether the province is
among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), a leader having had any
city governmental leadership experience (or not), a leader having been a governor before
his current post (or not), a leader having been a CCP provincial secretary before (or not),
a leader having been a CCP provincial vice secretary before (or not), a leader having been
a vice governor before (or not), and a leader having had ministerial or central
governmental experience (or not), and having been a vice-ministerial leader before (or
not).
Among all the independent variables, higher education, native province, tenure, party
school training, current posts, city leader before, and top revenue provinces are all coded as
dummy variables. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 4.18 and are discussed below.
First, whether a Chinese provincial leader receives a subsequent promotion or not, the
outcome is positively affected if the leader has had city leadership experience; it is also
positively affected if the leader is a tenured provincial leader (i.e., had served at least one full
term), and served as a provincial CCP secretary before the current post. In other words, a
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provincial leader is more likely to receive promotion if he: has been a city leader before, has
tenure at his post as a provincial leader, or has been (or will become) a CCP secretary of a
province. These dummy variables are significant in determining whether a provincial official
receives promotion or not. Meanwhile, having had higher education, and if one’s current position
(at the time when observed in the study) is the governor of a province, both of these factors have
positive influences on the leader’s future promotion. However, the significance levels are lower
than that of city leadership experiences, tenure, and chief secretary posts. None of the other
dummy independent variables in the promotion model are statistically significant.
Second, whether a Chinese provincial leader is demoted or not, is correlated with
education level and tenure in a governor post at a lower significance level. Provincial leaders
observed in the study who received subsequent demotions were those without higher education
but currently working as governors. However, the educational factor is not solely responsible for
leaders’ demotions. The demotion score is significantly related with all provincial leaders’ length
of services and previous provincial tenures. But it has no realistic meaning of such significance:
demoted leader are those who are not tenured and have worked as leaders for shorter periods of
time. It is a fact instead of being statistical proofs. No other independent variables have
significance in affecting the demotion outcomes of provincial leaders.
Third, whether a Chinese provincial leader receives a parallel transfer or not is positively
correlated with having higher education and having been a provincial secretary before his current
post. Provincial leaders with college education who had worked as provincial chief-secretaries
previously are more likely to receive transfers to different provinces. Meanwhile, having party
school training and had a posting in a developed and revenue-contributing province both have
positive affect on leaders being transferred laterally. But they are significant at lower confidence
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intervals. No other independent variables are statistically significant in explaining the variation
in the transfer data.
Furthermore, in order to track down the locational and regional shifts of Chinese
provincial leaders after they served in provincial governments, the study also applies a
multinomial regression model to examine the correlation between regional changes and the
independent variables coded.

The regional change model is: the destination region a leader is relocated to after his
provincial leadership posting is affected by that a leader’s age, educational level, service
in his native province, length of years served, tenured or not, Communist Youth League
experience, party school training, previous service as governor (or not), as secretary (or
not), service in developed provinces (or not), previous service as governor (or not),
previous service as provincial secretary (or not), previous service as vice governor (or
not), as vice secretary (or not), previous service as ministerial leader (or not), previous
posting in any of East China’ provinces (or not). Except age and length of service years
are numbered, all other independent variables are dummy variables (0 or 1). Codes for
different regions are shown in Table 4.16. And the results are shown in Table 4.19.
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Table 4.19 Multinomial Logistics Model Explaining New Regions after Provincial Leadership
Transferred to Regions After Provincial Leaderships
Dismiss or
Retire

West

Northeast

Middle

East

NPC

1

2

3

4

6

1.025

1.064

1.093

1.026

1.039

1.136**

(0.0440)

(0.0346)

(0.0633)

(0.0272)

(0.0251)

(0.0492)

0.910

0.368

0.411

0.673

0.540

0.474

(0.627)

(0.188)

(0.320)

(0.275)

(0.203)

(0.282)

0.762

0.430

0.115

0.965

0.820

1.219

(0.517)

(0.203)

(0.130)

(0.344)

(0.286)

(0.626)

1.248

1.172

1.028

0.991

1.065

1.074

(0.166)

(0.107)

(0.176)

(0.0802)

(0.0825)

(0.122)

0.519

1.629

1.408

2.099

1.388

1.290

(0.349)

(0.837)

(1.268)

(0.889)

(0.540)

(0.785)

2.214

3.224*

1.276

1.107

0.865

0.254

(1.580)

(1.583)

(1.517)

(0.510)

(0.405)

(0.279)

1.283

1.305

0.201

0.828

0.923

0.798

(0.856)

(0.587)

(0.225)

(0.313)

(0.343)

(0.451)

0.417

0.397

2.540

0.944

0.497

2.118

(0.370)

(0.236)

(3.081)

(0.465)

(0.244)

(1.901)

0.445

0.734

1.423

0.572

1.046

2.573

(0.355)

(0.402)

(1.748)

(0.294)

(0.470)

(2.318)

0.262

0.0324***

0.162

1.331

1124345.4

0.221

0
Age

College

Native

Length

Tenure

Y. League

Party school

gov_now

sec_now

Developed
Provinces
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gov_bef

sec_bef

vgov_bef

vsec_bef

minister_bef

East_bef

N
*

(0.327)

(0.0225)

(0.175)

(1.289)

(862815578.9)

(0.208)

0.00000190

1.886

0.000000535

2.175

0.433

0.408

(0.00265)

(2.142)

(0.000893)

(1.736)

(0.532)

(0.539)

1.604

0.208*

0.532

0.321*

0.448

0.0748**

(1.220)

(0.140)

(0.495)

(0.161)

(0.187)

(0.0671)

1.563

3.843

1.392

1.089

1.788

2.143

(1.974)

(2.756)

(1.834)

(0.718)

(1.093)

(1.722)

0.685

1.119

0.841

1.075

0.556

0.172

(0.840)

(0.690)

(0.806)

(0.561)

(0.313)

(0.157)

0.384

0.361

0.000000252

0.119**

0.278

0.222

(0.489)

(0.262)

(0.000224)

(0.0865)

(0.189)

(0.172)

0.865

0.460

0.218

0.308**

1.726

0.128**

(0.596)

(0.215)

(0.189)

(0.121)

(0.603)

(0.0910)

368

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Source: Author’s Database
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Since most of the provincial leaders observed in this study were transferred to the central
government to continue their services in the executive branch of Chinese political system, region
code 5 for central government as a dependent variable is used as the base outcome for
comparison. As shown in Table 4.19, when using the central governmental posts as base
outcome, our findings are as follows:
(1) Provincial leaders who changed their serving locations to West China are positively
affected by their college education, Communist Youth League background, have worked
previously in a developed province, and were serving as current provincial secretaries. These
independent variables have statistical significance on the likelihood of being relocated to the
West.
(2) Provincial leaders who served in their native provinces were likely to be reappointed as
provincial leaders in the Northeast, if they were not transferred to the central government.
Provincial leaders from developed and top revenue-making provinces are also likely to be
appointed as Northeastern provincial leaders, if they were not transferred to the central
governmental. But the significance is at a lower confidence interval.
(3) Provincial leaders who previously served as provincial secretaries or as ministerial
officials, and previously (not currently) worked in Eastern Chinese provinces, are likely to be
relocated to Central Chinese provinces (in the middle of the country), unless they are getting
promoted to the central government of China. All these variables seem to have strong
significance on the outcomes.
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(4) Provincial leaders with provincial secretary experience, ministerial experience, previous
work experience in East China provinces, and higher education are likely to be relocated to the
East.
(5) If provincial leaders are not promoted to the central governmental posts, those leaders
with older age, provincial secretary or vice-secretary experience, ministerial leadership
experience, and previously (not currently) worked in the East, are more likely to be relocated to
NPC or CPPCC leadership posts. Also, leaders who currently worked in developed provinces of
China, were more likely than others to receive NPC or CPPCC posts.
(6) Statistically, all the independent variables applied in the model have failed to explain
why some provincial leaders were dismissed.
As has been suggested in a previous chapter of the study, if a provincial leader cannot get
promoted to a central governmental leadership post, one might consider as acceptable choice in
one of the developed provinces in East China. And Central provinces, financially and
economically, are also better outcomes than the Northeast and the West. Here, this study applies
the regional change model by changing the base outcome to the West (coded as 1). The results
(Table 4.20) suggest that:
(1) If provincial leaders were not getting relocated to Western provinces of China after they
had served in provincial governments, they were likely to be relocated to the Northeast of China
if they had had party school training, and if they currently worked in developed provinces. Both
factors are significant on the results at a lower confidence interval, yet they are more significant
than all other independent variables on the outcomes.
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(2) Provincial leaders currently worked in a developed province of China, assuming a
Communist Youth League background, are more likely to be relocated to the middle of country
(Central provinces), if they were relocated to neither the West nor the Northeast.
(3) If provincial leaders were not relocated to any of the three regions mentioned above,
which are the West, the Northeast and the Central, those leaders with Youth League background
and previous Eastern provincial leadership experiences were more likely to stay (or be relocated)
in the East. Both factors have a strong influence on the outcomes.
(4) Several independent variables are shown to be significant in explaining why some
provincial leaders were relocated (promoted) to central governmental leadership posts. Leaders
with older age, higher educational achievements, work as Youth League officials (either the
League central or regional organizations), currently working in a developed and industrialized
province of China as the CCP provincial secretary, are significantly more likely to be promoted
to the center of Chinese politics. Having any one of these factors would enhance a leader’s
upward political mobility. He does not need to have multiple factors. Previously serving as vice
governors and currently serving in an Eastern province, also have a positive influence on leaders’
promotion, but only at a lower confidence interval.
(5) Provincial leaders, if not relocated to the West, the Northeast, the Middle provinces, or
to the central government in Beijing, who received posts in NPC and CPPCC systems were
likely leaders with a Youth League background, who currently serve as governors from
developed provinces, and who previously worked as CCP provincial vice-secretaries.
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(6) Finally, leaders who previously served in Eastern provinces were likely to be promoted
to NPC and CPPCC in Beijing, but the significance is robust at a lower confidence interval. On
the contrary, regional leaders who previously served in other regions of China have not shown
such career trajectories.

The details of the analytical models are shown in Table 4.20.
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Table 4.20 Multinomial Regression Model Explaining Regional Changes (Base outcome 2)

age

Higher Edu.

Death or
Dismiss
0
0.963
(0.0470)

Transfer to Regions after Provincial Leaderships
Northeast
Middle
East China
Central
China
Provinces
4
Government
2
3
5
1.028
0.964
0.977
0.940
(0.0630)
(0.0337)
(0.0329)
(0.0306)

NPC or
CPPCC
6
1.068
(0.0512)

2.474
(1.917)

1.118
(0.931)

1.829
(0.979)

1.469
(0.770)

2.718
(1.388)

1.289
(0.867)

1.771

0.266

2.244

1.907

2.325

2.834

(1.341)

(0.312)

(1.089)

(0.937)

(1.099)

(1.697)

length

1.066
(0.151)

0.877
(0.153)

0.846
(0.0803)

0.909
(0.0861)

0.854
(0.0778)

0.916
(0.110)

tenure

0.319
(0.246)

0.864
(0.826)

1.289
(0.722)

0.852
(0.468)

0.614
(0.315)

0.792
(0.551)

League exp.

0.687
(0.524)

0.396
(0.475)

0.343*
(0.181)

0.268*
(0.147)

0.310*
(0.152)

0.0789*
(0.0873)

Party school

0.983
(0.716)

0.154
(0.175)

0.634
(0.302)

0.707
(0.340)

0.766
(0.345)

0.611
(0.375)

gov_now

1.052
(1.008)

6.405
(7.981)

2.381
(1.452)

1.253
(0.793)

2.522
(1.500)

5.341
(5.006)

sec_now

0.606
(0.518)

1.937
(2.418)

0.778
(0.465)

1.424
(0.801)

1.362
(0.745)

3.504
(3.221)

8.064

4.985

41.03***

34664751.4

30.83***

6.823*

(9.166)

(4.619)

(33.48)

(2.66015e+10)

(21.37)

(5.162)

gov_bef

0.00000101
(0.00141)

0.000000284
(0.000473)

1.153
(1.213)

0.229
(0.328)

0.530
(0.602)

0.216
(0.314)

sec_bef

7.721*
(7.169)

2.559
(2.686)

1.544
(1.129)

2.155
(1.464)

4.815*
(3.235)

0.360
(0.367)

Vice-gov_bef

0.407
(0.523)

0.362
(0.476)

0.283
(0.207)

0.465
(0.326)

0.260
(0.187)

0.558
(0.466)

Vice-sec_bef

0.612
(0.764)

0.752
(0.736)

0.961
(0.588)

0.497
(0.326)

0.894
(0.552)

0.154*
(0.147)

minister_bef

1.064

0.000000698

0.330

0.772

2.771

0.616

Native
Province

Top revenue
provinces
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(1.445)

(0.000620)

(0.299)

(0.675)

(2.012)

(0.571)

East_bef

1.880
(1.414)

0.475
(0.432)

0.670
(0.336)

3.751**
(1.781)

2.173
(1.014)

0.279
(0.213)

N

368

*

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: Author’s Database
In comparing the two different outcomes after running the same regional change
multinomial regression model, it makes more sense when we set the base outcome to be the West
instead of the Central Government. In brief, regional revenues and economic development can
explain many cases of provincial leaders’ political mobility. Economic growth and
developmental performance matter in regional leaders’ political careers, as some scholars have
found that “the Chinese central government tends to promote provincial leaders who perform
well economically and terminate provincial leaders who perform poorly…economic performance
matters for provincial leaders’ career prospects [and] is robust to various sensitivity tests.”113
Meanwhile, Youth League working experience and the holding of posts of governors
or party secretaries can also explain many cases of provincial leaders’ political mobility.
However, none of these independent variables applied in all the regression models explain
provincial leaders’ demotion or dismissal cases very well.
3. Political Mobility Analysis of Chinese City Leaders
As in any clearly defined hierarchical political system, the higher a cadre moves the
fewer choices of posts left for the cadre to compete for. Provincial leaders in China, by whatever
standard, are already senior governmental leaders in Chinese politics, even if they get transferred
to a different region without gaining a prominent promotion in the hierarchical system, they
113

Hongbin Li and Li-an Zhou. Ibid, p.1760.
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should not be considered as the losers of the games of throne. By all means, when one has served
as a provincial leader peacefully and competently until one’s retirement age, the material
compensations and social prestige that accrue are far from disappointing.
However, the case is different for a city leader in China. First of all, there are many more
city leaders than provincial leaders, and only a limited number of them can receive great
promotions (to become provincial leaders or even higher) even if the party-state’s merit system is
fairly based on a regional leader’s performance and achievements. Simply put, there are not
enough posts for everyone, and the higher you aim, the more difficult it is for you to reach.
Second, city leaders on average are younger than provincial leaders, as provincial leaders are at
the late stage of their careers. City leaders are in the middle yet crucial stage of their political
careers, and they can be more anxious and ambitious to compete with one another for scarcely
granted promotional opportunities, especially when the opportunity is to promote one from
regional government to the CCP center. To many scholars and China watchers from the outside,
Chinese technocrats (as it can be the same for all bureaucracies under authoritarian regimes) are
collectively defined and assumed to have great similarities with each other. Nevertheless, they do
end up very differently and unexpectedly based on their background and experiences as leaders
in different regions across China. Therefore, in order to more accurately reflect the political
reality of the party-state system, here, it is important to apply a few more models of analysis to
find out where the city leaders have gone after they served in their current posts. Besides getting
promoted, transferred or demoted, many city leaders entered into a provincial leadership group,
and some of them even acquired central governmental positions afterwards. Thus, our logistical
regression models of Chinese city leaders’ political mobility are:
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Table 4.21 Logistics Regression Analysis of City Leader’s Political Mobility
Model 1
Promotion

Model 2
Demotion

Model 3
Transfer

Model 4
Provincial after

Model 5
Finally Central

Age

-0.0153
(-0.73)

-0.0493
(-1.16)

0.00317
(0.12)

-0.0191
(-0.93)

-0.0354
(-1.51)

Gender

0.0905
(0.11)

-0.987
(-1.04)

0.0452
(0.05)

0.0499
(0.04)

College

0.239
(0.72)

-1.090
(-1.69)

-0.325
(-0.77)

-0.245
(-0.74)

0.891*
(2.32)

Native
province

-0.168

0.619

0.450

-0.0112

-0.367

(-0.62)

(1.03)

(1.25)

(-0.04)

(-1.22)

CCP
member

0.170

-0.890

(0.13)

(-0.66)

Length year

0.0243
(0.38)

-0.00221
(-0.02)

0.0734
(0.92)

0.0975
(1.52)

0.00980
(0.14)

Tenure

0.666
(1.83)

0.474
(0.53)

-1.105*
(-2.38)

-0.164
(-0.44)

0.0682
(0.16)

League

0.0635
(0.18)

0.824
(1.19)

-0.961
(-1.58)

0.543
(1.52)

-1.167*
(-2.50)

Party school

0.361
(1.15)

-0.948
(-1.15)

0.193
(0.46)

0.386
(1.27)

-0.321
(-0.93)

Local before

0.665*
(2.14)

0.260
(0.35)

-0.631
(-1.64)

0.765*
(2.43)

-0.295
(-0.83)

Mayor now

0.407
(0.94)

0.910
(0.81)

-0.626
(-1.16)

1.297**
(2.69)

2.341*
(2.21)

City sec.
now

0.859

0.0699

-0.525

2.024***

3.108**

(1.96)

(0.06)

(-0.98)

(4.19)

(2.93)

0.437

0.0909

-0.0963

0.0547

0.547

(1.53)

(0.16)

(-0.26)

(0.19)

(1.65)

-0.281

-0.385

0.438

0.299

-0.389

Big revenue
cities

Eastern
before
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(-0.97)

(-0.64)

(1.16)

(1.06)

(-1.22)

Constant

-0.764
(-0.41)
299

-1.067
(-0.42)
289

0.408
(0.25)
296

-0.386
(-0.20)
299

-2.366
(-1.20)
296

N

t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Model 1: Chinese city leaders receive promotion (or not) due to the factors associated
with these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native province (or not), how
many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having Communist
Youth League experience (or not), having received party school training (or not),
currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief CCP
secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among the
top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any city or
lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a leader has
been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).
Model 2: Chinese city leaders receive demotion (or not) due to the factors associated with
these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native province (or not), how many
years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having Communist Youth
League experience (or not), having received party school training (or not), currently
serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief CCP secretary of
the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among the top revenue
contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any city or lower-level
local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a leader has been a
regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).
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Model 3: Chinese city leaders receive parallel transfer (or not) due to the factors
associated with these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native province (or
not), how many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not), having
Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received party school training (or
not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as the chief
CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region is among
the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has had any
city or lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and whether a
leader has been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).
Model 4: Chinese city leaders receive provincial leadership position (or not) promotion
(or not) due to the factors associated with these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in
one’s native province (or not), how many years they have served, having tenured as
leaders (or not), having Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received
party school training (or not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently
serving as the chief CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the
municipal region is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not),
whether a leader has had any city or lower-level local governmental leadership
experiences (or not), and whether a leader has been a regional or local leader in an
Eastern province (or not).
Model 5: Chinese city leaders receive central governmental posts promotion (or not) due
to the factors associated with these leaders’ age, educational level, serving in one’s native
province (or not), how many years they have served, having tenured as leaders (or not),
having Communist Youth League experience (or not), having received party school
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training (or not), currently serving as the mayor of the city (or not), currently serving as
the chief CCP secretary of the city (or not), whether the province or the municipal region
is among the top revenue contributing provinces of China (or not), whether a leader has
had any city or lower-level local governmental leadership experiences (or not), and
whether a leader has been a regional or local leader in an Eastern province (or not).
Here, Model 4 is applied to examine why some city leaders have made a greater career jump
than others―how they managed to be promoted into provincial governments instead of staying
at the city leadership level of the political system. Model 5 is applied to examine what might
possibly affect city leaders’ political mobility such that after a longer time period (if not
immediately) they finally got promoted to central leadership positions in China (CC members,
Politburo, or ministerial posts). It is surely a smashing achievement for one to make one’s way
from a leader of a Chinese city (as there are thousands cities) to be a central governmental leader.
The results of all five of the logistics regression models are shown in Table 4.21. Our findings
are:
(1) City leaders who received promotions or upward political mobility were more likely
to be those leaders who were tenured on their leadership posts, who had previously
worked in local government (lower than city-level governments) as governmental
heads, and who currently served as party secretaries of the cities, instead of serving at
other posts. Also, city leaders who worked in developed regions with great revenue
contributions to the central government tended to be promoted more frequently than
those who worked in less developed parts of China. But this relationship is only
statistically significant at a lower significance interval.
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(2) City leaders who were demoted or dismissed afterwards were not associated
statistically with any independent variables. No convincing statistical proof was
found among the independent variables as to what had caused leaders to be dismissed.
(3) City leaders who received parallel transfers without outstanding changes of
hierarchical rankings were likely to be those leaders who were tenured (finished at
least one term of service), and who were local governmental leaders previously (local
experience). Also, leaders with a Youth League background were more likely to be
transferred.
(4) Several independent variables seem to affect the likelihood of being provincial
leaders afterwards. City leaders, who are promoted to be provincial leaders
immediately after their city chief posts, were those with local governmental
leadership experience, currently served as mayors or city secretaries (party chiefs).
Also, longer years of service, Youth League experience and party school training, and
previously work as governmental heads in an Eastern province of China, all influence
the odds of being transferred.
(5) Among all the city leaders observed in the study, those who finally achieved central
governmental leadership positions of China, were those with better educational
background (with college degrees), with Youth League experience, who had worked
as mayors or chief party secretaries of cities. Also, by controlling the independent
variables mentioned above, leaders with older age, who had worked in developed
provinces of China, and who had previously worked in Eastern provinces were more
likely than other leaders to be promoted to central government at later stages of their
political careers.
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Furthermore, it is of equal importance to show the cross-regional mobility of city
leaders as the models mentioned above also test the leader’s horizontal political mobility.
Therefore, we may adopt the regional change model (multinomial logistic regression) of regional
leaders again in examining city leaders’ regional changes after they served in certain regions of
China.
The regional change model for Chinese city leaders is: the region a leader was
relocated to after one’s city leadership is explicable in terms of a leader’s age,
educational level, served in native province, length of years served, tenured (or not),
Communist Youth League experience, party school training (or not), service as mayor
(or not), as party secretary (or not), service in developed provinces ( and great
revenues contributing cities) (or not), previous service as local leaders (or not),
previous service in secretary (or not), previously worked in Eastern Chinese
provinces (or not). Except age and length of service years are numbered, other
independent variables are dummy variables (0 or 1). Codes for different regions are
shown in Table 4.17. Meanwhile, in order to analyze city leader’s political mobility
across regions, the model also runs with controlling different outcomes as base
outcomes.
Situation 1: In running the regional change model, set dismiss, retire, or death (coded
0) as the base outcome, in order to have other outcomes’ possibilities compared with
city leaders being dismissed, dead or retired.
Situation 2: In running the regional change model, set West (coded 1) as the base
outcome, in order to have other outcomes’ possibilities compared with city leaders
being relocated to the West of China.
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Table 4.22a Multinomial Regression Analysis of City Leader’s Regional Changes afterwards
(1)
Region after
City Leaders
West
1

0.900
(0.0621)

Central
Government
5
0.937
(0.0708)

NPC or
CPPCC
6
0.677
(0.273)

(2)
Region after
City Leaders
Dismiss,
Retire, Death
0
1.106
(0.0807)

Northeast
2

Middle
3

East
4

age

0.904
(0.0659)

0.966
(0.0739)

0.892
(0.0640)

college

2.676
(3.601)

2.207
(3.058)

3.442
(4.545)

1.855
(2.346)

11.01
(15.52)

1.27764e+15
(3.15104e+18)

0.374
(0.503)

0.825
(0.572)

Native

4.766
(5.745)

5.070
(6.267)

6.802
(8.134)

5.758
(6.673)

4.027
(4.937)

2.41e-14
(3.67e-11)

0.210
(0.253)

Length
year

1.383

1.487

1.300

1.551

1.581

0.328

(0.548)

(0.596)

(0.514)

(0.605)

(0.636)

tenure

0.378
(0.582)

0.538
(0.861)

0.654
(1.002)

0.369
(0.543)

league

0.521
(0.699)

0.509
(0.705)

0.344
(0.461)

Party
school

0.744

0.626

(0.991)
Mayor
now

City sec.
now

Big
revenue
cities

Eastern
before

0.996
(0.0360)

Central
Government
5
1.037
(0.0450)

NPC or
CPPCC
6
0.749
(0.298)

1.286
(0.698)

0.693
(0.423)

4.116
(3.241)

4.77472e+14
(1.17759e+18)

1.064
(0.538)

1.427
(0.555)

1.208
(0.561)

0.845
(0.437)

5.06e-15
(7.69e-12)

0.723

1.075

0.940

1.122

1.143

0.237

(0.684)

(0.287)

(0.126)

(0.0882)

(0.117)

(0.146)

(0.486)

0.125
(0.194)

0.0800
(0.281)

2.643
(4.065)

1.421
(1.036)

1.729
(0.952)

0.975
(0.648)

0.329
(0.229)

0.211
(0.684)

0.447
(0.582)

0.254
(0.357)

280.0
(1744.2)

1.918
(2.573)

0.976
(0.566)

0.660
(0.305)

0.857
(0.492)

0.487
(0.329)

537.1
(3277.6)

0.392

0.654

0.469

6.22e-17

1.344

0.841

0.527

0.878

0.630

8.36e-17

(0.857)

(0.520)

(0.847)

(0.635)

(1.20e-13)

(1.790)

(0.458)

(0.220)

(0.459)

(0.348)

(1.62e-13)

0.000000334

0.000000465

0.000000610

0.000000659

24.25

6.34247e+12

2990886.7

1.390

1.825

1.971

72515483.3

1.89696e+19

(0.00142)

(0.00197)

(0.00259)

(0.00280)

(120632.7)

(3.11514e+16)

(1.26940e+10)

(0.983)

(1.060)

(1.531)

(1.88287e+11)

(4.68891e+22)

0.000000198

0.000000102

0.000000270

0.000000292

5.796

4.84951e+11

5051415.4

0.515

1.362

1.475

29276114.7

2.44969e+18

(0.000840)

(0.000432)

(0.00114)

(0.00124)

(28836.0)

(2.38186e+15)

(2.14394e+10)

(0.374)

(0.768)

(1.102)

(7.60155e+10)

(6.05514e+21)

0.439

0.640

1.315

2.573

2.434

4.36e-08

2.276

1.456

2.993**

5.856***

5.540**

9.92e-08

(0.460)

(0.688)

(1.357)

(2.545)

(2.649)

(0.0000342)

(2.381)

(0.762)

(1.213)

(2.883)

(3.109)

(0.0000779)

*

*

**

***

*

1.94023e+09

0.0253

**

0.0595

0.0461

(0.0324)
(0.0776)
(0.0575)
N
299
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

2.173

0.113

49073438.2

(2.710)

(0.143)

(3.85512e+10)
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39.54

(50.69)
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Northeast
2

Middle
3

East
4

1.069
(0.0455)

0.987
(0.0314)

2.354

1.823

(1.682)

(1.106)

85.90

(51.31)

4.453

(3.011)

(1.52421e+12)

Table 4.22b Multinomial Regression Analysis of City Leaders’ Regional Changes afterwards
(3)
Region after
City Leaders
Dismiss, Retire,
Death
0
1.035
(0.0791)

West
1

Middle
3

East
4

0.935
(0.0398)

0.923
(0.0383)

College

0.453
(0.628)

1.213
(0.841)

Hometown

0.197
(0.244)

Length year

Tenure

NPC or CPPCC
6

0.931
(0.0403)

Central
Government
5
0.970
(0.0480)

1.560
(1.039)

0.841
(0.580)

4.990
(4.307)

5.78959e+14
(1.42789e+18)

0.940
(0.475)

1.342
(0.672)

1.136
(0.612)

0.794
(0.472)

4.76e-15
(7.23e-12)

0.673
(0.270)

0.930
(0.109)

0.875
(0.102)

1.043
(0.125)

1.063
(0.152)

0.220
(0.452)

1.860
(2.978)

0.704
(0.513)

1.217
(0.906)

0.686
(0.548)

0.232
(0.195)

0.149
(0.486)

1.964

1.024

0.676

0.878

0.498

550.1

(2.721)

(0.594)

(0.399)

(0.582)

(0.378)

(3362.7)

Party school

1.598
(2.189)

1.189
(0.647)

0.627
(0.342)

1.044
(0.635)

0.750
(0.481)

9.94e-17
(1.92e-13)

Mayor now

2151038.3
(9.12951e+09)

0.719
(0.508)

1.313
(0.921)

1.418
(1.170)

52152960.9
(1.35415e+11)

1.36429e+19
(3.37226e+22)

City sec. now

9814112.1
(4.16534e+10)

1.943
(1.412)

2.645
(1.944)

2.865
(2.396)

56878927.8
(1.47686e+11)

4.75937e+18
(1.17642e+22)

1.564

0.687

2.056

4.023*

3.805*

6.82e-08

(1.682)

(0.360)

(1.028)

(2.215)

(2.384)

(0.0000535)

16.80*
(21.89)

0.425
(0.304)

0.774
(0.498)

36.50***
(23.15)

1.892
(1.328)

824358039.3
(6.47601e+11)

Age

League
experiences

Big revenue
cities

Eastern before

N

299

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: Author’s Database
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0.701
(0.279)

Situation 3: In running the regional change model, set the Northeast (coded 2) as the
base outcome, in order to have other outcomes’ possibilities compared with city
leaders being relocated to the Northeastern provinces of China.
The results (shown in Table 4.22a and Table 4.22b) suggest the following:
(1) For Chinese city leaders, if they are not retiring or being demoted after their leadership
services, those leaders who got transferred to the West, the Northeast, and the Middle provinces
of China were likely to be those who had previously served at Eastern Chinese provinces,
meaning that they still could continue their leadership but with changes of locations. The results
show that city leader with prior Eastern regional leadership experience stayed in the government
longer (more durable) than those who did not.
(2) City leaders who got promoted to central governmental posts were those who had
higher education and who had previously worked in the East. But the significance interval is
lower.
(3) City leaders who got transferred or relocated to the Middle and the Eastern provinces
of China were those leaders served at developed cities of China (with great revenue contributions)
and had Eastern regional leadership experience. It seems clear that previous regional or local
governmental experience may have helped those leaders stay in the relatively more developed
regions of China, instead of moving to the poorer side of the country.
(4) City leaders not relocated to the West and the Northeast of China, who got promoted
to central government were those who had higher education, were with tenures, had previously
worked in Eastern regions, and were currently serving as city leaders in develop cities that made
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great revenue contributions. These independent variables’ influences on the likelihood are
statistically significant (All results shown in Table 4.22a and Table 4.22b).
In addition, the results of “regional change regressions” of provincial and city leaders
show that:
(1) Due to the center's deliberate arrangements, talented bureaucrats are always sent to
the developed provinces in China but less competent regional leaders always serve in
underdeveloped parts of the country.
(2) This uneven (or unfair) arrangement actually may have increased the gap between the
developed coastal regions of China and less developed Mid-West China. People, as they want,
deserve better leadership if they cannot elect their regional leaders.
D. Conclusion：Chinese Political Elites “on the Go”
1. Political Mobility and the Preferred Characteristics of Chinese Regional Elites
In this part of the study we have intensively studied the patterns of Chinese regional
leaders’ career mobility by providing applicable research models to analyze the specific cases
under observation. The analysis suggests examining Chinese regional political leaders’ career
mobility with a broader and more comprehensive perspective by analyzing their personal
background, previous professional experiences of working at different levels of governments in
Chinese politics, and more importantly, how different Chinese regions’ geopolitical settings have
influenced these regional leaders’ political careers in the future. As the previous chapter of the
study has pointed out, in contemporary Chinese politics CCP officials need to be of a younger
age (as there are retirement requirements on age), have had higher education and have
180

demonstrated expertise in administrative management. In this chapter, the study also points out
that regional leader’s local leadership experiences matter; those who worked in executive
branches of the regional governments in China (provincial or municipal party committees and
governments) had advantages over those who worked in non-executive branches of the
governments (NPC or CPPCC systems and attached offices) or those with other professional
background (educational institutions or state-owned business firms).
As a matter of fact, by applying the analytical research models designed to examine
the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders from the 1950s to 2000s, the findings show that
Chinese regional political elites with certain personal characteristics tied to their professional
career choices tend to receive more upward career assignments than those who do not possess
any of these personal characteristics. These factors are: relatively younger age (more years to
stay in the executive posts before retiring), higher educational credentials (though the study does
not specify or compare college education with advanced post-graduate degrees), professional
leadership training in the party school system, and relatively longer years of serving the
government (tenured leaders) that can prove one’s loyalty to the party-state.
Furthermore, because all the cases are randomly selected from different time periods
of Chinese political history and from different regional settings of Chinese political economy,
there are not considerable numbers of female regional leaders or leaders with ethnic minority
background. Thus, gender and nationality factors do not have significant influences on career
movements in the research models. However, it is firmly believed that if it is a study on ethnic
groups or gender preferences in Chinese politics is undertaken, we may see more robust
outcomes by controlling other independent variables and focusing on gender and ethnicity only.
Against all odds, gender and ethnicity factors by far are not crucial factors that can solely affect
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the decision-makings of the CCP center or alter the entire regime; instead, it is believed that only
fundamental change of regime shall bring much more dynamics to both of the two groups in
Chinese political life.
Moreover, the nativity of regional leaders serving at their hometown provinces (either
provincial leaders or city leaders) does not seem to have convincingly strong negative effects on
regional leaders’ political mobility. In other words, the study has found no evidence that a
regional leader cannot get promoted because one is a native who heads a region government in
one’s native province. Despite exceptional cases, we conclude that it is some other set of factors
that may have prevented a particular regional leader from being promoted or making parallel
transfers as regional leaders. The CCP center does not appear to judge a regional leader only on
the basis of nativity or locality. Previous studies suspected that the CCP center viewed localism
as a threat to the center’s authority, and that the center might, therefore, treat native and nonnative regional leaders differently. Our findings show that native-born leaders sooner or later
change the regions where they serve as regional leaders, and the majority of them do not tend to
stay at their native provinces throughout their careers. From a natural perspective, then, there is a
real circulation of elites. It is suggested here that it is the localism that concerns the center, not
any individual regional leader from a particular province of China that alarms the center. At least
we have no proof in concluding that native-born leaders receive no promotions.
2. Political Mobility and Regional Leaders’ Performance
Needless to say, one of the most overpowering features of Chinese political-economic
phenomena is the sustaining economic growth under the authoritarian party-state regime. Some
of the previous studies on the issues have suggested that economic achievements may affect
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Chinese regional leaders’ political mobility as the center prefers those leaders who have made
the economy look good. 114
Our findings show that this issue should be discussed from both of its sides: first, more
developed regions (provinces and their major metropolitan municipalities) do enjoy more
socioeconomic development in addition to higher GDP growth. It is likely that officials who are
appointed to be regional leaders in developed provinces of China have much larger shoes to fill
in as they must keep the economic growth fast enough to keep their posts. Second, it happens
recently that GDP growth numbers tend to reflect less realistic situations of Chinese regional
economic development; the numbers fabricated by regional officials can be deceptive, designed
to cheer the Chinese people up and please the CCP center. Therefore, we adopt regional revenues
incomes and their contributions to the center as an adjustment. The results have shown our
hypothesis to be convincing that regional leaders from higher revenue contributing regions get
promoted higher, faster, and greater.
As most economically developed provinces are in the East, our analysis has also applied
another independent variable to observe how many incumbent regional leaders in China
previously had served in the East as governmental heads. The results show that regional leaders,
who previously worked in the East and currently worked in a developed region, had greater
possibilities of getting promoted. And they actually have greater chances to be relocated to the
central government in Beijing, which means that their political careers will have entered into a
much more advanced stage than the rest of the regional leaders in China. China’s reform of its
personnel control system coincided with the beginning of its economic reforms. A crucial
turnaround in personnel management was the wholesale change in the evaluation criteria for
114

Li and Zhou (2005), and Bo (2002).
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government officials. Political conformity, which was the only important pre-reform criterion for
promotion, gave way to economic performance and other competence-related indicators.
Although political loyalty remains important, generating more financial resources for the center
(and for the local government as well) has proved to be an efficient means for leaders to show off
their achievements in governance. In other words, they are the “employees of the year (fiscal
year)” who are expecting to be rewarded by the center.
Our findings show that when it comes to political mobility opportunities, there exist
actual differences between more executive posts and less executive posts in Chinese regional
governments. Findings of the study show that among provincial leaders, CCP chiefs and
governors are more likely to be promoted than vice party secretaries and vice governors. There is
only one governor of a province at a time, and the same is true of the party chief of the province.
But there can be several vice secretaries and vice governors in charge of different departments
inside the regional political system. Therefore, the “CEOs” of regional governments, governors
and party chiefs so to speak, are the ones who think of the big pictures and run the entire systems.
Among city leaders observed in the study, city party chiefs and mayors received more
promotions than vice secretaries and vice mayors. As city governments are ranked lower than the
provincial governments, vice city secretaries and vice mayors are more junior regional leaders
(and they are younger in general); it takes longer for them to climb up the administrative
hierarchy, and promotion opportunities come later as well.
The findings support the hypothesis made in the previous chapters of the study: the CCP
is a political party with strong discipline that runs the party-state, and the CCP center has its
strict rules in promoting regional leaders that one’s achievements must be proved by one’s
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loyalty and performance altogether. Though there are exceptions, in post-Deng’s Chinese politics,
the center is extremely cautious to make the regional leaders do “great leaps upward.” 115
The East of China is the better-looking side of the country, but we must keep in mind
that the rest of China combined has more developmental issues and more complicated
governance-related problems (poverty, infrastructure, education, welfare, multinational groups,
and natural resource related environmental issues). As a matter of fact, in addition to the
evidence the study has found that regional leaders from the developed regions of China get more
opportunities. Our findings also show that regional leaders serving in other regions of China with
particular credentials or personal experiences can get the spotlight attention from the CCP center
as well, even though the chances seem to be greater for those who work at the East. Two other
important indicators applied by the study are local leadership experience and Communist Youth
League official experience. Our study finds that in the post-Deng era regional leaders with
administrative experience in the Communist Youth League have been attracting more and more
political opportunities from the center. As we have discussed in the prior chapter of the study, the
smaller group containing officials with Youth League working experiences inside the CCP was
developed at a relative later stage of the CCP’s rule. Our analysis shows that regional leaders (as
well as the central leaders who came from regional governments) classified as Tuanpai (the
clique of the League) came with very different personal background, and the concentration of
League-related regional leaders is most pronounced in the Mid-west provinces of China.
Furthermore, our findings show that this locational disadvantage does not stop Youth
League-related regional leaders from getting outstanding opportunities of promotion; having
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One the important feature of contemporary Chinese politics is that the center tries to make leadership transitions
more smooth and semi-predictable. Relevant studies on the topic see Bruce J. Dickson. “Threats to Party
Supremacy.” Journal of Democracy, 14(1), (2003):27-35, and Andrew G. Walder. “Career Mobility and the
Communist Political Order.” American Sociological Review, 60(3), (June 1995):309-28.
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Youth League experience has a significantly positive influence on regional leaders who received
promotions. In terms of regional changes after the fact, leadership posts in the less developed
parts of China have not stopped League-related regional leaders from getting relocated to the
central government in Beijing. Can this background advantage (having worked for the Youth
League) overcome a regional leader’s locational disadvantage (serving at the Mid-west regions
of China)? And why are League-affiliated regional leaders are not concentrated in the developed
provinces of China? The next chapter of the study will discuss more about on this topic.
In addition, another significant factor that has affected regional leaders’ political
mobility in a general sense is having local governmental experience. Our findings show that
among all provincial leaders in China observed by the study, those who have had city leadership
experience were more to win promotions than those who have not. Provincial leaders who have
serve as city leaders had greater promotions. Likewise, city leaders who have had leadership
experience at lower level local governments were more likely to get promotions than those who
have not.
Overall, Chinese regional leaders who had served in local governments before they
were appointed to governmental heads at other local governments tend to get more subsequent
promotions than those regional leaders who came from the central government, state-owned
business or education institutions. The significance of local work experience on regional leaders’
political mobility suggest that the CCP center values regional leaders’ credentials and
achievements before they receive regional governmental posts or serve as regional political
chiefs in China. After all, leaders who have spent their previous careers at local governments
very likely would know local politics more than those have not had any similar working
experiences in the regional governmental system. Bureaucracy in general is a merit system where
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professional training and specialized expertise are more encouraged, but where passion and
enthusiasm for being politicians are less necessary and helpful. Apparently, the center values
those regional leaders who are more familiar with agenda-settings and solution-orientated
governing skills. Presumably, most authoritarian regimes do likewise.
3. The Unveiled Opacity: Downward Mobility of Regional Leaders
The patterns of promotions and transfers are adequately explained by the series of factors
observed in the study. However, we still have not found a functioning model to explain Chinese
regional political elites’ downward career movements, such as demotions and dismissals. Even if
the independent variables have robust significance in explaining the outcomes of promotions and
transfers. We may have clarified why Chinese regional leaders receive promotions, but we have
little idea why some Chinese regional leaders have received demotions and gotten dismissals.
In fact, though the cases of all regional leaders observed in the study were randomly
chosen, leaders’ demotions seem to be even more random, such that a demoted leader’s age,
education, nativity, professional experiences (party school trainings and local experiences
before), incumbent position (governor, secretary or mayor), locations (Eastern or Mid-west
China), economic tribute and fiscal contribution to the center (top revenue making provinces or
cities) and length of years serving as regional leaders do not seem to have a significant influence
in explaining demotions. As a result, it is suggested that the demoted or dismissed regional
leaders need to be examined and explained through other unconventional means in order to
reveal the correlation between a leaders’ performance and the center’s drastic disapproval that
makes the latter decide to discontinue the leader’s service for the regime.
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At this stage, though, the downward mobility of Chinese regional leaders does not seem
to be affected by the conventional factors used in the study. At least we know that for whatever
reason a CCP cadre gets dismissed by the center, it is the termination of his political career and
the end of a regional leader’s political mobility. Therefore, as the models applied in this chapter
analyze the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders, it is suggested that we need to study
the demoted or dismissed cases differently and independently by applying analytical theories and
models other than the ones we have used here. Otherwise, this study by far is effective in
explaining the outcomes of political mobility of regional leaders.
Again, pointed out earlier, the teleology of any study on Chinese political elites and
elite political mobility must ultimately be concerned with the party-state regime and any
dynamic changes of its. Therefore, the following part of the study will continue in its efforts to
unveil the existing opacities in studying Chinese regional leaders’ political mobility.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FOR THE HARMONIOUS SOCIETY:
BEYOND ECONOMIC REASONING AND HOW NOT TO GET PROMOTED

One of the most noticeable trends in Chinese politics in the post-Deng Xiaoping era is
that the CCP has become less unified in ideological concentration, party organization, and the
central leadership. Such a decentralizing trend of the party-state regime, even though the CCP
center’s authority as the central government of the unitary state has not been severely weakened
at all, has also caused many newer phenomena in the personnel arrangements and the selection of
regional official in Chinese politics. As this study has suggested, the reformist policies initiated
by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s were actually and practically a series of decentralizing
actions aimed at limiting the center’s influences over the market and people’s economic life.
Local authorities were encouraged to issue economic growth-centric policies featuring the
advantages of their particular regions.
Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping insisted that such decentralized reformist economic plans
should and would not lead to visibly greater income inequality among the Chinese people, or
unevenly developed Chinese regions. The essential guideline of his reformist ideas was to
transform China toward “common prosperity.” The prosperous Chinese people would accelerate
the pace to the common prosperity.116 In fact, more than 30 years of economic reform pushed by
the CCP has brought countless social changes to Chinese society but not the common prosperity
Deng Xiao predicted.
Furthermore, as revealed by the study, the undeniably huge developmental gaps among
different Chinese regions might have also brought political inequality into contemporary Chinese
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politics. According to the analysis of Chinese regional leaders’ political mobility in the previous
chapter of this study, regional leaders from different Chinese regions received different
promotion opportunities. They were also being relocated differently after they have served their
terms in a region. Though the geopolitical settings have their rigidities and are not easily subject
to social or political changes, their uneven development resulted political differences when a
regional leader of China makes their plans to climb up to ascend the party-state hierarchy.
Other than the developmental advantages that the Eastern Chinese provinces enjoy, the
political influences of their regional leaders are also associated with the fiscal contribution they
make to the CCP center. Unlike increasing the regional GDP growth rate, where governmental
investments and costly public projects (e.g., cross-provincial freeway systems, high-speed bullet
train rail tracks, metropolitan subways and urban landscapes) can boost the GDP number greatly
in a very short period of time and put the regional governments in debt, fiscal revenues take a
much longer time to grow. The growth is also more vulnerable (compared to GDP growth
manipulated by the government) to external factors, such as market demands and global
economic trends.
However, as the study has examined, when the CCP center grants promotion
opportunities to regional leaders who fiscally contribute more to the center, it actually
encourages Chinese regional leaders to squeeze more from their local people and give more to
the center (and save more to themselves). When the economy is prosperous and flourishing, the
negative side effects seem to be trivial as the people’s general income has been increasing. Yet
during recession, such a means of revenue-collecting can severely deepen the cleavages between
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local businesses and their regional governments. Some recent cases have shown popular
discontent caused by local governments’ brutal ways of collecting taxes.117
To nurture a sustainable local economy is more difficult than to destroy its fruits.
Hurting the local businesses, in order for the governmental heads themselves to get promoted, is
a regretfully foolish practice as it kills the goose that lays the golden eggs. Meanwhile, due to the
great achievements of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, the Eastern Chinese provinces are now known
for being the economic engines of the country, and their regional governments draw much more
political and social resources than the regional governments of the rest of China. Regional
leaders capable of keeping the economy and revenue incomes growing have become the CCP
center’s preferences in selecting potential elites to fill regional governmental posts. From this
perspective, being a governmental official from Eastern China can be more preferential than
those from other regions of China. For regional officials who do not have such advantages may
have to try something different to show their outstanding leadership skills so as to be considered
for promotion. Such preferential advantages, as the study examines in the priori chapter, also
exist among Chinese regional political elites with Communist Youth League background. Youth
League working experience seems to have helped officials get promoted to prominent
governmental posts.
Besides the patterns shown in regional leaders’ promotions and transfers, few factors can
explain the termination of the political career of Chinese regional leaders in the post-Deng period.
Aside from age, which is the most obvious factor to determine a regional leader’s retirement (as
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when one reaches a certain age limit, one is most likely to retire), and institutionalized retirement
(leaving one’s office and transition of power to the successor) has not yet been found strong
connections with other factors that can explain why many regional leaders received demotions or
were dismissed.
In Mao Zedong era of Chinese regional politics, political reasons and elite power
struggles were the main causes that resulted in regional political elites losing their prominent
posts in regional governments. The political turbulence was extremely unstable during the
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), while even the central leadership was in crisis from time to
time due to Mao’s purges of the veteran revolutionary leaders. More than 80 percent of
governmental officials were purged and removed during the chaotic Cultural Revolution
period.118 This assertion that removals of regional leaders were due to their political standings
against Mao’s personal leadership has been empirically studied by a number of scholars.119
Since the 12th CCP National Congress in 1982, where institutionalized retirements of
senior leaders became a part of the personnel arranging system, regional leaders’ political
mobility had been more connected with their governance achievements, especially regional
economic growth and revenue incomes. Fewer regional political elites were terminated from
their careers for exclusively political reasons. In other words, disobeying the center can cost a
regional leader his job, but merely obeying the center (without achieving anything economically
great) cannot guarantee the leader’s tenure. The removal of General Secretary Hu Yaobang in
1987 and the resignation of Mr. Hu’s successor, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang in 1989 were
both remarkable political events in Chinese politics, but neither one of them resulted in a
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political earthquake among Chinese regional governments. Most Chinese regional leaders
remained in their posts after 1989 even if the political atmosphere had shifted drastically. When
former Shanghai party boss, Jiang Zemin was appointed the new general secretary of the CCP,
the power transition was smooth.
This study contends that there are two reasons why most regional leaders were not
reshuffled after 1989. First, the ultimate decision-maker, Deng Xiaoping, was still in power.
Although Deng himself was not the constitutional head of government in China, his influence
and directions over governmental policies and finalized decisions were undeniably decisive. This
included the dismissal of Zhao Ziyang and the promotion of Jiang Zemin from Shanghai party
boss to the general secretary of the CCP in 1989. Second, the importance of Chinese regional
politics had been switched to sustaining the high-speed economic growth and the transition to the
market economy from the central-planning system. Ideological politics was no longer the only
consideration that the center used to determine a regional leader’s fate. Even after 1989, Deng
Xiaoping insisted that the decision of continuing the reform was unstoppable. Deng insisted that
“no single character of the Political Report of 13th CCP National Congress shall be changed” 120
to make it clear to all that he always supported the reform. The top priority of the party-state
shifted from political struggles to socioeconomic development of China. Chinese regional
governmental leaders have also shifted from proletarian revolutionaries to the authoritarian
regime’s technocrats and local economic managers. They started focusing more on the
normalized local governance issues, as most regional governments in the world do, such as the
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emphasis of the importance of economic development, increasing of revenues, and lowering the
unemployment rates.
Therefore, one can hypothesize that contemporary cases of removals or dismissals of
Chinese regional leaders are much more normalized or institutionalized compared to those of the
Mao Zedong era. Chinese regional leaders are dismissed or demoted due to their incompetence,
due to their violations of laws and state regulations, due to their power-abusing or corrupt
behaviors, but not merely because they had misunderstood the central leader(s), or they took the
wrong side during any political debates. Meanwhile, as the great achievements of Chinese
economic reform over the past 30 years were strongly associated with governmental policies and
support of Chinese government(s) (both the central government and regional governmental
branches), we can further hypothesize that the demotions and dismissals of Chinese regional
leaders in the post-Deng era are also associated with economic issues, especially cases involving
the abuse of power and rent-seeking economic crimes of political elites. Nationwide and
systemic corruptions among governmental officials have posed great challenges to the CCP’s
ruling legitimacy.
Furthermore, in post-Deng Xiaoping era Chinese politics, especially since the 16th CCP
National Congress in 2002 when Hu Jintao was elected as the General Secretary of CCP, the
party has mandated social orders and political stability to sustain their leaderships of the country.
Contentious politics due to socioeconomic changes, environmental concerns due to rapid and
nationwide industrializations, and major accidents involving great number of civilians, are the
newest challenges to the CCP in contemporary Chinese society. None of them were foreseen by
either Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping during their years as China’s ultimate leaders.
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All these governance-related issues are compelling the CCP center to take affirmative
actions to discipline those regional leaders who fail to handle the problems well and who deserve
to be swept from the elite. The removal of regional leaders due to any of these crisismanagement failures has not yet become institutionalized, which means not every official who
fails to manage these issues will be fired. But having failed to manage the crises is an excuse that
is used by the center to dismiss or demote some regional leaders. However, compared to
avoiding economic crimes, do the social management skills of Chinese regional leaders occupy
the same political priority on the center’s cadre policy agenda? Does the center dismiss or
demote a regional leader because of alleged corruption activities, mistreatment of social
movements, or major accidents involving the local people? At last, this chapter of the study gives
a comprehensive analysis of political mobility trends among post-Deng Xiaoping regional
leaders. With dismissal cases taken into consideration, we will now have an overall perspective
of the subject, and a more clearly defined map of regional leader’s political mobility.
The essential hypotheses of the chapter are:
Hypothesis 5.1: Compared to party politics under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping where
political struggles accounted for many of the removals of Chinese regional leaders, postDeng Xiaoping’s China dismisses such officials due to: (1) the age limits for formal
retirements, (2) economic crimes, such as accepting bribes and engaging in corruption, (3)
serious violations of the state’s laws and regulations, and (4) incompetence on the job and
having made serious mistakes over governance-related issues (such as mistreatment of
accidents, environmental issues, and other social stability-related issues).
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Hypothesis 5.2: As is shown in the previous chapter of this study, Eastern Chinese
regional leaders get promoted more. There are similar patterns that characterize the
demotions and dismissals of Chinese regional leaders as well. Dismissals and demotions
of regional leaders from different parts of China are handled differently. Some groups of
regional leaders are more resilient than other regional leaders.
Hypothesis 5.3: Highly ranked Chinese regional leaders are more resilient than lowerranked Chinese regional leaders. It is more likely that lower-ranked officials will get
demoted than higher-ranked regional leaders. In other words, the higher one’s rank, the
safer one may be from the center’s disciplining actions.
A. Downward Political Mobility Analysis of Chinese Regional Leaders in Post-Deng Xiaoping
Era

Collectively, Chinese regional leaders who head regional governmental branches
across the country are technocrats hired and trained by the CCP party-state and work for the
party as its agents nationwide. Yet, individually, every Chinese regional leader is a party cadre
who has emerged from numerous rounds of selections and attained at a certain height within the
strictly hierarchical political system. Every step one is about to take must be carefully planned as
any incorrect move can cost everything one has achieved so far in this elaborate political game.
This study has already highlighted the reason why a political career means a great deal to a
Chinese regional leader. It is not only because of the political importance that comes with being
a governmental leader; but the social privileges and personal prestige that come along with a
regional leader’s political power occupy great significance when one chooses to start a career in
the government.
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This unique feature of Chinese politics, where power is strongly associated with all sorts
of social and economic resources, makes the political career of a regional leader in China a
lifetime commitment and a prominent lifestyle choice. Considering the many difficulties a
regional leader has been through (to get promoted from the very bottom of the system), and how
much effort (and possible sacrifice) he has made for the exchange of power and privileges, it is
obvious that it can be unthinkably disastrous for a regional leader’s political career to be
terminated suddenly and abnormally. In other words, no Chinese regional leader, we assume,
would ever try to avoid promotion, let alone seek dismissal. Furthermore, to be put in prison for
violations and crimes is definitely an extremely shameful moment for any fallen regional leader,
especially since they were once in line for more upward political mobility in the system.
In studying Chinese politics of in the post-Deng era, and taking the dismissals of
regional leaderships as results which are against most Chinese regional leaders’ motives, the
current analysis assumes that any regional leader in China who encounters unexpected demotion
or dismissal ordered by the center, must be given a reasonable explanation by the CCP center.
This logic applies both to the leader himself and the public who once regarded him as their
legitimate authority. When the CCP center announces a new regional leader, it makes sure the
whole process looks to be a seemingly sensible arrangement for the leader has achievements that
qualify for the reward. In like manner, when the center decides to terminate a regional leader’s
career, it must be presented a seemingly sensible decision as well. Having no direct access to the
CCP center’s decision-making processes, though, we predict that the top leaders of China make
their decisions (mostly) based on objective reasons, performance-related not mere political bias.
As a matter of fact, there are two main types of downward political mobility found among
Chinese regional leaders who are under the center’s scrutiny. First, they could be demoted, but
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still stay in the political system. These regional leaders would leave their current posts but accept
lower posts in regional governments (or sometimes in the central governments but in lowerranked or non-executive offices). Second, they could be kicked out from the bureaucracy
completely and be dismissed from their current posts. Such a scenario would mean the end of
their political mobility, and many of them would also face judicial charges for the crimes they
have committed.
As discussed in the previous chapter, institutionalized regular retirement due to age also
causes the termination of a regional leader’s political career. In this study, 63 of 370 (17 percent)
were retired due to the age limit. Also among the 370 provincial leaders, 132 of them served as
provincial leaders in post-Deng Xiaoping era, and after their leadership service, 5.4 percent of
them retired due to the government’s age limit regulations. We have also discussed in prior parts
of the study the fact that regional leaders who were in offices shortly after the Cultural
Revolution had the highest mean age among all Chinese regional leaders at all times because
many of them were revolutionary veterans who were purged during Mao’s Cultural Revolution,
only regaining their careers afterwards. Thus, the retirement rate since the 1990s among regional
leaders has been more stabilized by the CCP center. Rarely are older leaders allowed to go
beyond the age limit. Regularly retired regional leaders (as well as central leaders) leave younger
leaders more room and freedom in regional governance. Some regional leaders actually changed
their occupation afterwards, though it is a rare thing for a regional leader to do.
Among all the observations of post-Deng Chinese provincial leaders, there was one
leader who later became university president and two leaders later ran large state-owned
companies. Although they were no longer in the government, they still worked for the state
(public higher education and state-owned economy). Some regional leaders chose to “resign” so
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as to terminate their political careers. For the resigning leaders, if they resigned for purely
personal reasons (health or other private issues), this study views the situation to be similar to an
age-based retirement. However, if they resigned due to crimes and violations, and if they were
charged by the legal branches of the government (The People’s Courthouses or The People’s
Procuratorates), the study views such cases the similar situations to leaders who were dismissed
for wrongdoing. We look at the outcomes of the political mobility of Chinese regional leaders
regardless of causes of the termination of their political careers are what we analyze.
1. Corruptions, Serious Violations, Accidents and the Removals of Chinese Regional
Leaders
As a persistent ailment of Chinese politics, corruption of governmental officials in China
has had a rather long history. The Communist Revolution and the establishment of the People’s
Republic seemed to have reduced corruption for a short period of time under Mao’s totalitarian
rule. Yet, the economic “opening up” and privatized market since the late 1970s seemed to cause
increasing corruption in Chinese government, and elite corruption was one of the main customs
voiced held by the protesters on Tiananmen Square in 1989. Some scholars consider corruption
as the failure of the planned economy―is a generic problem existed in most Communist regimes.
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Others view the increasing number of corrupt officials as a developmental issue which is

particularly associated with countries that are undergoing sociopolitical transitions in the middle
of the painful modernization process.122

121

Janos Kornai. The Socialist System: the Political Economy of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1992). Cited from simplified Chinese edition, Zhang An (trans.) (Beijing: Central Compilation and
Translation Press, 2007), pp.260-61.
122
Xiao Gongqin. Zhongguo de da zhuanxing (China’s Great Transformation) (Beijing: New Star Press, 2008),
pp.183-86.

199

Regardless of different pathological explanations of corruption, the undeniably high
degree of corruption existing in contemporary Chinese politics has definitely alarmed the CCP
center in recent years, as corrupt governmental officials have caused great losses to the country’s
economic resources, national capacities, social capital, and public disrespect. Worst of all,
though, corruption has weakened the CCP and its regional governments. As pointed out by China
watchers, the large number of corrupt governmental officials stirs up greater social inequality
and political instability; “those who are most likely to prosper are the ones who are most closely
tied to the state. Those who have taken the lead in getting rich have little incentive to change the
system that has allowed them, their families, and their friends to prosper.”123 An example of this
corruption is rent-seeking scandals where the semi-open access to the market for the investors
entailed pressure from powerful political figures to make doing business easier. For some
expected amounts of bribery to lubricate the political system, business people would gain a much
greater share of the market as a reward.124
In addition to the corruption that exists on the business side of China, where private
enterprises seek easier accesses to the market of 1.4 billion consumers, China’s infrastructural
boom in the recent decades provides another channel of generating numerous corruption cases.
Due to the demands of sustainable economic growth and trillions of U.S. dollars of governmental
investments in China’s public infrastructure, governmental officials, who do not have to be highranking political figures at all, who deal with the details of expenditures are exposed to the daily
opportunities of billions of dollars of cash flow from the governments’ vaults to the contractors’
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banking accounts. The absence of a well-functioning auditing structure in China gives these
officials the perfect chances to put tremendous amounts of the governmental investments into
their own pockets. Recently, China’s railway minister was dismissed for his involvement in the
stealing of the national high-speed railway investments, 125 and many provincial leaders and
departmental heads were caught for having stolen money from other public projects, such as
freeway constructions. 126 Accepting bribes can cause disturbances of the market as it violates
the fairness of competitions. Stealing the public investments on infrastructures also generates
serious problems that the center disproves the most. Either circumstance would alarm the center
to take actions against corrupt governmental heads, and likely to remove them from their posts.
Another issue, which is related to corruption and which stirs social controversies in
Chinese society, is the seeming increase in safety accidents and public health crises. Due to the
unfairness of market competition and the absence of “value-free” quality control, many
unqualified Chinese food and drugs manufactures have entered the market not because of the
sound quality their products, but for the bribes they have offered to the governmental officials. In
consequence, fatal accidents due to the poor quality of these products (sometimes they were
toxic without passing the governmental tests) have occurred, and have caused people’s anger
toward the manufacturers and the governments’ monitoring failures. The frequency of such
events has been rising in recent years; so has the number of the regional governmental leaders
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(including ministers of the central government) who have gotten fired by the center due to their
deadly mistakes.127
While it does not mean that each and every similar accident would cost a regional
leader his career, the discontent of the people can damage the center’s reputation and threaten its
rule of China. It is possible that both the center and the regional political system try to protect
their protégés from these incidents and minimize their negative effects. Because of this, it is an
acceptable strategy for the center to sacrifice one or two of its less favored employees. Above all,
we must admit that certain large scale of incidents could cost some regional leaders their posts,
as has happened before.
Furthermore, a relatively newer phenomenon that affects Chinese regional leaders’
political mobility is the land dispute issue involving the people, the government, and a third party
(mostly real estate developers). Accidents relating to mishandled drug and food products directly
affect Chinese people’s lives and merit the center’s great attention (and immediate countermeasures). While land disputes are highly sensitive sociopolitical issues that until recently have
not been widely discussed by the Chinese government.
All the land of China is ultimately claimed by the Chinese government as the only
rightful owner and landlord. Dwellers and farmers living on the land only have the right of using
their land based on their contract with the state. Soaring real estate prices across most Chinese
cities in recent years have provided the government with the opportunity to sell its land to real
estate developers for cash. However, the government must first get rid of the dwellers (with
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compensation offerings) on the land first to open it for the developers. Frequently, when the
dwellers refuse to move, the governmental branches clear them out through improper means. The
land dispute issues have caused fatal incidents involving civilian deaths and ignited social
protests involving hundreds to thousands of villagers and suburban dwellers. Some of the
incidents were exposed to the media before the provincial or central government could react,
causing roaring anger and ghastly criticisms among the Chinese people especially amongst
Internet users. As a result, again, to ease the societal dissatisfaction and to direct people’s hatreds
to certain targets, some regional governmental leaders would lose their jobs or get demoted for
incompetence. By far, among the demoted and dismissed regional leaders observed in this study,
most provincial-level governmental leader had never been punished for land dispute problems;
however, lower-ranked officials who were involved were demoted or removed.
Above all, in post-Deng Chinese politics, regional leaders who received downward
political mobility or terminations of their political careers were always associated with certain
reasons or explanations given by the CCP center. Their removals were primarily due to official
misbehavior, such as corruption and other unlawful violations, administrative failures that led to
accidents and loss of lives and property, abuse of power for personal gains, and other scandals
are unacceptable for any governmental officials as civil servants (usually include accusations of
having extra-marital affairs, sexual harassment, and all other morally unacceptable behavior).
Table 5.1 shows that the most common types of accusations applied by the CCP center to
remove or demote its regional leaders. Corruption (133 counts) or having violated other laws
(140 counts) was found among removed regional leaders. Also, having made unforced
administrative mistakes (114 counts) or having mishandled accidents (90 counts) were common
reasons used by the center to fire its regional leaders. Overall, regional leaders were removed for
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violating one or more of the listed accusations given by the center. Only a few regional leaders (7
counts) were accused directly for political disagreements with the center that cost their careers.
Again, compared to that of Mao’s era, being politically wrong is no longer the main reason a
regional leader got fired, at least not the publicly acknowledged reason.
Table 5.1 Types of Accusations Causing Regional Leaders’ Demotions or Dismissals
Type of Accusation Frequency
Corruption
133
Other Violation
140
Accident
90
Duty Mistakes
114
Movements
24
Land Disputes
83
Stability
73
Scandal
65
Political Reason
7
Source: Author’s Database
2. The Possibility and the Degrees of Punishments: What’s Hard to Gauge?
Among studies of political elites under authoritarian regimes, the factors influencing
elites’ political mobility are difficult to measure due to limited information released by statemonitored sources. Information beyond the brief statements must be gauged through contextual
meaning and relevant sociopolitical events. The situation is the same for scholars and China
watchers who study Chinese political elites if no reliable insiders provide reliable news of what
is going on in the decision-making black box. However, certain information about demoted or
dismissed Chinese regional leaders can be generally categorized based on the descriptions and
accusations given by the state-owned media. As is shown in Table 5.1, most demoted or
dismissed Chinese regional political elites in recent decades were removed because of their
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illegal violations, especially corruption-related crimes. But we have little knowledge about how
these officials got caught by the center. Furthermore, how (and when) would the center
determine to take actions toward a corrupt cadre due to serious violations? As we have discussed
in chapter three, many of the post-Deng regional leader share very similar professional
background and political career paths. They have also been working in the same regions prior to
receiving different further political mobility. Why then, were some of them under investigation
for corruption, while some others were not? Since most of the outsiders will not know at all until
the information is released by the center, previous studies have not provided convincing analysis
on the issue.
Some other questions remain to be answered at this stage before we discuss any
further aspects of the removal of Chinese regional leaders. First, to what degree would the CCP
center tolerate corruption and bribery among its regional political elites? And when does the
center being silent? This study has revealed that different governmental branches occupy
different political status in the political system of China. Meanwhile, we have also found
evidence that some regions in China are politically more important than others, not only because
they are located in the coastal regions of the country, but because they also generate greater
revenue contributions to the center. Do these factors give more political protection to the
regional leaders who work in these regions? Are more executive posts exposed to the CCP
center’s scrutiny because the executives deal with more complicated situations in carrying out
the policies, while the non-executives are less vulnerable due to fewer opportunities for
wrongdoing? For instance, the head of a cultural department or a local People’s Political
Consultative Committee would be much less involved in a mining accident or a local people’s
social protest against the government’s tax hikes.
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Second, has the center always been reasonable in removing its regional leaders with
corruption as the prime cause? Or are of corruption so prevalent because such charges gain the
center increased authority and cater to the wants of the people in China? In other words, if it is
known to the center that the bureaucracy is corrupt frequently and collectively, it is only a matter
of timing to weed out a regional official who seems to be disloyal and disputative to the center
over certain issues?
Table 5.2 Distribution of Posts of Demoted and Dismissed Regional Leaders
Post
Count
Provincial Secretary
8
Prov. Vice Sec.
33
Governor
7
Vice Governor
45
Ministerial
18
City Secretary
21
City Vice Sec.
18
Mayor
30
Vice Mayor
74
Sub-City or County
65
Level
Total
319
Source: Author’s Database

%
2.6
10.8
2.3
12.7
5.9
6.8
5.9
9.8
24.1
19.3
100

As the study itself is not fully devoted to the political phenomena of corruption in China,
the analysis does not pretend to answer all the questions raised above. Yet, for a political system
with extremely limited access to outsiders, these questions are surely of great benefits to anyone
who intends to make intellectual contributions to the subject. As in our study, we have at a
minimum observed the dismissed Chinese regional leaders with different characteristics to
support the proposed hypotheses. As shown in Table 5.2, the 319 total dismissals involved, 8
provincial CCP secretaries, 33 vice or deputy provincial secretaries, 7 governors, 45 vice
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governors, and 18 ministerial officials (including regional leaders ranked as the equivalent of a
minister). Together they constituted more than one-third of the observed cases. Provincial and
sub-provincial leaders are considered senior governmental leaders in China; many of them are
also CCP Central Committee members and the next move upward will be on their way to the
Politburo.
Meanwhile, there were 74 vice mayors, 18 city vice or deputy secretaries, and 65 subcity ranked regional leaders observed by the study. Together they made 49.2 percent of the
sample. These are the regional leaders who are considered relatively lower-ranked officials. They
are younger and less-experienced in governmental posts, and they all have their supervisors to
give them orders. Yet, these lower-ranked regional leaders are those who try hardest to receive
promotions in order to have a greater future career in politics. Otherwise, they may end up where
they are doing administrative jobs on a daily basis with official earnings much less than other
careers.

Above all, compared to the study of upward political mobility among Chinese regional
leaders, there are fewer unambiguous lessons we can learn from studying the dismissed Chinese
regional leaders. It can be hypothesized here that removals of Chinese regional leaders in the
post-Deng era are more regular, rational and legitimate with visible and explainable causes other
than political purges and power struggles among central leaders. Compared to the removals of
regional leaders in Mao’s and Deng’s eras, we expect to see more removals for actual unlawful
accusations but less ideological disagreements or disputes.
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Table 5.3 Correlations of Variables Observed in Demoted and Dismissed Regional Leaders

|

age

gender

college ccpmember

psec

gov

pvsec

vgov

csec

-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------age |

1.0000

gender |

0.1977

1.0000

college |

0.3127

0.2100

1.0000

ccpmember |

0.0147

-0.0202

0.0571

1.0000

psec |

0.2946

0.0408

0.0347

0.0132

1.0000

gov |

0.1379

0.0381

0.0258

0.0124

-0.0250

1.0000

pvsec |

0.3361

-0.0029

0.0769

0.0281

-0.0568

0.1583

1.0000

vgov |

0.2805

0.0642

0.1697

0.0336

-0.0678

-0.0633

-0.0249

1.0000

csec |

0.0907

0.0676

0.1404

0.0219

-0.0443

-0.0414

-0.0524

-0.0758

1.0000

mayor |

0.0413

0.0354

-0.0980

0.0266

-0.0538

-0.0503

-0.0788

-0.0744

-0.0023

cvsec |

0.0035

-0.0557

0.0275

-0.1521

-0.0408

-0.0381

-0.0866

-0.0642

-0.0676

vmayor |

-0.2326

-0.0214

-0.0435

0.0456

-0.0922

-0.0861

-0.1710

-0.2336

-0.1527

county |

-0.4294

-0.1422

-0.2584

0.0420

-0.0848

-0.0792

-0.1799

-0.2148

-0.1404

minister |

0.0636

0.0623

0.1293

0.0202

-0.0408

-0.0381

-0.0866

-0.1034

-0.0676

league |

0.0607

-0.0662

0.1215

0.0190

0.0536

0.0624

0.0606

0.0686

0.0526

partyschool |

0.0608

-0.0964

0.0724

0.0276

0.0111

0.0907

0.0537

-0.0510

0.0343

east |

0.1194

-0.0098

0.1260

0.0481

0.0426

-0.0410

0.0815

0.0267

0.0743

west |

-0.0058

0.0820

0.0461

0.0473

0.0454

-0.0390

-0.0093

0.0543

-0.0692

middle |

-0.0521

-0.0539

-0.0970

-0.1123

-0.0317

0.1199

-0.1394

-0.0270

0.0494

northeast |

-0.1253

-0.0579

-0.1785

0.0266

-0.0538

-0.0503

0.1691

0.0187

-0.0457

poor_reg |

-0.2262

-0.0801

-0.2394

-0.0631

-0.0412

-0.0160

0.0102

-0.0569

-0.1348

first_media |

-0.2534

-0.0106

-0.0238

-0.0125

-0.0160

0.0016

-0.2123

-0.1501

0.0812

low_rank |

-0.5515

-0.1283

-0.2353

0.0756

-0.1527

-0.1426

-0.3030

-0.3685

-0.2272

incompete |

-0.1640

0.0236

0.0960

0.0241

0.0261

0.0343

-0.1033

-0.0560

-0.0335

corruption |

0.4639

0.0783

0.2761

0.0708

0.1046

-0.0014

0.2059

0.3068

0.0235

accident |

-0.4218

-0.0829

-0.4369

-0.0368

-0.1053

-0.0025

-0.2004

-0.2062

-0.0328
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(table continued)
stability | -0.2437

0.0417

-0.1787

movements |

-0.0826

0.0727

violation |

0.2484

0.0336

powerfight |

0.1053
-0.3382

Mistake

|

-0.0499

0.0047

-0.0341

-0.1691

-0.1882

0.0305

-0.0273

0.0236

0.1047

-0.0445

-0.1011

-0.1207

0.0653

0.2184

-0.0071

0.0555

0.0792

0.0834

0.1568

0.0369

0.0381

0.0792

0.0124

0.2490

-0.0233

0.0879

0.0601

0.1315

-0.0665

-0.2123

-0.0216

-0.1257

-0.1174

-0.1797

-0.1660

-0.0213

scandal |

0.3046

0.0615

0.1710

0.0420

0.1154

-0.0258

0.1548

0.1008

0.0807

Land issue |

-0.1426

-0.0042

-0.0615

-0.0419

-0.0075

-0.0439

-0.1402

-0.1279

0.0094

demotion |

-0.2645

-0.0583

-0.1117

-0.0571

-0.1885

-0.0312

-0.0455

-0.0596

-0.0554

dismiss |

0.3566

0.1350

0.2439

0.1219

0.0199

0.0541

0.1621

0.1954

0.0400

jail |

0.3068

0.0863

0.2354

0.0649

0.0366

0.0118

0.1099

0.2342

0.0209

LostCCP |

0.4011

0.1032

0.2053

0.0699

0.1483

0.0006

0.1896

0.2569

0.0271

fin_recov |

-0.3313

-0.0933

-0.0561

0.0444

-0.0412

0.0197

-0.1155

-0.1181

-0.0262

|

mayor

cvsec

vmayor

league partys~l

east

west

county minister

-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------mayor |

1.0000

cvsec |

0.0113

1.0000

vmayor |

-0.1855

-0.1082

1.0000

county |

-0.1706

-0.1293

-0.2921

1.0000

minister |

-0.0821

-0.0623

-0.1406

-0.1293

1.0000

league |

-0.0772

0.0039

-0.0294

-0.1215

0.0039

partyschool |

-0.0046

0.0964

-0.0178

-0.0985

0.0056

0.0639

1.0000

east |

-0.0454

-0.0850

0.0818

-0.0534

-0.0534

-0.0390

-0.0082

1.0000

west |

0.0095

0.0136

-0.2239

0.3019

-0.1457

-0.0359

-0.0277

-0.3294

1.0000

middle |

0.1096

0.1123

0.1556

-0.2056

-0.1799

-0.0146

0.0911

-0.4280

-0.4208

northeast |

-0.0344

-0.0354

0.0454

0.0443

-0.0821

0.1203

-0.0764

-0.1954

-0.1921

poor_reg |

-0.0377

0.0515

-0.0320

0.2723

-0.3202

0.0316

0.0240

-0.6393

0.3931

first_media |

0.0732

-0.1297

0.0565

0.1529

-0.0175

0.0067

-0.0982

-0.0132

0.0450

low_rank |

-0.2853

-0.1775

0.6035

0.5550

-0.2330

-0.1308

-0.1048

0.0407

0.0400

incompete |

-0.0579

-0.0743

0.1107

0.0498

0.0271

-0.0162

-0.0236

-0.0411

-0.0643
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1.0000

(table continued)
corruption |
0.0443

0.0616

-0.0931

-0.4048

0.0896

0.0612

0.0675

0.1998

-0.0724

accident |

-0.0192

-0.0998

0.0553

0.3143

0.0220

-0.0544

-0.0792

-0.1867

-0.0142

stability |

0.0996

0.0560

-0.0107

0.1226

0.0560

-0.0621

-0.0904

-0.1224

-0.0096

movements |

0.1493

-0.0210

-0.0223

0.1164

-0.0727

-0.0137

-0.0596

-0.0900

0.1366

violation |

-0.0370

-0.0058

-0.1031

-0.1383

0.0499

-0.0087

0.0301

0.1120

-0.0386

powerfight |

0.0232

-0.0381

-0.0861

-0.0792

-0.0381

0.0624

-0.0521

0.2076

-0.0390

duty_mstk |

-0.0486

-0.0483

0.1816

0.1958

0.0091

-0.0589

-0.1739

-0.1337

-0.0149

scandal |

0.0443

0.0743

-0.2175

-0.2491

0.2440

-0.0139

-0.0202

0.0738

-0.0827

landissue |

0.0220

-0.0270

0.1028

0.0615

0.0354

0.0552

-0.0156

0.0730

-0.0689

demotion |

-0.1172

-0.0889

0.1065

0.2471

-0.1183

0.0098

-0.0989

0.0091

-0.0490

dismiss |

0.0282

0.0755

-0.1378

-0.2093

0.0755

0.0286

-0.0509

0.0402

0.0143

jail |

0.0286

0.0558

0.0168

-0.3498

0.1126

-0.0076

0.0763

0.1632

-0.0842

ccplost |

0.0266

0.0089

-0.1013

-0.3504

0.0930

-0.0245

0.0290

0.2380

-0.0799

fin_recov |

-0.1025

-0.0054

0.1424

0.0939

-0.0054

0.0799

0.0404

-0.1496

-0.1072

|

middle northe~t poor_reg first_~a low_rank incomp~e corrup~n accident stabil~y

-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------middle |

1.0000

northeast |

-0.2373

1.0000

poor_reg |

0.2361

0.1886

1.0000

first_media |

0.0908

-0.1710

0.0424

1.0000

low_rank |

-0.0400

0.0885

0.1890

0.1645

1.0000

incompete |

0.0113

0.1026

0.0110

0.1064

0.1279

1.0000

corruption |

-0.1453

0.0001

-0.3626

-0.4034

-0.3815

-0.1401

1.0000

accident |

0.1089

0.1013

0.2805

0.3170

0.2880

0.1745

-0.4908

stability |

0.1457

-0.0807

0.1828

0.3885

0.0766

0.2254

-0.3957

0.4807

1.0000

movements |

-0.0309

0.0268

0.0518

0.2661

0.0686

0.1795

-0.2301

-0.0276

0.4359

violation |

0.0154

-0.1912

-0.2307

-0.0699

-0.1732

-0.2248

0.1894

-0.4891

-0.3424

powerfight |

-0.1101

-0.0503

-0.1960

0.0457

-0.1426

0.0343

0.1747

-0.0984

-0.0853

duty_mstk |

0.0854

0.0649

0.2096

0.2009

0.3095

0.2149

-0.4542

0.5121

0.4575
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1.0000

(table continued)
scandal | -0.0375

-0.0900

-0.2539

-0.1214

-0.3721

-0.0960

0.4158

-0.2812

-0.1958

landissue |

0.0249

-0.0768

0.0055

0.3244

0.1373

0.0065

-0.2954

0.0269

0.4352

demotion |

0.0566

0.0458

0.1777

0.1986

0.3121

0.0077

-0.3323

0.2416

0.1016

dismiss |

-0.1021

0.0282

-0.2262

-0.1887

-0.2722

-0.0864

0.4524

-0.3329

-0.2100

jail |

-0.0287

-0.1287

-0.2707

-0.2272

-0.2529

-0.1409

0.6064

-0.3839

-0.2906

ccplost |

-0.1222

-0.0843

-0.3192

-0.2595

-0.3435

-0.1606

0.6678

-0.3965

-0.2962

fin_recov |

0.1419

0.1577

0.1725

0.1866

0.1847

0.2604

-0.4484

0.2917

0.1654

scandal landis~e demotion

dismiss

jail

| moveme~s violat~n powerf~t duty_m~k

-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------movements |

1.0000

violation |

-0.1935

1.0000

powerfight |

-0.0445

0.0792

1.0000

duty_mstk |

0.1278

-0.3518

-0.1174

1.0000

scandal |

-0.1212

0.2779

0.1879

-0.3158

1.0000

landissue |

0.2872

-0.0125

-0.0930

0.1545

-0.2257

1.0000

demotion |

0.0251

-0.0762

-0.0776

0.3131

-0.2608

0.0713

1.0000

dismiss |

-0.0698

0.2819

0.1015

-0.3085

0.2924

-0.1525

-0.4386

1.0000

jail |

-0.2333

0.2718

0.1460

-0.3532

0.4182

-0.1419

-0.3987

0.4887

1.0000

ccplost |

-0.2267

0.2943

0.1771

-0.3632

0.4718

-0.1693

-0.3702

0.5017

0.7666

fin_recov |

0.0705

-0.1920

-0.0838

0.3139

-0.2464

0.1010

0.3213

-0.4737

-0.4236

|

ccplost fin_re~v

-------------+-----------------ccplost |

1.0000

fin_recov |

-0.4576

1.0000

Source: Author’s Database
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3. Analysis of Chinese Regional Leaders’ Removals
Base on the accusations the CCP center utilizes to drag down regional leaders, there are
five different main outcomes that could happen to a dismissed regional leader. These outcomes
are listed in Table 5.4 below.
Table 5.4 Consequences Due to The Center’s Accusation
Consequence
Count
%
Demotion
206
66.9
Dismissal
213
69.2
CCP Membership
131
43.5
Lost
Jailed
120
39.0
Finally Recovered
72
23.4
Source: Author’s Database
As is shown in Table 5.4, downward political moves in the careers of regional leaders could be:
(1) being demoted to a lower post in the government, (2) being dismissed and removed from
current post and no longer employed in the government, (3) being dismissed from his post and
losing CCP membership, (4) being dismissed from a governmental post, and being jailed for
illegal wrongdoing, and (5) being removed but managing eventually to come back to
governmental leadership post.
These five outcomes of regional leaders’ downward political mobility and future career
paths are not statistically distinct outcomes. This means, for example, that losing CCP
membership does not mean one will recover one’s post in the future. And getting dismissed by
the center does not mean the leader must be jailed. They represent different degrees of political
mobility. However, a certain correlation is stronger when it comes to lost CCP membership and
jailed former regional leaders (see Table 5.3 for the correlations among variables). Regularly,
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before a leader would be sent to jail, he would first be deprived of his CCP membership. Losing
CCP membership is a disciplinary punishment made by the Communist party; receiving a jail
sentence is a punishment decision made by the courthouse. And once a leader was jailed for
wrongdoing, there would no possibility that this leader would be hired again by the government.
Thus, for any cases of lost CCP membership and a jail sentence, the chance for a full recovery is
zero. The Communist party does not employ anyone with criminal histories as a governmental
official. Being dismissed, being deprived of CCP membership, and being jailed―all the three
outcomes can happen together to the same regional leader, meaning that one’s serious unlawful
violations had led to the center’s severe punishments.
Now that we have clarified all the potential ambiguities in the present research design
of Chinese regional leaders’ downward political mobility, it is now possible to examine
theoretical hypotheses of the “Chinese Regional Leaders’ Downward Political Mobility Analysis”
models:
Model 1: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will receive a demotion from his
current regional leadership post is associated with his age, higher educational level,
Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle,
or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the
leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not),
had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents
happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or
not), whether the leader’s behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not).
Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of
the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not)
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had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial
secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary?
Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low
ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary
level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age.
Model 2: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will receive a dismissal from his
current regional leadership post is associated with his age, higher educational level,
Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle,
or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the
leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not),
had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents
happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or
not), whether the leader’s behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not).
Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of
the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not)
had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial
secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary?
Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low
ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary
level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age.
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Model 3: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will lose his CCP membership is
associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League working
experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China), whether
his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the center of
being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or
incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or
not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or not), whether the leader’s
behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been
involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above
released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public
disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or
deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary?
Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any
post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above
independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age.
Model 4: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will be sentenced to jail for
wrongdoing is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League
working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China),
whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the
center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or
incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or
not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or not), whether the leader’s
behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been
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involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above
released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public
disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or
deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary?
Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any
post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above
independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age.
Model 5: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will eventually recover from previous
punishment is associated with his age, higher educational level, Communist Youth League
working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle, or Northeast of China),
whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the leader was accused by the
center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not), had duty-related mistakes or
incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents happened under his leadership (or
not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or not), whether the leader’s
behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not). Furthermore, had the leader been
involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of the accusations mentioned above
released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not) had caused greater public
disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial secretary? Governor? Vice or
deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary? Mayor? City vice secretary?
Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low ranking post (or not) (any
post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary level)? All the above
independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age.
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Furthermore, the current analysis utilizes a multinomial logistics regression analysis to
examine the regional leaders’ demotions and dismissals issued by the center. “The Multinomial
Downward Mobility Models” are as follows:

Model 6: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will experience downward political
mobility of one administrative level is associated with his age, higher educational level,
Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West, Middle,
or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether the
leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or not),
had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents
happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or
not), whether the leader’s behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not).
Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of
the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not)
had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial
secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary?
Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low
ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary
level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age. Set
the base outcome as “2”.
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Model 7: The likelihood that a Chinese regional leader will experience downward political
mobility of at least two administrative levels is associated with his age, higher educational
level, Communist Youth League working experience, current working location (East, West,
Middle, or Northeast of China), whether his current region is a poor region (or not), whether
the leader was accused by the center of being corrupt (or not), had violated other laws (or
not), had duty-related mistakes or incompetence (or not); whether any large scale accidents
happened under his leadership (or not), whether any large scale people’s protests occurred (or
not), whether the leader’s behavior had caused issues of political instability (or not).
Furthermore, had the leader been involved in any personal scandals (or not); whether any of
the accusations mentioned above released by the news media earlier than the authority (or not)
had caused greater public disruptions? Finally, what was the leader’s post? Provincial
secretary? Governor? Vice or deputy provincial secretary? Vice governor? City secretary?
Mayor? City vice secretary? Vice mayor? Or was it a sub-city or county leader? Was it a low
ranking post (or not) (any post lower than the vice provincial governor or deputy secretary
level)? All the above independent variables are dummy variables, except the leader’s age. Set
the base outcome as “1”.

Here, no change of post is coded as “0”, demotion is coded as “1”, and dismissal is coded as “2”.
The purpose of utilizing the multinomial model is to examine downward mobility short of being
jailed, being deprived of CCP membership, or recovering a political post after punishment.
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Table 5.5a: Logistics Regression Models of Regional Leader’s Downward Political Mobility
(1)
Demotion
0.989
(0.0269)

(2)
Dismiss
1.068*
(0.0318)

(3)
Lost CCP
0.968
(0.0316)

college

1.167
(0.524)

1.627
(0.698)

0.573
(0.314)

psec

0.166
(0.208)

0.261
(0.340)

15550853.1
(2.06534e+10)

gov

0.818
(0.782)

3.591
(5.006)

0.954
(1.149)

pvsec

1.667
(1.006)

1.862
(1.738)

1.545
(1.127)

vgov

1.506
(0.869)

2.064
(1.872)

1.418
(0.933)

csec

0.656
(0.436)

1.356
(1.283)

0.834
(0.707)

cvsec

0.801
(0.553)

4.692
(4.879)

0.500
(0.418)

mayor

0.646
(0.405)

2.318
(2.056)

1.040
(0.834)

vmayor

0.000000272
(0.000262)

0.0000506
(0.0318)

2.289
(3.378)

county

0.000000695
(0.000670)

0.0000749
(0.0471)

0.834
(1.269)

league

1.622
(1.073)

1.392
(1.174)

0.364
(0.306)

east

2.130
(1.692)

0.600
(0.680)

3.169
(3.145)

west

0.479
(0.450)

3.409
(4.485)

1.727
(1.944)

middle

1.070
(0.916)

1.981
(2.464)

1.017
(1.076)

northeast

0.734
(0.784)

10.97
(15.38)

0.973
(1.247)

age
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(table
continued)
poor_reg

2.243
(1.093)

0.256*
(0.178)

1.461
(0.850)

corruption

0.570
(0.228)

10.50***
(6.161)

15.34***
(7.653)

accident

1.281
(0.726)

1.573
(0.881)

0.919
(0.670)

stability

0.490
(0.302)

2.357
(1.291)

1.951
(1.400)

movements

1.663
(1.334)

1.116
(0.772)

5.58e-08
(0.0000742)

violation

1.308
(0.456)

4.578**
(2.267)

2.398
(1.077)

duty_mstk

3.580**
(1.518)

0.796
(0.318)

0.541
(0.247)

first_media

2.006
(0.746)

1.066
(0.435)

1.485
(0.668)

scandal

0.570
(0.221)

3.205
(2.371)

7.944***
(4.507)

low_rank

4482077.9
(4.31678e+09)

39765.7
(24991239.0)

0.515
(0.720)

landissue

0.716
(0.303)
308

0.845
(0.362)
308

0.945
(0.454)
308

N

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: Author’s Database
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Table 5.5b: Logistic Regression Models of Regional Leaders’ Downward Political Mobility
(4)
Jailed
0.981
(0.0321)

(5)
Final Recovery
0.908**
(0.0315)

college

1.161
(0.657)

3.020*
(1.559)

psec

2.026
(2.500)

6.853
(12.14)

gov

2.264
(2.657)

1.771
(2.478)

pvsec

1.993
(1.436)

1.442
(1.429)

vgov

3.387
(2.298)

2.327
(2.208)

csec

1.868
(1.607)

1.034
(1.071)

cvsec

2.008
(1.746)

1.323
(1.454)

mayor

2.646
(2.147)

0.317
(0.307)

vmayor

4.609
(6.901)

258851.7
(607466937.5)

county

0.687
(1.091)

189322.1
(444296606.6)

league

0.643
(0.504)

2.524
(2.372)

east

0.491
(0.466)

0.130
(0.180)

west

0.367
(0.401)

0.0999
(0.155)

middle

0.392
(0.399)

0.312
(0.452)

northeast

0.0884

0.744

age
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(table
continued)

(0.112)

(1.183)

poor_reg

1.596
(0.912)

0.848
(0.617)

corruption

11.04***
(5.020)

0.0215***
(0.0199)

accident

0.626
(0.480)

1.007
(0.654)

stability

1.330
(1.039)

0.510
(0.297)

movements

0.947
(0.731)

violation

1.639
(0.661)

0.657
(0.404)

duty_mstk

0.526
(0.238)

1.752
(0.797)

first_media

0.978
(0.426)

1.363
(0.620)

scandal

4.287**
(2.019)

0.117
(0.136)

low_rank

1.046
(1.451)

0.00000258
(0.00607)

landissue

1.817
(0.871)
284

0.864
(0.401)
308

N

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: Author’s Database
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Table 5.6 Multinomial Regression Models of Regional Leader’s Downward Political Mobility

Demotion
1
0.934*
(0.0286)

(7)
Downward
Mobility
No Change
0
0.000000265
(0.000269)

Dismissal
2
1.071*
(0.0328)

3.23e-40
(1.50e-35)

1.149
(0.524)

2.81e-40
(1.31e-35)

0.870
(0.397)

psec

1.4044e+155
(3.2819e+160)

1.137
(1.798)

1.2350e+155
(2.8859e+160)

0.879
(1.391)

gov

2.13e-33
(3.50e-28)

0.302
(0.446)

7.05e-33
(1.16e-27)

3.309
(4.886)

pvsec

5.5896e+128
(1.3043e+134)

0.327
(0.334)

1.7104e+129
(3.9912e+134)

3.060
(3.127)

vgov

0.000256
(61.20)

0.653
(0.603)

0.000393
(93.78)

1.532
(1.415)

csec

2.33e-31
(4.57e-26)

0.623
(0.618)

3.73e-31
(7.33e-26)

1.604
(1.591)

cvsec

7.39453e+62
(1.06736e+68)

0.186
(0.191)

3.97958e+63
(5.74433e+68)

5.382
(5.542)

mayor

7.56e-17
(1.81e-11)

0.840
(0.760)

9.00e-17
(2.15e-11)

1.191
(1.077)

vmayor

3.02589e+17
(1.71644e+22)

1.121
(0.538)

2.69975e+17
(1.53143e+22)

0.892
(0.428)

league

3.70e-47
(4.92e-42)

0.643
(0.551)

5.75e-47
(7.66e-42)

1.556
(1.334)

east

1.03e-39
(2.69e-34)

1.014
(1.185)

1.01e-39
(2.65e-34)

0.986
(1.153)

west

1.22e-51
(1.92e-46)

0.178
(0.245)

6.85e-51
(1.08e-45)

5.619
(7.739)

middle

6.50e-83
(1.04e-77)

0.381
(0.494)

1.70e-82
(2.73e-77)

2.621
(3.396)

7.06e-91

0.118

5.99e-90

8.486

age

college

northeast

(6)
Downward
Mobility
No Change
0
0.000000247
(0.000252)
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(table
continued)

(1.11e-85)

(0.171)

(9.43e-85)

(12.31)

poor_reg

0.000408
(79.14)

6.180*
(4.479)

0.0000659
(12.81)

0.162*
(0.117)

corruption

8.94472e+55
(1.31452e+61)

0.0756***
(0.0443)

1.18262e+57
(1.73799e+62)

13.22***
(7.751)

accident

0.000196
(17.10)

0.327
(0.193)

0.000600
(52.30)

3.058
(1.807)

stability

1.44e-15
(4.86e-11)

1.158
(0.664)

1.24e-15
(4.20e-11)

0.864
(0.496)

5.8147e+100
(5.1152e+105)

0.478
(0.348)

1.2160e+101
(1.0697e+106)

2.091
(1.523)

2.37e-54
(2.11e-50)

0.219**
(0.112)

1.08e-53
(9.62e-50)

4.559**
(2.338)

duty_mstk

35.29
(3522909.3)

1.166
(0.474)

30.28
(3022635.4)

0.858
(0.349)

first_media

8.35014e+93
(1.14204e+98)

1.501
(0.612)

5.56297e+93
(7.60839e+97)

0.666
(0.272)

scandal

2.28e-67
(2.19e-63)

0.307
(0.234)

7.42e-67
(7.13e-63)

3.253
(2.475)

low_rank

8.49e-71
(2.27e-65)

0.637
(0.532)

1.33e-70
(3.57e-65)

1.571
(1.313)

landissue

2.70e-90
(8.34e-86)
308

0.555
(0.257)

4.86e-90
(1.50e-85)
308

1.800
(0.831)

movements

violation

N

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: Author’s Database
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4. Findings
The analyses above point to the following major findings:
(1) Post-Deng era’s Chinese regional leaders who had received demotions were more
likely to have received those demotions because of poor performance in their leadership duties.
Leaders who failed to treat their jobs as seriously as the center expected, or who caused serious
mistakes would be demoted. Also, if the leader’s mistake(s) was released to the media before the
authorities could act and consequently caused public attention, the leader was more likely to be
demoted. The independent variable has significant influence on the likelihood. It indicates the
center’s effort to minimize the negative publicity caused by the leader’s wrongdoing. In addition,
leaders from poorer regions are more likely to be demoted than leaders from richer regions.
However, this prediction is successful only at a lower significance level (results are shown in
Table 5.5a).
(2) Regression analysis shows that regional leaders who were dismissed and removed
completely from the political system by the center were those who had corrupt activities and
were accused of accepting bribes. This finding provides support for the hypothesis offered earlier.
Also, leaders with other serious illegal violations (damaging the national security, leaking
confidential intelligence, abusing power, violating human rights and privacy, brutal or violent
behavior, crime-related activities including murder) were very likely to be removed and
dismissed, ending their political careers. Again, results show that leaders from poorer regions
were more likely to be dismissed than leaders of the developed regions. Meanwhile, leaders of
older age were more likely to be dismissed once they were associated with wrongdoing. Issues
concerning political stability (protests, people’s criticisms, or damage to the party-state’s rule
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and legitimacy) can also cause leaders to be dismissed. But the prediction is successful at a lower
confidence interval.
(3) Regression analysis shows that Chinese regional leaders who lost their CCP
membership were more likely to have been charged with corruption or bribe-taking. Among
observed cases, leaders who lost their CCP memberships were frequently accused of corruption.
Also, leaders who lost CCP memberships were those who were accused of other unlawful
violations and illegal wrongdoings. In addition, regional leaders who were involved in personal
scandals (especially if the sandals were known to the public) as well as their other misbehaving
were likewise highly likely to be deprived of their CCP memberships. Chinese regional leaders
are considered party-state’s technocrats yet ones who enjoy traditionally acknowledged,
mandarin-like, higher social status. They do not represent only the political authority of the party,
but also carry the CCP’s legitimate and moral image. The results show that the CCP center has
little tolerance for any damage to its reputation caused by its regional leaders’ adulteries or other
licentious behaviors. The likelihood is statistically significant (see Table 5.5a).
(4) Regression analysis shows that post-Deng regional leaders who were jailed for
criminal charges by the government were much more likely to be those who were corrupt and
tainted by personal scandals at the same time. The results suggest that corruption is very often
used by the central authority as a primary accusation in jailing its fallen regional leaders.
Meanwhile, results show that vice governors had a much higher probability of being jailed than
any other regional leadership posts observed in the study. It shows that executives are more
exposed to the danger of being caught by the center for their misbehaving. Also, results show
that leaders who worked at in Northeastern China were more likely to be jailed than regional
leaders from other parts of the country (see Table 5.5b).
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(5) Regression analysis shows that regional leaders who eventually recovered from
demotions and dismissals were those who were younger and with higher education credentials.
Also, leaders accused of being corrupt at the time of their removals (but without other types of
accusations) were more likely to recover their governmental posts than those who were removed
for other wrongdoings (see Table 5.5b). It seems that the center still values such leaders’
usefulness despite their greed. Yet, there were only a relatively small number of cases of political
recovery, and making reappearance can be a highly complicated issue involving both personal
capabilities and political opportunities simultaneously. Deng Xiaoping himself was a wellknown example of that during his political life. He was purged three times and returned to power
three times. Indeed his final political reappearance in 1977 was eminently successful.128 Yet
Deng was surely never accused of crime-related charges by the party leaders, including
Chairman Mao.
Furthermore, to clearly present the trajectories of downward political mobility of
Chinese regional leaders, the multinomial regression models have suggested the following:
regional leaders who received demotions and dismissals were those of younger ages, were
accused of incorrectly handling accidents (i.e., mining accidents, collective food poisonings,
public terror threats or incidents, environmental pollutions, and so on). Also, those leaders facing
corruption charges and other unlawful violations were likely to be demoted. In addition, regional
leaders of the poorer regions of China were more likely to be demoted, once being charged for
their wrongdoings. All other thins held constant, regional leaders of less developed regions of
China are more vulnerable to the center’s disciplinary actions (see Table 5.6).

128

Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Deng Xiaoping," accessed November 28, 2011,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/157645/Deng-Xiaoping.
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To summarize, the analytical models presented here have been successful in explaining
the downward political mobility in general of Chinese regional leaders in post-Deng Chinese
politics. It is clearer that the center downgrades or removes its regional leaders with fairly
reasonable charges and accusations. Most regional leaders were removed in the name of justice
and the rule of law. It is now unusual for the center to remove or purge any of its regional leaders
without proper excuses and strong evidence of the leader’s wrongdoing. Although there could be
political reasons and private motivations for the top leaders to reshuffle a local government and
its leaders, they would take pains to make the whole process look normal.
Moreover, involvement in serious corruption and illegal activities are the most
frequently used accusations by the center to remove or rectify its regional leaders. And these
charges never fail to work as the entire bureaucracy has been corrupt due to the rent-seeking
authoritarian regime-controlled market economy.
B. Geopolitical Preferences and Chinese Regional Leaders’ Political Resilience
By all means, the reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping when he became the actual leader
of China in the late 1970s has by far brought tremendous changes to Chinese society and the
state. In fact, Deng’s original reformist plans not only included economic transformation to
market economy, but also included a rich bundle of political reforms to the CCP. He pushed
these reforms even though he was reportedly to have despised “Western-styled” parliamentary
democracy as an unacceptable institutional choice for the Chinese state. However, there have
been newer but trickier problems confronting the CCP after Deng’s retreat from public politics
and his eventual death in 1997.
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The decentralized market and export-led economic growth over the last three decades
have caused a visible decline of the CCP’s centralized authority, and an enormous developmental
gap between the more industrialized coastal regions of China and the less developed Midwest.
The inklings of the problem were actually foreseen by Deng himself, but he seemed to be too
optimistic about the situation to leave the party any specific instructions for the future. Gradually,
the disparity between China’s economic reform and its political transition has started showing its
significant negative side. Not only is the future of Chinese people’s livelihood now hijacked by
the rumors of a potential collapse of the state-orchestrated economic growth, but also those
economically advanced regions of China are corrupting the regime by taking advantages of it.
Up to now the study has revealed many important patterns of Chinese regional leaders’
career movements, and it is now quite clear that different regions, due to their geographic and
socioeconomic differences, occupy different levels of political importance to the center.
Naturally, these regions are able to influence the center’s political moves as well by rearranging
the settings of regional political systems and their elites. The elites’ performances and the
center’s preferences for the regions they lead combine to determine the opportunities the elites
receive for further political advancement.
Furthermore, it has been hypothesized that compared to the rest of the regional leaders
in post-Deng’s China, regional leaders who head the economically advanced regions of China
have more resilience facing the center’s discipline over the leaders’ corruption and other
unlawful violations. As demonstrated in the first part of the chapter, regional leaders from the
less developed regions of China are more likely to be demoted and dismissed when their
wrongdoings are discovered by the center. On one hand, it could be true that in the less
developed regions of China, their socioeconomic development is more dependent on the
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governments’ strength and determination to modernize. In a way, the bigger role the local
government plays in the economy, the more wrongdoing opportunities the regional leaders might
encounter as they are given more power with less control. On the other hand, it can be more
realistic to reason that in less developed regions of China, the relatively less political importance
the regional leaders have exposes them to greater danger of being punished by the center for their
corrupt or unlawful activities.

Based on the findings in previous parts of this study, longer years in regional
leadership services contribute to a regional leader’s upward political mobility (getting promoted);
and constitutionally, a provincial leader in China can serve only two 5-year terms up to 10 years
total. A city leader can also serve two terms of 5 years each, up to 10 years of services in the
same post. The analysis of the data on Chinese regional leaders show that on average, provincial
leaders in China serve 5 years before they receive other occupational options granted by the
center; and city leaders serve 4.3 years in average before they move forward to other positions
(both results are shown in Table 4.11).
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Table 5.7 Regional Leaders of the City of Shenzhen and Their Post Changes
Year
1995
1998
2000
2001
2005
2005
2007
2010
Mean

Name
Li Zibin
Zhang Gaoli
Yu Youjun
Huang Liman
Xu Zongheng
Li Hongzhong
Liu Yupu
Wang Rong
N/A

Post
Mayor
Secretary
Mayor
Secretary
Mayor
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
N/A

Length(Year)
5
3
3
4
4
2
3
1
3.1

Previous
Vice Minister
Vice Gov.
Provincial
City Dep. Sec.
City Dep. Sec.
Vice Gov.
Provincial
City Sec.
N/A

Location
Central
Guangdong
Guangdong
Shenzhen
Shenzhen
Guangdong
Guangdong
Suzhou
N/A

After
Minister
Gov.
Vice Gov.
Provincial NPC
Dismiss
Gov.
City NPC
N/A
N/A

Location2
Central
Shandong
Hunan
Guangdong
N/A
Hubei
Shenzhen
N/A

Change of Region
Y
Y
Y
N
N/A
Y
N
N/A

Source: Author’s Database
Table 5.8 Regional Leaders of the City of Suzhou and Their Post Changes
Year
1998
2000
2001
2002
2004
2008
2009
Mean

Name
Liang Baohua
Chen Deming
Yang Weize
Wang Min
Wang Rong
Yan Li
Jiang Kunhong
N/A

Post
Secretary
Secretary
Mayor
Secretary
Secretary
Mayor
Secretary
N/A

Length(Year)
2
2
3
2
5
3
2
2.7

Previous
Vice Gov.
City Dep. Sec.
Bureau Chief
Vice Gov.
Mayor
City Dep. Sec.
Mayor
N/A

Location
Jiangsu
Suzhou
Jiangsu
Jiangsu
Wuxi
Suzhou
Nanjing
N/A

Source: Author’s Database
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After
Gov.
Gov.
City Sec.
Gov.
Mayor
N/A
N/A
N/A

Location2
Jiangsu
Shaanxi
Wuxi
Jilin
Shenzhen
N/A

Change of Region
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N/A

Table 5.9 Regional Leaders of the City of Wenzhou and Their Post Changes
Year
1984
1984
1985
1988
1990
1990
1992
1996
1998
2002
2003
2004
2006
2008
2010
2010
Mean

Name
Yuan Fanglie
Lu Shengliang
Dong Chaocai
Liu Xirong
Chen Wenxian
Kong Xiangyou
Zhang Youyu
Qian Xingzhong
Jiang Jufeng
Li Qiang
Liu Qi
Wang Jianman
Shao Zhanwei
Zhao Yide
Chen Derong
Wu Weirong
N/A

Post
Secretary
Mayor
Secretary
Mayor
Mayor
Secretary
Secretary
Mayor
Secretary
Secretary
Mayor
Secretary
Mayor
Mayor
Secretary
Mayor
N/A

Length(Year)
1
4
5
2
6
2
6
7
4
2
3
4
2
3
1
1
3.3

Previous
Mayor
Vice Mayor
City Sec.
Provincial
Vice Mayor
Vice Mayor
Vice Mayor
Vice Mayor
Provincial
Mayor
City Dep. Sec.
City Dep. Sec.
Vice Mayor
City Dep. Sec.
Mayor
Mayor
N/A

Location
Zhejiang
Zhejiang
Zhejiang
Zhejiang
Zhejiang
Zhejiang
Wenzhou
Zhejiang
Zhejiang
Zhejiang
Zhejiang
Hangzhou
Ningbo
Wenzhou
Jiaxing
Jinhua
N/A

Source: Author’s Database
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After
Prov. Court
City NPC
Vice Gov.
Vice Gov.
State Business
Prov. NPC
Vice Gov.
Business
Vice Gov.
Prov. Dep. Sec.
City Sec.
Vice Gov.
Mayor
City Sec.
N/A
N/A
N/A

Location2
Hangzhou
Wenzhou
Hangzhou
Hangzhou
Hangzhou
Hangzhou
Hangzhou
Chengdu
Zhejiang
Ningbo
Hangzhou
Hangzhou
Quzhou
N/A

Change of Region
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
-

It is a reasonable outcome to observe that most Chinese regional leaders can tenure
their posts to finish their first term. Meanwhile, analysis in previous chapter shows that regional
leaders who receive demotions and dismissals were strongly associated with short years of
services. In other words, many demoted or dismissed regional leaders received the punishment
before they were able to finish their first term. The 352 observations made by the study have
shown the same pattern of downward political mobility (results are shown in Table 4.18). In
general, the common pattern we have found is: the longer a regional leader has served, the
greater the chance that the leader can be promoted. The shorter years a leader has served, the
greater the chance that the leader may be demoted. It is understandable that it would take some
time for the leaders to prove themselves to be qualified as the CCP center’s loyal servants.
However, it seems that Chinese regional leaders from the economically advanced
regions might have been able to change the rule of the game. The City of Shenzhen in
Guangdong Province, the City of Suzhou in Jiangsu Province, and the City of Wenzhou in
Zhejiang Province, are all located in more developed coastal provinces of China. All of them are
more industrialized cities in their own province, and all of them are considered outstanding
revenue generators to their provinces and the CCP center. As shown in Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9,
there are two smashing features that each of their leaders shared in common that deserve to be
noticed.
First, in average, city leaders in all the 3 cities had served much shorter tenures than the
national average of the regional leaders. Leaders of Shenzhen changed only every 3.1 years in
average (Table 5.7), leaders of Suzhou changed every 2.7 years in average (Table 5.8), and
leaders of Wenzhou changed every 3.3 years (Table 5.9). In other words, leaders in these 3 cities
move rapidly. Changing posts within short periods of time not only avoided demotions to the
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leaders of these cities, but also provided the majority of them with promotion opportunities that
many other Chinese regional leaders (especially the city leaders who are younger yet ranked
relatively lower) have been seeking for years.
Second, a great number of the leaders from the 3 cities experienced upward political
mobility from the tier of city leaders to the tier of provincial leaders. As has been pointed out in
previous parts of the study, among thousands of city leaders in China, only a small number are
fortunate enough to become provincial or ministerial leaders in the future of their political career.
Failure to be promoted to the provincial tier usually would not give a city leader any chance to
step up on the CCP’s Central Committee, the club of the senior Chinese officials, and very likely
the city leader will end up working in the municipal government until he retires. The ranking
barriers that haunt the lower-ranked Chinese regional leaders are considered the “bottle-neck” of
a political elite’s career. In other words, among the city leaders with similar educational
background, training and expertise, and career experience, some of them received promotions
earlier and more frequently, making them ranked higher in the political system of China. The rest
of them seem to be less mobilized and stuck with the posts and locations they have had. They
can, however, keep the privileges associated with regional political elites and some lower-ranked
posts can be considerably lucrative inside a regional government. Yet with less hope of getting
promoted to the upper tier of the political system, their career future is indeed gloomier than
those regional leaders who have broken through the bottle-neck of their career prospects.
It is important to remember that none of the three cities―Shenzhen, Suzhou, or
Wenzhou―is the capital city of their provinces, and that none of them is the most populous city
of the province in which they are located. The vital political importance they occupy on the
CCP’s map is due to their crucial function as some of the most important economic engines of
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industrial China. As rewards, after serving the center as its managers of regional economic
development and revenue creation, these city leaders can receive promotion opportunities that
are higher than the national average, elevating them into the provincial leaders’ club. Therefore,
serving as regional leaders at specific locations in China where the state’s economic and
financial lifelines are located can be the turning points for the regional leaders to successfully
break through the “bottle-necks” of upward political mobility.

To sum up, the elite sample examined in this study was randomly chosen. More typical
cases are the supersized Chinese cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, where their
municipal leaders are current Politburo members. With no biased preferences regarding any
region of China, this study argues that the impact of the locational, socioeconomic and
geopolitical settings of Chinese regional governments on the political mobility opportunities of
regional leaders must not be underestimated.
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Chinese
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Eastern
Chinese
Provinces

Figure 5.1 Political Mobility Patterns of Chinese Regional Leaders in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era
Legend: Straight arrows in orange show transfers of regional leaders among different regions and from the Communist Youth League to regional governments.
Straight arrows in blue and red show leader’s promotions and mobility from/to the CCP center. Curvy arrows show regional or central leaders’ movements to the
legislative branches of Chinese political system: the National People’s Congress systems and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference system.
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Type of Leader

Legend:
Thick
straight
arrows
show
patterns of
Higherranked
Regional
Leaders
and thin
curvy
arrows
show
patterns of
lowerranked
regional
leaders.
Both types
show the
likelihood
of the
results.

Type of Region

Higherranked
Regional
Leaders

Type of Accusations

Media Exposure

Corruption

High Revenue
Income Regions

Type of Final Punishment

Inner-Party Reprimand
and Introspection;
No Change of Posts
Reported
through
PartyState
Channels

Other
Violations

Demotion
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Income
Regions

LowerRanked
Regional
Leaders

Movements,
Disputes and
Stability Issues
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Resignation

CCP Membership Lost,
Jailed
or Death Sentence

Scandals

Figure 5.2 Patterns of Demotions and Dismissals of Chinese Regional Leaders in Post-Deng Xiaoping Era
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C. Conclusion: The Regime’s Configuration of the Regional Leaders’ Political Mobility
Among the classical studies of social and political elites whose ultimate fates were
concurrently associated with the regime, some scholars assert that there are a few important signs
that show the declining quality of the regime’s elites. They would initially appear to be softer
than before, showing others a more humane side. Yet they appear to be very greedy trying
everything to increase their “unlawful appropriations and to indulge in major usurpations of the
national patrimony.”129 It would be an ambiguous assertion to state that the Communist Party of
China as the ruling force of the country is a declining elitist party. The Chinese economy is
predictably moving forward and more and more Chinese people have improving lifestyles.
Meanwhile, to confront Pareto’s argument, the CCP party-state has not yet shown its
more humanly soft side. It is a government that is highly sensitive to external political
stimulation and to the Chinese people. It has also put up the world’s greatest Internet censorship
system to filter potential risks brought on by recent movements in the Middle East.130 Also,
prominent social activists who show resentment are considered as dissidents and are treated
harshly by the regime. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo and popular artist Ai Weiwei are
prime examples.131
The unyielding side the regime seems to be very determined to continue its single-party
rule of the country such that potential competitors are not likely to set their foothold in the
political arena. From the other side, Pareto’s assertion concludes that the systemic corruption of
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the entire bureaucracy has become the primary force that exposes the regime to the Chinese
people’s criticisms and discontentment.
As the study has revealed in this chapter, a great number of demoted or dismissed
Chinese regional leaders in recent decades were corrupt, accepting huge amounts of bribes. The
market economy as an institutional design chosen by Deng Xiaoping was supposed to enhance
competition and lawfulness in Chinese society. In fact, “the market economy with Chinese
characteristics” has increased the opportunities for governmental officials to abuse their power
by seeking lucrative personal gain from business and public investments.
On one hand, the center’s removal of officials with corruptions, unlawful violations,
scandals, and incompetence has shown the CCP center might be vigilant in disciplining its fallen
cadres, even sending some senior governmental leaders to prisons and executing others. This
shows that the center can respond to the people’s dissatisfaction toward the regime. On the other
hand, the massive scales of power-abusing, rent-seeking corruption and violations have shown
the great failure of the CCP’s management of its regional political elites. Given tremendous
amounts of social and economic privileges with respect and prestige, a regular city leader in
China should not be in desperate need of extra money as most of his proper private needs are
being supplied by the government at the taxpayers’ expenses. On the contrary, however, regional
leaders are turning their authority into various lucrative ways to maximize the personal gain by
usurping state investments and blackmailing businessmen. If the CCP center should be directly
responsible for its regional leaders’ wrongdoings, at the very least the center has failed to build
an efficient nationwide administrative system.

239

By comparing the patterns that have evolved over time, in this chapter has highlighted
the transitions and changes of career patterns giving regional leaders downward political
mobility. Unlike in Mao Zedong’s era, where regional leaders were dismissed mainly for
political reasons even though they violated no laws, in post-Deng’s Chinese politics, the CCP
center actually promotes and demotes its regional political elites for lawful administrative
reasons. Primarily, a regional leader will be removed or punished for his actual illegal
wrongdoing, not because of political accusations of being disloyal to the center. In fact, among
the cases observed in the study, almost all of the dismissed regional leaders who were later put
on trail pleaded guilty of their corruption and other violations. The majority of them accepted the
sentences without further appeals. Though these cases cannot prove that the center was always
correct with its accusations, at least it shows that the center’s accusations are somewhat
reasonable and evidence-based.
Finally, the findings point out that even among the demoted or dismissed regional
leaders, not all officials have been treated equally. The study shows that regional leaders from
the more developed parts of China seem to have more political resilience that they are more
likely to survive the center’s rectifications, are more likely to recover their careers after
punishment. Regional leaders who led in the important economic centers of China received faster
and higher upward political mobility opportunities than regional leaders from other regions of
China. The developmental gap among Chinese regions not only creates inequality of economic
growth, but also leads to political inequality among Chinese regional political elites.
Moreover, lower-ranked officials have been shown to be more likely to be exposed to
the danger of getting rectified by the center for their unlawful violations and management
failures. Executive posts such as vice mayors and vice governors who are in charge of operating
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governmental policies in certain fields are especially more likely to be removed for the mistakes
or accidents that directly involve these leaders. Therefore, another disparity of Chinese regional
politics is that party officials (regional secretaries, deputy secretaries, et hoc genus omne) are
ranked higher than governmental officials (governors, mayors, and their deputies) yet the party
officials are usually less responsible for the governments’ mistakes and management failures. All
being the employees of the CCP, it would a unilateral statement to assert that the center protects
the party officials more; but the relatively lower-ranked executive regional leaders are more
vulnerable for making the incorrect moves.
For example, the former provincial party secretary of Shanxi province, Mr. Zhang
Baoshun, was appointed the Secretary in 2005 from his vice governor post of the same province.
Later, from 2005 to early 2009, there came three different governors of Shanxi Province: Gov.
Yu Youjun (2005-07) was dismissed for the province’s rural brickkiln’s labor-abusing scandal;
Gov. Meng Xuenong (September 2007-September 2008) was forced to resign after the
province’s mining accidents and increasing death tolls among the miners; and Minister Wang
Jun (then Head of National Safety Inspection Division) was appointed as the Interim Governor
(September 2008-January 2009) to deal with the aftermath. Three different governors with little
working experiences in the province all took responsibility for the government’s mistakes, while
party Secretary Zhang Baoshun who had been vice governor of the province since 2001, was not
politically damaged at all by any of these unexpected events. When he finished his term as the
CCP Secretary of Shanxi, Mr. Zhang was transferred to Anhui Province, President Hu Jintao’s
hometown province and continued serving as the provincial party secretary.132
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The opacity of the regional political personnel arrangements of contemporary China not
only makes the outsiders feel puzzled by watching it, but also makes the incumbent political
actors face risky choices and sensitive subjects in policy-making decisions. A new term that
describes the tricky situations and interweaved personal feelings of being a governmental official
in China is luoguan (the Bare Officials). It refers to an official who has more or less secretive
behaviors, especially of the unlawful kind, has sent his wife or children abroad with large
amounts of cash. The possessions are the official gained through illegal means. Thus, once the
official is caught by the center for his wrongdoing, the official can either flee quickly by leaving
no worries behind, or go to prison by himself while his family members and properties remain
safe and sound in a foreign country.133
It is undoubtedly logical that a regime’s elites are configured by the regime and become
the agents of the regime that is greatly benefited by their effort to make the regime work. Elites
should maintain their loyalty to the regime that provides them with privileges. By studying the
demotions and dismissals of Chinese regional leaders in the post-Deng Xiaoping era we reach
the conclusion that the current party-state regime of China is struggling to manage all of its
regional elites, while the regional elites are also struggling to maintain their commitment to the
regime.
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CONCLUSIONS
“Mencius said to the king Xuan of Qi, ‘When the prince regards his ministers as his
hands and feet, his ministers regard their prince as their belly and heart; when he regards them
as his dogs and horses, they regard him as another man; when he regards them as the ground or
as grass, they regard him as a robber and an enemy.’”
――“Lilou, Book II,” Mencius (circa 4th Century BC)

Chinese regional leaders have occupied a role of undeniably remarkable importance in
the political history of China. Historically, Chinese regional political elites had traditionally
played crucial roles in industrializing and modernizing the nation. The famous yet failed SelfStrengthening Movement (1861-1895) of the late Qing Dynasty was initiated by some of the
most open-minded governors of the stumbling Manchu Empire, while the center government was
hesitant to make such moves for a very long time. 134 The direct effect of the failed effort of
modernization through decentralized commerce and regionalized industrialization was the
defeated Chinese naval forces in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895; the secondary effect which has
not been forgiven by many people of China until in the 21st century was the disabled regime of
the late Qing dynasty and its great negligence that failed the entire nation. By reviewing history,
many modern Chinese people seem to have more sympathy for the regional political leaders in
the late Qing dynasty’s social upheavals than to the regime itself. Yet, by all means, when the
last Chinese dynasty fell and was replaced by the Republic of China, the majority of its political
elites lost their privileges and retreated from the forefront of Chinese politics to their mostly
eremitic private lives.
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With the findings of the study, we are certain to conclude at this stage that it is the
particular type of regime that creates particular types of political elites (and socioeconomic elites
as well) who in return work for the regime to make sure that the regime keeps functioning. In
contemporary Chinese politics, Chinese regional leaders are protégés and agents of the partystate regime who continuously get rewarded by the party in financial terms and in sociopolitical
privileges. Overall, as in many other meritocracies found in world politics, the three most
important parts of Chinese politics are the central government, the elites, the people; the
interactions among them have reframed and reshaped the regimes in different time periods.
A. The People: Judging the Regime by Its Elites
Scholars and China watchers have noticed the evolving adaptions the CCP has made
through the years since the end of the Cultural Revolution and especially the great economic
changes brought by the post 1978 reform. In fact, the adaptions the CCP has made were not due
solely to its internal party demand of self-improvement, but were due to the even greater changes
taking places in Chinese society. The transition of the CCP from a highly centralized totalitarian
Leninist party to a pro-business, post-totalitarian authoritarian political party has been pushed by
the changing Chinese society which “has become far more plural, fluid, and dynamic, and the
way in which it is governed needs to reflect that reality.” 135 The traditional point of view, which
used to be held by the majority of Chinese people until the Maoist years of Chinese political
history, that the state and the government that runs it represent the ultimate secular authority is
gradually declining because of the rise of economic individualism and the popular demand for
the rule of law to replace absolute obedience to the state and the government. The CCP and its
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regional political leaders are adopting changes to their agenda in order to achieve more efficient
governance of the people and the country.
The study has revealed that the CCP center has been using highly complicated but
carefully designed models in selecting capable cadres to operate the party-state’s nationwide
regional governments ever since the establishment of the People’s Republic. We have found that
in the past 60 years as the regime matures from an isolated revolutionary party to the dominant
political force of a country of 1.4 billion, its regional leaders have also become much more
educated, more professionalized, more open-minded (in adapting to globalization and dynamic
changes in world economy and politics), more managerially skilled (in attracting foreign
investments and promoting local economic growth), and more technocratic in terms of relying on
solving problems and less on charisma in gaining popularity from the voters. In other words,
compared to early revolutionary veterans appointed as regional leaders, contemporary Chinese
regional leaders are more technically trained for the administrative professions as regional
leaders. The people of China are the direct forces that push the CCP to adjust its way of
organizing its regional political leadership. Only when the Chinese people’s livelihood is being
improved can the people accept the regime as the legitimate authority or so-called government.
Without fundamental progress in transforming the regional governments above and
beyond reshuffling their leaders, the people of China would not view their regional leaders as
their lawful and rightful representatives but rather as the agents of the center. As highlighted in
the study, governing a Chinese province with tens of millions of residents brings no less
governance-related issues and administrative challenges than governing a medium-sized country
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of the world.136 The center relies on its provincial leaders to represent its authority while the
provincial government relies on its municipal and county-level governmental branches and their
principals to govern the locales. As a result, most Chinese do not encounter their mayors or
governors in their daily lives (and many are not aware of regional governmental leadership
reshuffles), not to mention powerful central leaders such as CC members, Politburo members or
someone even more superior. It is the lower-ranked officials who interact with the people the
most; and it is most often the case that a citizen would be mistreated by a local authority with
relatively low ranking in the bureaucracy who often lacks the accomplishment or sophistication
one may find from a higher-ranked CCP cadre. However, when people feel mistreated and
abused by authority, they sometimes do not associate their dissatisfactions with their local
officials who are lower-ranked or non-ranked governmental employees, but with the entire partystate regime and its gigantic nation-wide bureaucracy. 137 Administratively, the CCP center
controls its regional agents through party discipline, organizational means (mobility whips), and
ideological propaganda (mind control). It is hardly true (or practically possible) that each and
every local governmental policy comes directly from the Chinese central government.
Nevertheless, when any of the local officials’ wrongdoings causes popular discontent, they
forward their dissatisfaction to the upper level of the government as most people consider the
authority of the central organs to be responsible for the aftermath. In other words, lacking of
136

France, the United Kingdom and Italy each has population of more than 60 million (retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population), while there are currently 9 provinces in China each
has population of at least 60 million (retrieved from http://www.chinaquhua.cn/list/renkou_list.html).
137
In a recent land dispute protest involving a suspicious death of a villager, the villagers of Wukan, Guangdong
Province showed their strong distrusts over their municipal and provincial authorities, even if administratively the
village is the lowest and smallest unit with political superstructure. Pictures of reports show the villagers using
banners with slogans such as “The CCP Center Save Us” written on. See Andrew Jacobs (2011, December 15).
“Provincial Chinese Officials Seek to End Village Revolt,” The New York Times, retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/world/asia/local-chinese-officials-seek-to-end-villagerevolt.html?_r=1&ref=asia. And also in Martin Patience (2011, December 15). “China’s Wukan Village Stands up
for Land Rights,” BBC News, retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-16205654. Both articles
were accessed on December 16, 2011.

246

transparency and openness, the CCP center’s control over its regional political leaders through its
cadre policy does not concern most Chinese people. If the complaints do not bring better
governance or people’s life-improvements it would be equally disappointing to the people as
there were no change at all. The use of political mobility as the center’s powerful organizational
weapon must be associated with realistic issues of people’s lives in order to generate more ruling
legitimacy for the party-state regime. Otherwise, the people consider themselves as outsiders and
in the situation of “taxation without representation” which not only increase their distrusts to
their regional leaders but also of the CCP central authority.
Fundamentally a regime must root itself into its people to survive any possible
turbulence and crisis, and it seems to be common sense that a regime and its elites should have
perceived. When all is said and done, the improvement of governance and the degree of the
Chinese people’s satisfactions toward the regime must be considered seriously by the CCP center
and its regional leaders. A complicated system of arranging regional governments may work to
provide temporary solutions, but it is far from being a satisfactory solution to the people’s
legitimate political demands. “The urban middle class wants national dignity, a sense of progress,
a national purpose, and the opportunity for fulfillment through participation in the overall
reconstruction of society.” 138 Political modernization, following the economic development
brought on by the regime, has its own definition of a “good life.” It is the sort of change that has
never existed before that these people want to occur; and they surely would not stop asking when
only a few of their regional governmental heads had been demoted by the center. The task of
maintaining the current system of rule requires the CCP to make changes: they might not be
fundamental changes at this stage, but they must be effective changes that really work and are
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compatible with China’s socioeconomic development and status as a rising great power in the
world.
B. The Elites: between the Regime and the People
This study focused exclusively on Chinese regional leaders’ political mobility by
tracking their career movements over the decades since the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China. Two of the most important findings presented in this study are: first, the CCP
center has eventually adapted a much more normalized and institutionalized means of
determining its regional elites’ career future; and second, while being a part of the larger political
elite in contemporary China, regional leaders of China have been treated significantly differently
due to the geopolitical and socioeconomic characteristics of the regions.
The party-state government in China has created politically and socially privileged
groups of Chinese regional leaders since the establishment of the People’s Republic. It is the
regime which grants certain privileges to its political elites, and in return the elites are expected
to maintain and defend the regime in order to keep themselves privileged. We have found that
from Mao era to the post-Deng era, the majority of top Chinese leaders (the Central Committee
members and its Politburo members as the ultimate decision-makers of the country) have more
or less regional leading experience, especially those who were promoted since the economic
reforms of the late 1970s. It indicates that some regional leaders of China are potentially going to
be the leaders of the country someday; and being an important regional governmental head may
be a stepping stone to the central leadership. This practice of the CCP center, as it has become a
more institutionalized process, compels leaders in China’s regional governments to compete
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(with each other) for the limited seats on the CC, and requires that one must be much more
aggressive with greater strategic plans to fight for Politburo membership.
In consequence, under a regime where even a CC member (as they are already higher
than being a regular provincial leader) still does not have full access to the top decision-making
tier, and where an alternate CC member does not even have voting rights of the center’s
decisions, the informal connections and resource-seeking communications among leaders play a
crucial role in determining a leader’s career future and one’s use of power. In other words, when
most leaders want to progress upward in the hierarchical system despite there being no
formalized procedure to follow, the informal ways of getting promoted shall dominate the “highend” part of Chinese politics. Presumably, it will also create a tremendous amount of space and
opportunities for factional politics and informal networks among Chinese political elites. Before
it is released to the public, personnel decisions in Chinese politics are notably marked by rumors,
mysteries, opacities, suspicions, and sometimes schemes, plots and distrust. There is no doubt
that regional leaders and other political elites will be hurt by the highly unofficial ways of
competition as they are dealing with uncertainties that even a professional politician cannot
predict; yet eventually the efficiency and quality of the regime will be greatly weakened by its
own imperfect mechanism of selecting leaders as its elites are afraid of the uncertain outcomes.
By all means, being haunted by the rumors about leadership successions is no positive help for
any government to continue its effort of making its policies work.
The delicate position of Chinese regional leaders, as being specially arranged by the
party, makes them a medium between the CCP center and the Chinese people. In principle, the
regional leaders are supposed to govern the people with the center’s institutions while expressing
the people’s needs and sentiments to the center. Historically, the initiation of Deng Xiaoping’s
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reformist ideas involved a series of decentralizing agricultural economy recovery plans carried
out in a few selected provinces of China on an experimental basis.139 And those regional leaders
who were bold in carrying out the reformist policies received central leadership posts as
rewards.140 Yet, when the center over-emphasizes regional economic development as a
measurement of its regional leaders it might generate unexpected problems. Because the fiscal
and locational preferences of the CCP center factors into the promoting or demoting Chinese
regional leaders, it actually makes those Chinese regional leaders who possess no geopolitical
advantages or are without informal or fractional connections with top political figures of China
almost excluded from further significant promotions. Having been treated differently, these
regional elites’ behaviors viewed as acting against the center’s commands seem to be of some
kind of explainable self-centeredness. If getting promoted from one’s leadership post is unlikely
or with limited possibilities, one might think more about turning one’s post into profit by
utilizing the governmental resources to make money in business through businessmen who are
seeking such opportunities. As a result,
“corruption discourse during the reform era is more diffuse and less politicized than was
the case during these three time periods and relies more heavily on the language of the
market than on political categories defined by the state. The images of political
corruption that predominate in reform-era tabloids are frequently intermingled with lurid
descriptions of criminal and deviant sexual behavior, and offer very little by way of
political analysis as to possible causes or potential cures. As the state has receded to make
room for market forces, corruption discourse itself has become commodified, eschewing
the categories of class and status, and caters to a new set of manufactured popular
desires. ” 141
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Furthermore, when getting promotions becomes a mixed outcome of a regional
leader’s performance, the center’s preference and the impact of informal connections with
central leaders, it means that simply being a capable regional leader is not enough to ensure
further promotion in this regional leader’s political career. Such a practical concern will make
the regional leaders put much less weight on promoting their local people’s livelihood and
socioeconomic development, and much more weight on getting connected with central leaders
and having more publicity and fame. This study has found that regional leaders who work in the
more developed regions of China get more opportunities for promotion; some of them get
promoted much more quickly than leaders of other regions. After serving in these developed
regions, these leaders either got promoted to the center or remained in the same region with
higher posts: they rarely get transferred to the underdeveloped parts of the country where good
governance can be more difficult to achieve due to the dearth of resources available. Thus, some
Chinese regional leaders have all the advantages with outstanding career successes while some
others have no such advantages.
Moreover, this study’s finding that the higher-ranked regional leaders receive more
protections of the center than the lower-ranked officials is a further reflection of the systemic
bias that exposes the lower-ranked regional elites to the punishments that they may not have
deserved. This study finds that accusations of corruption are frequently used by the CCP center
to drag the fallen regional leaders down from their posts. Nevertheless, there are preferable
patterns where the downgraded elites have not all been treated equally. If the elites are to be
rewarded equally by the regime, they should be punished equally as well. Otherwise not only the
accomplishments of the center would be reduced (or become excessively costly to achieve), its
elites would also be turned away due to the inequality which even exists at the very nature of the
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political mobility mechanism. Gradually, the effort to “promote administrative redesigns that
enhance the sinews of governance and provide the foundations for a regulatory state,”142 which is
supposed to be made by both the regime and its leaders of regional governments, would be
achieved at much higher costs with many setbacks.
The achievements of the regional governments that get little attention from the center
may not have themselves availed properly by the party, and as the size of the bureaucracy is so
gigantic that such cases can be unavoidable and more common than people have estimated. It
surely is the misfortune of those regional leaders with great ambitions and a great loss to the
regime that good governance can be achieved in more efficient ways. As has been emphasized
multiple times in this study, the elites are viewed collectively by the outsiders yet they are
actually very different from each other; it should be the regime that remains sensitive to the fact.
Each and every elite of the regime should be treated equally with trust and respect that they
deserve.
C. The Regime: Ruling the People with the Elites
By all means, the party-state system dominated by the Communist Party of China is a
powerful regime run by professionals. The CCP has been paying close attention to the political
arenas it is in, both domestic and international. The party and its center have been facing all sorts
of challenges and tensions, and have understood the importance of adapting to these challenges.
The collapse of the Soviet Union played a crucial role in making the CCP understand world
politics better; despite the ideological constraints it carried at that time. With Deng Xiaoping’s
insistence, the reform carried on without the disturbance from the more conservative CCP
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leaders.143 Deng and other reformist Chinese leaders had realized that the way for the CCP to
survive a political earthquake such as the collapse of the Soviet Union was not to halt the
marketization but to expand it and deepen it. The conclusion they reached was that the ruling
legitimacy of the CCP only exists in making the Chinese people happy. “To abandon the path of
reform and opening now in favour of ideological orthodoxy would only lead the CCP, and China,
to catastrophe of the sort befalling the CPSU and the USSR.” 144 Thus, the direction of further
political change in China should start by reforming its regional governments and their leaders.
It seems that the nature of Chinese politics has hardly changed for the past two
centuries and that the center of political power has always strictly controlled its regional
governmental heads, rewarding the best performers among them with opportunities of higher
promotions and greater prestige. Regional elites have had to be both capable and intelligent in
tackling the central government’s tasks efficiently while their ways of handling the regional
governments must be acceptable and appropriate from the center’s point of view. However,
much the intrinsic mechanism may have remained the same, the external world has changed
almost fundamentally. Today’s world politics and the dynamic changes in Chinese society have
left little time for the regime and its elites to think thoroughly before they react. As a matter of
fact, the conventional model where the center commands and rearranges its regional political
elites in order to achieve its notion of good governance under the center’s authority is facing
potent challenges from both domestic and international sources. “This may help to improve the
party’s popular legitimacy in the near term, but over the longer term more competitive dynamics
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need to be introduced into the system.”145 The authority of the CCP center is being threatened,
though in a gradual way, by other governments of the world, by the citizens of China with
modernized political demands, and most important of all, by the CCP’s regional leaders as even
the elites of the regime have started making plans for themselves.
By controlling the political mobility of its regional leaders, the CCP center has
unmistakable advantages in governing the party and the state with remarkable efficiency.
Especially when the socialist market economy requires more decentralized and regionalized
policies to adapt to the regional characteristics of China, by controlling the outputs (personnel
system, GDP growth and revenues), instead of the inputs (investments and labor policies) of the
regional political economy, it surely is a progressive way of making the regime work at lower
costs. However, since the “economic decentralization has led to the feudalization of
administrative power, and the power monopoly of the party has become the personal power
monopoly of each chief administrator,” 146 one of the consequential outcomes is that the party
uses the political mobility whip to balance the regional economic dominance and the center’s
organizational authority. In consequence, sustained economic growth relies on the developed
regions of China, but by controlling the regional leaders’ career movements the center can be
assured that these regions will not challenge the center’s dominance by deepening the economic
decentralization.
Furthermore, by granting capable elites with upward mobility or transferring them to
the more developed regions of China (as these regions are also more politically important), and
by demoting or removing elites who failed to meet the center’s expectations, the center tries to
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maintain its ruling authority by showing its regional leaders its “just” and “mighty” sides.
However, with uprising people’s movements, mishandling of accidents and land disputes
protests all pointing to China’s regional governments, it is doubtful that such a system will in
fact increase the central government’s accountability (which actually matters the most to the
regional leaders), and the continuity of its policies. As the lower-ranked regional leaders and
leaders from less developed parts of the country get punished more frequently and harshly than
those more powerful and higher-ranked leaders in the developed provinces, the accountability of
the center’s personnel system might eventually decline in the eyes of its regional leaders.
Moreover, when corrupt elites start to flee with all of their unlawful gains, gradually the people
will lower their respect for the entire regime and do the same things that those corrupt officials
have already been doing.
Regional leaders are essential to the regime; the center’s effective control of the
Chinese people comes from its effective control of regional leaders. To increase the
accountability of the regime, the center must use more effective methods of managing its elites in
order to achieve better governance with more credibility. Although punishments after crimes
sounds like a solution, it might be more efficient to prevent crimes from happening in the first
place. Since corrupt activities among Chinese regional leaders are more and more common and
reach deeper and deeper degrees, perhaps it is the time for the center to rethink and modify its
current system of mobility control over its regional leaders. All the arrangements of Chinese
regional governance enacted by the center function to maintain the CCP’s ruling legitimacy;
however, the satisfaction of the Chinese people must be treated by the center with at least as
much importance as the center handles its regional political leaders. Otherwise the control of the
regional leaders’ political mobility will bring only temporary peace to regional politics but no
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help to the regime in the long run. Aside from the improvement of local governance as a longterm goal for Chinese regional leaders to achieve, the accountability and accessibility of the
regional governments in China can be achieved in a much shorter time with much lower costs by
involving the regional elites. Numerable institutions have been set up to improve government
work and to prevent possible official corruption. Furthermore, technology can also play a more
crucial role than building up the “Great Fire Wall” by filtering politically sensitive information
on the Internet. Some scholars argue that Chinese local governments have not been governing
with transparency and dedication; the accessibility issue (of the governments’ websites) should
be treated as a very important part of the continued development of e-government in China. 147
The cost of keeping the communicating channel open is presumably much lower than making
any systemic regime changes.
Punishing its fallen corrupt regional leaders through lawful means is indeed a
positive step taken by the CCP and when the center realizes the importance to maintain a good
image, the rule of law will have a higher level of authority than any other institution of the
regime. 148 When the regional leaders of China today are being demoted or dismissed for their
wrongdoings, the center is making use of the law. It is remarkably different from the Mao and
Deng eras of Chinese politics when the rule of law sometimes could not be applied to the central
leaders of the CCP; yet the center must not forget that it must obey the laws itself even if it is the
ultimate decision-maker of the regime. Political development, as important as economic
development, must be achieved by the government in order to meet the Chinese people’s
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expectation for good governance. Among the essential elements of good governance: “a good
legal system, clean and honest officials, high administrative efficiency, and good administrative
services,” 149 it is the government that is responsible for bringing the people good livelihoods
under the rule of law. When it comes to the rule of law, as it is most closely associated with good
governance under many post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes, no single element of the party of
the three (the people, the elites, and the regime) shall make itself exceptionally more powerful
than the others.
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APPENDIX I: ABBREVIATIONS
CCP

Chinese Communist Party (or The Communist Party of China)

CPPCC

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

GOV

Governor

NPC

National People’s Congress

SEC

Secretary of CCP Regional Committee (Provincial or Municipal)

SEZ

Special Economic Zone
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APPENDIX II: OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED CCP PERSONNEL ARRAANGEMENT

(Screenshot taken from http://cpc.people.com.cn)
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APPENDIX III: A SAMPLE OF A REGIONAL LEADER’S OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHY

(Screenshot taken from http://www.people.com.cn)
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APPENDIX IV: SCREENSHOT OF A PROVINCIAL BUREAU OF LETTERS AND VISIT
ONLINE REPORTING WEBHOST

(For Reporting and Accusing Governmental Employees for Unlawful Violations)
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APPENDIX V: OFFICIAL REPORT OF OFFICIAL WITH UNLAWFUL VIOLATION

[Screenshot taken from Xinhua News Agency (2012, February 12)
http://news.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2012-02/08/c_122671868.htm]
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